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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the 
diplomacy of the middle first millennium B.C. Near East, a 
subject which has received less scholarly attention than the 
diplomacy of earlier periods of near eastern history. It falls 
Into two parts : Part I is concerned with the diplomacy of the 
Assyrian Kings from c7E>0 - 630 B.C. and, to a lesser extent, of 
the neo-Babylonian dynasty c620 - £i|.0 B.C. Cuneiform documents, 
in particular the royal inscriptions and administrative archives 
of neo-Assyria furnish most of the evidence for this part.
Part II investigates the diplomacy of the Persian Kings with 
the Greeks c£50 - c360 B.C. and is based on almost exclusively 
classical sources.
The aim is to Isolate and analyse significant aspects of 
diplomatic theory and practice in Assyria and then to study 
Persian diplomacy In the light of these findings. By th is method 
it Is possible to establish whether there were elements of 
continuity in diplomacy from the Assyrian to the Persian 
period and- whether a more reliable view of Persian diplomacy, 
which has up to now been studied in the context of Greek rather 
than near eastern diplomacy, can be achieved.
Part I, by analysis of selected events in their historical 
context and by discussion of important diplomatic terminology, 
establishes for the first time some Important aspects of 
Assyrian diplomacy Including :
i) the emphasis on the subordination of foreign rulers 
to Assyria and the concomitant reluctance to concede parity- 
status,
li) the conflict between this political ideology and 
the exigencies of diplomacy,
iii) the distinction between 'friendly* and 'hostile' 
states with no intermediate 'neutral' category.
In Part II Persian diplomacy is shown to reflect several 
features of Assyrian diplomacy, particularly the conflict 
between ideology and the requirements of practical diplomacy 
with the Greeks whose political ideas were markedly different.
Acknowl ed^ement s
I am grateful to Mr. J.D. Hawkins for his criticisms 
of chapter 1 of Part I, to Dr. M.J. Seller for suggestions on 
the decipherment of some of the cuneiform texts, to 
Dr. D.M. Lewis for advice on chapters 2 and 3 of Part II and 
to Professor F.G.B. Millar for comments on several chapters 
in Part II. I am particularly indebted to Professor D.J. Wiseman 
for his patient and painstaking superintendence of the vhole 
of the thesis. To Dr. J.A. North I owe a debt of gratitude 
for his critical supervision of Part II and for his support 
throughout.
I am beholden to the following for their kindness and 
several contributions during the research and writing of 
the thesis : Ali Yaseen Ahmad, David Baker, Morven Baker,
Tom Forbes, Diana Driscoll, Sandy Littman, Sue Rollin,
Michele Vance, and to one other 1suorum memor, suae negligens1.
-  k ' -
• Contents ,
Introduction ^
Part I Diplomatic contacts of Assyria and Babylonia
with their neighbours, 8th - 6 th centuries B.C.
Chap. 1 Diplomatic contacts of Assyria with 
Anatolia
a) Muski
b ) Lydia
c) Urartu%
Chap. 2 Diplomatic contacts of Assyria with the 
East
a) Elam c670 - c6i|.0 B.C.
I) Ur taku
II) Teumman 
III) Indabigas
b) Zagros tribes, Medes, Persians and 
Mannaea
i) Sargon 
11) Esarhaddon 
III) Ashurbanipal
Appendices
I. Terminology of diplomacy
a ) sulummu
b) salmu
c) tabu and its derivatives
II. Foreign Diplomats in late neo-Assyria
Part II Diplomatic contacts of Persia with Greece,
6 th - lj.th centuries B.C.
Chap. 1 . Diplomatic contacts before c510 B.C.
Chap. 2 Persia’s diplomatic contacts with Athens 
c 510 - 1|.79 B.C.
i) c5 1 0
ii) c50^
iii) cl|91
iv) clj.79
6
1 2
13
57
87
\87
101
1014-
117
• 1 2i|.
125
135
- 5 -
Chap. 3 
Chap. It
Chap. 5
Conclusions 
Abbreviatlons 
Bibliography
Persia1s diplomatic contacts with Greece, 
clj.65 - clj.20 B.C. 
i) cl+65
ii) CI4.2I4.
Persia’s diplomatic contacts with Greece 
clj.1 3 - c3 8 6
i) Negotiated settlements between 
Persia and Greece
Ii) Persia and the Implications of 
autonomy
Persia’s diplomatic contacts with Greece 
c392 - c362
i) The Effect of the Common Peaces on 
Persia
ii) Persia’s role in the Common Peaces 
of 3 8 6 - 362 
ill) Persia’s negotiations with Greece
1 5 2
167
193
213
222
226
Introduct ion
In this thesis diplomacy is defined as the peaceful 
management of International affairs by contacts between formal 
organs of state, Including heads of state and duly accredited 
representatives. Informal contacts, such as those between 
private individuals, the movement of nomadic groups and 
international trade are excluded except where they can be shown 
beyond question to reflect diplomatic theory or practice.
The thesis falls into two parts :
I) The diplomacy of the neo-Assyrian kings with their 
neighbours c750 - c630
II) the diplomacy of the Achaemenid kings of Persia with 
the Greeks c550 - c360.
For part I there is only one major source of evidence for 
diplomacy - the corpus of cuneiform Akkadian documents from the 
late neo-Assyrian period, especially the archives of Nimrud,
Nineveh and Assur. These can be divided into two major types :
i) royal Inscriptions
ii) letters and administrative documents .
Non-cuneiform sources have not been studied In detail with 
the result that Assyria’s relations with the West, and in 
particular, Israel and Judah, the evidence for which Is derived 
largely from the Hebrew Old Testament, are not included in the
o
thesis. This complex subject requires a separate study •
1• The interrelationship of these two types of source is discussed 
in chapter 1 ;
2 . Assyria’s relations with Israel and Judah have been studied 
by M. Cogan, Imperialism and Religion : Assyria, Judah and 
Israel in the"bth and ?th centuries B.C.E. (197h). Diplomatic 
Terminology In the Old Testament Is discussed with special 
reference to Assyrian diplomacy by D.J. Wiseman, VT (forthcoming); 
see also J.A. Thompson, VT 27 (1977) I] 75 - I4-8 I ;
Diplomacy in the ancient near east has been studied less 
tnan international law and first millennium diplomacy far less 
than that of the second millennium. Prom the earlier period 
there are more diplomatic documents, both letters and treaties, 
principally from Mari, Amarna, Boghazkoy and Ugarit, than from
the first millennium archives of Assyria. Even so apart from
3
a few major studies and some investigations of individual
topics^, less research has been devoted to diplomacy than
5
international law in the second millennium B.C. . In addition
research has been dominated by the study of treaty-form and
particularly its relevance to the Biblical covenants^. First
millennium treaties have benefited from this interest and to that
extent they have received more detailed research than diplomacy
7
in the same period .
It is therefore apparent that first millennium diplomacy 
has been seriously neglected either because of or despite the 
emphasis on second millennium diplomacy and requires more 
detailed research. Because the treaties of this period have
3. J.M. Munn-Rankin, Iraq 18 (1956) 68 - 110; V. Korosec, CRRA 
15 (ed. J-R. Kupper, Paris 1967) 139 - 150; M. Liverani, L1 Alba 
della Clvilta (ed. S. Moscati; Turin 1976) 378 - 3 8 9;
i|. Notably W.L. Moran, CBQ 25 (19 6 3 ) 77 - 87; id., JNES 22 (1963)
173 - 1 7 6; J. Nougayrol, Iraq 25 (1963) 110 - 123; V. frorosec,
Iraq 25 (1963) 159 - 166;"T7l. Holmes, JAOS 95 (1975) 376 - 381 ; 
eacU, Orient and Occident, essays ... C'.fl. Gordon (ed. H.A. Hoffner, 
Kevelaer 1973) 91 - 9U; G. Kestemont, Iraq 35 C ^ 977) 191 - 201 ;
C. Zaccagnini, Lo Scamblo del Donl nel vlclno Orlente ...
(Rome, 1973)
5. e.g. V. Korosec, Hethltlsche Staatsvertrage (Leipzig, 1931);
G. Kestemont, DDIA0 ;~J. Zlsklnd, Aspects o f International Law 
in the Ancient Near East (Univ. Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1968)7
W. Prieser, Archiv des Volksrechts h (195^) 257 - 288; G. Purlani,
I trattati internazionali dell’antichita Annuarlo dl dlrltto 
comparato e dl studl leglslatlvl 31 (1 9 5 5) 1 - 12;
6. K. Baltzer, The Covenant Formulary in Old Testament, Jewish 
and Early Christian :WritIngs (Oxford, 19?1): D.J. ticflarthy.
(2nd ec^  Rorae> 1 9 7 8); G. Mendenhall, Blb.Ar.
17 (195if) 54 “ 76; K.A. Kitchen, Ancient Orient and Old 
Testament (London, 1 9 6 6) 90 - 102"] J.A. Thompson, The Ancient 
Near Eastern Treaties and the Old Testament (London," "1'96^ );
M. Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Oxford.
1 9 7 2) 59 - 1£7!-------- -------- -------------------
7. See note 6 and V. Korosec, Romanltas 3 (1961 ) 261 - 277;
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already been studied intensively reference to them is made only
where it is relevant to the argument. Since, however, they form
an important part of the diplomatic process - which could not
be fully understood without some knowledge of the treaties - a
short outline of them is given here.
Prom the first millennium there are four extant neo-
0
Assyrian treaties from this period under discussion , an
g
earlier neo-Assyrian treaty (c825) and a treaty or series of
1 0treaties from west Syria written in Aramaic (c754) • All are
’ vassal-treaties1 i.e. terms drawn up by a suzerain and imposed
on a vassal or subject with seemingly no reference to the
11vassal’s opinions or wishes . The vassal swore to abide by the
stipulations in perpetuity on pain of punishment by the gods
named as guarantors of the treaty. The influence of religion on
and its interdependence with diplomacy is best illustrated in
12this aspect of the treaties • The most significant features of
the neo-Assyrian treaty were the unilateral imposition of its
1 ^terms and the complete subordination of the vassal .
8. i) A&Sur-nerari V and Mati’ilu of Arpad; E.F. Weidner,
AfO 8 (1932) 17 - 27; w. Schramm, EAK II 123f.;
ii) Esarhaddon and Ba’al of Tyre: E.F. Weidner, AfO 8 
(1932) 29 - 324.5 Borger, Ash., 107 - 109;
iii) Esarhaddon and Zagros rulers: Wiseman, VTE; R. Borger,
ZA 5U (1961 ) 173 - 196 and £7 (1961;) 261; I.J. GeTE, Bi.Or.
(1962) 159 - 162; -----
iv) Ashurbanipal and Qedar, K. Deller and S. Parpola,
Or.NS 37 (1968) I4.65. - 1;66;
9. SamSi-Adad V with Marduk-zakir-sumi I of Babylon: E.F. Weidner 
AfO 8 (1932) 27 - 29; W. Schramm, EAK II 109; Brinkman, PKB 201;; 
on all the neo-Assyrian treaties see McCarthy, op. cit Tn76)
106 - 121 ; ------
10. J.A. Fitzmyer, The Aramaic Inscriptions of Seflre (Rome, 1 9 6 7)
11. Wiseman, VTE 27f.;
12. J.R. Ziskind, Aspects of International Law in the Ancient 
Near East (Ph.D. Diss., Columbia U.; University Microfilms,
Ann Arbor, 1977) chap. 1;
13. McCarthy, op. cit. (n.6 ), 131 - 1 3 6;
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In part II Persia's diplomatic contacts with the Greeks, 
which began with the Persian conquest of Lydia (c5U7), are 
considered. After this initial contact a bi-lateral 
relationship developed between Persia on the one hand and on the 
other the numerous Greek city-states but this modus operand! 
was radically altered by the emergence of a third power in the 
Aegean area, Philip of Macedon (c355)» At the same time the 
attitude of the Greeks to Persia underwent an important change 
so that after c3&0 Persia's diplomacy was conducted in a 
political environment very different from that obtaining 
beforehand. In addition the lack of a detailed contemporary 
narrative history after 3&2, when Xenophon's history ends, is 
a serious obstacle to detailed analysis of Persian diplomacy • 
There Is no archive or corpus of evidence extant from 
the Achaemenid empire providing sufficient Information for 
a study of diplomacy1^. It is therefore necessary to rely 
on the works of classical authors, principally Herodotus, 
Thucydides and Xenophon, and Greek inscriptions. Since none 
of these sources was written from a Persian viewpoint they 
require critical evaluation if they are to provide reliable 
evidence of Persia's diplomatic theory and of its underlying 
assumptions. On the other hand they are unlikely to reflect
11;. R.T. Hallock, 'The Evidence of the Persepolis Tablets', 
Cambridge History of Iran vol. II (ed. I. Gershevitch, 1971 )
T - 31; see also Lewis, S & P chap. 1 for a study of the 
Persian court at this period. The evidence of the royal 
Inscriptions is negligible : R.G. Kent, Old Persian Grammar 
(New Haven, 1953), and the papyri from E!gypt preserve no details 
of diplomacy as such but are useful for the study of Persian 
administration : A.E. Cowley, Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth 
Century B.C. (Oxford, 1923), modern translations In P. Grelot, 
documents Arameens d'Egypte (Paris, 1972) 265 - 327;
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a pro-Persian, propagandist view of diplomacy with Greece 
such as official Persian sources would presumably have adopted.
In this respect the two parts of the thesis are in contrast : 
the first is derived almost exclusively from Assyrian sources 
of Assyrian diplomacy while in the second Persian diplomacy 
is studied on the basis of almost exclusively non-Persian 
sourc es.
The study of Greek diplomacy has recently benefited from
intensive systematic research and a synthesis of extant
1 5material has been achieved . However, this research has 
concentrated on diplomacy between the Greeks themselves and 
not on the less well recorded contacts with non-Greeks, 
especially Persia. This gap may be at least partially filled 
by Part II of the thesis.
In the light of the foregoing outline of the two parts,
the thesis aims to investigate diplomacy and to analyse not
only the most important elements in theory and practice but
also the underlying political ideology of both Assyria and
Persia. In addition to these two basic aims Persia* s relations
with Greece will be analysed with special reference to traditional
near eastern patterns of diplomacy, as outlined in the first
part of the thesis, in order to ascertain :
i) whether there was any continuity of diplomatic theory
1 8or practice from neo-Assyrian to Achaemenid times ,
15. Notably D.J. Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece 
(Historia Einz elschrif t , 22 ] T^TjT^nuET^JTir^co^
D.J. Mosley, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (London, 1975); also
D. Kienast i n ft E Suppi. 13 (1973) - 628 Presbeia;
16. The lack of detailed historical texts from the neo- 
Babylonian period renders a consideration of diplomacy in this 
period difficult. Prom the inscriptions of Nabonidus, especially 
the Ilarran stelae (C.J. Gadd, An. St. 8 (1958) 35 - 93)* there 
seems to be a close similarity between neo-Assyrian and neo- 
Babylonian diplomatic terminology and, given the inherent 
conservatism of diplomacy, it is unlikely that there should have 
been marked changes in either theory or practice;
- T i ­
ll) whether Persian diplomacy with Greece can be better
understood when set against its near eastern background, and
iii) whether this approach is valuable for a study of 
1 7Greek history
In part I of the thesis each significant theme is discussed 
in the context of a particular event or series of events, a 
more comprehensive view being achieved by introducing relevant 
evidence from other diplomatic incidents. Certain terminological 
themes require separate treatment and are included in appendices. 
In part II Persian diplomacy with the Greeks Is discussed in 
di&chronic order, with particular reference to historical and 
geographic setting.
This method of working is particularly beneficial In the 
first part because of the obscurity of some of the incidents 
and the lack of previous research on them.
It must be emphasised that neither part attempts a 
comprehensive survey of diplomacy since this would require two 
separate theses. Incidents have therefore been selected for 
study on three criteria :
i) the availability of evidence,
ii) the historical importance of the event,
III) the presence of a particular diplomatic theme.
17* Previous attempts to relate classical and near eastern 
international law: see E.J. Bickerman, AHDO 5 (1950/1) 133 - 156; 
J.F. Priest, JNES 23 (I9 6I4.) I4.8 - 56; and especially M. Weinfeld, 
JAQS 93 (1973) 1tt0 - 189; and UP 8 (1976) 379 -
Part I
Diplomatic contacts of Assyria and Babylonia 
with their neighbours, 8th - 6th centuries B.C.
- 1 i -
R.G. Evans
Diplomatic Contacts of Assyria with Anatolia 
(a) Muski
Direct diplomatic contacts between Sargon II of Assyria and Mita of
Muski are attested only between c711 and c709 B.C. in which time Mita opened
relations with Sargon and ultimately entered into a treaty-bound relationship
with him. Prior to these manoeuvres Mita had opposed Sargon either directly
or indirectly since 718 B.C. and the settlement was a major diplomatic coup
for Assyria. It is therefore instructive to set out the historical background
to the Assyro-Muskian diplomacy before considering the manoeuvres in detail.1
Sources for Sargon's dealings with Mita include not only royal inscriptions
and foundation deposits but also a letter from Nimrud which supplies invaluable
_ 2
information on the preliminaries to the negotiations with Mita.
i) Tiglath-pileser III campaigned vigourously in north Syria and 
succeeded in diminishing Urartian influence there and in the central 
southern Anatolian states. From the lists of tributaries ir. his inscriptions 
it can be seen that the majority of Syro-Hittite states owed their allegiance 
to Assyria at least from 738 B.C. and possibly earlier in some cases since 
the defeat of an Urartian army near Arpad and/or Kummuh in 743 B.C. altered
1. Sargon's military career: H. Tadmor, JCS 12 (1958) 22-40, 77-100; his
chronology is followed below; also Ph. H.J. Houwink Ten Cate, Luwian Population 
Groups (1965), 20-25;
2. Inscriptions in Lie, Winckler; also F.H. Weissbach: ZDMG 72 (1918) 176-
185; foundation-deposit prisms: C.J. Gadd: Iraq 16 (1954) 173-201 cf. Tadmor:
loc.cit.; Nimrud letter: ND 27S9: H.W.F. Saggs : Iraq 20 (1958) 182-187
revised by J.N. Postgate: Iraq 35 ( 197 3) 21--34;
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the balance of power in this area. Subsequently these kingdoms became 
Assyrian provinces one by one as their rulers offended Assyria by revolting 
openly or treating with her enemies in secret.
Muski is mentioned in a text from the "reign" of Sam?i-ilu, the turtan
_ V v V v V —of Adad-n#rari III, Salmaneser IV, Assur-dan III and Assur-nirari V, but this
4
is the only eighth century reference apart from those of the reign of Sargon.
It is therefore unusual that a country which had previously made very little
impact on Assyria should so suddenly attain such a position of influence
over north Syria and southern Anatolia.5 The decline of Urartian power in
this area must have left a vacuum into which Mita was able to insinuate
himself perhaps also at the expense of Assyria in Que (Cilicia).^
The first clash in which Sargon names Mita as a protagonist is the
campaign against Kiakki of Sinuhtu who had revolted from Assyria (718 B.C.).7
Mita's involvement in this revolt is indicated by the inclusion of his name
in the description of Kiakki's plot in the prisms but lacunae prevent further
v
discussion of his exact role. Sinuhtu lay in Tabal and Kiakki, who is once
referred to as king of Tabal, was an obvious target for Muskian advances
0
because of the proximity of the two lands.
3. The history of this period is conveniently summarised in J.D. Hawkins,
Iraq 36 (1974) 67-83 and RlA sub Hatti; 157ff; M. Weippert, ZDP« 89 (1973)
26-53;
4. F. Thureau-Dangin: Til-Barsib (Paris, 1936) 146, 10;
5. R.D. Barnett, An.St. 3 (1953) 91 but cf. J.D. Hawkins, Iraq 36 (1974)
72ff and An.St. 25 (1975) 152;
6. Lie 22, 125f; Gadd, loc.cit. 183, 37; 199, 21; these references may suggest
Muskian offensives in the reign of Salmaneser V or, less likely, late in
Tiglath-pileser Ill's reign. On Que: E. Forrer, Die Provinzeinteilung des
Assyrischen Reiches (Leipzig, 1921) 70ff;
7. Lie, 10, 68ff; Winckler, 102, 28ff; 170, 11; Gadd, loc.cit.: 180, 50ff;
v
8. Winckler, 170, 11; Sinuhtu: J. Lewy in Halil Edhem Hatira Kitabi (1947), 16;
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In the year following Kiakki's defeat Pisiri of Carchemish revolted
9and turned to Mita for assistance:
I , . . URU .v . - I . —
... Pisiri Gargamisayya m a  ade llani rabuti lbtima ana Mita
^ar ^^Vluski zerati KURAssurkl istappar (var: ispurma ilqa setutu)
"Pisiri of Carkhemish transgressed the treaty of the great gods and
sent (messages) hostile to Assyria to Mita of Muski (treating it with
contempt)
w  —  V  —  #
Sargon uses zerati saparu to describe the sending of treasonable
and hostile messages by a vassal in an attempt to rally support from
10 v_ _ a
neighbouring kings. The coupling of this idiom with setutu lequ (to show
contempt) suggests that these were messages of an abusive nature which the
Assyrians found distasteful.11 They were not messages giving warning of
hostilities - a declaration of war - but verbal attacks on Assyria. Similar
instances of insolent messages are found in the inscriptions of Esarhaddon
and Ashurbanipal where stress is laid on the rude effrontery of the content
of the messages. In one case an embassy from Elam was exhibited to Urartian
envoys and the insolent message itself was explicitly included in this 
12
exhibition. Although in the case of Pisiri an agreement (adu) with Assyria 
was already in force, the sending of insolent messages was regarded with equal
13
displeasure even when sent by independent kings. It is therefore likely
that Pisiri's breach of the treaty was his canvassing of neighbours for support
since if Assyria condemned such abuse in independent rulers she probably
14
attempted in treaties with her vassals to prevent similar actions.
9. Lie: 10, 72f & n. 13;
10. Lie: 11, 73j 34, 208 & A.T. Olmstead, AJSL 47 (1931) 268; 40, 251; 
Gadd, loc.cit: 183, 51;
11. Esarhaddon's usage of apalu zerati conforms with this: Ash: 58, 27;
57, 3; 106, 30;
12. Further discussion p. 6I| ; AS5 62, 97; 72, 60; 64, 25; 78, 59; also 
CAD M: nierefrtu;
13. note 11;
14. Cf. VTE lines 73ff;
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Pisiri's appeal to Mita throws light on the loyalty of the south
Anatolian states tributary to Assyria. Carchemish had no common border
with Muski and communication between them had to cross two states allied
to Assyria, either Que and Sam'al or Tabal and Gurgum. It can be inferred
that the loyalty of those states to Assyria was not so strong as to prevent
the passage through their territory of messages hostile to Sargon. Equally,
if MitSi had sent military aid to Pisiri it would have had to cross these
states and Pisiri's appeal shows that he believed that the sending of such aid
would be practicable, an even stronger indication of the potential hostility
of the states to Assyria. Pisiri's appeal is also an index of Mita's
prestige and the corresponding fall in status of Urartu. Sargon's campaign
against Mita in the next campaign supports the belief that Mita was now
Assyria's most powerful opponent in the north-west.
The account of the seventh campaign in the annals can be supplemented
15by the prisms from Nimrud and the Cylinder Inscription. The annals are
broken at this point but it is clear that Sargon campaigned in Que and
16recovered two cities which Mita had taken previously. There then follows 
an account of the defeat and submission of various tribes and rulers of 
southern Palestine and the Arabian desert before the annals resume the account 
of affairs in Anatolia.
15. Annals: Lie: 20ff, 117-126; cf. Olmstead: loc.cit: 266; Cylinder 
Inscription: F.E. Peiser in _KB II (1890, ed. E. Schrader) 38ff; Prisms: 
Gadd, loc.cit< I99f, 20-21;
16. Forrer: op.cit: 71f restored the name of a third city but no other
text refers to another and URUhal$e would be more in accordance with their
evidence. However the traces on this line do not justify the emendation
(Lie: 20, 120).
- 17 -
V I, - . — V KUR ... — . V V. . . V ysa Mita sar Muski ina nagisu rap/si? adi ?-su tafrta/su askunnva
URU URU, V  . V  URU _ KUR v -
Harrua Usnams halge Que sa ultu ume ruquti ina danani ekimu
v vv
asrussun uterra (Lie; 22, 125f;)
"As for Mita king of Muski I accomplished his /defeat twice?/ in
• V  Vhis wide territory. Harrua and Usnanis,forts of Que,which he had taken by 
force in distant days I restored to their place."
17The lacuna may be filled confidently be referring to Winckler's 
18and Botta's copy of this line and Gadd's parallel text in the Nimrud
. . . .prism. Assyrian activity in Que during the seventh campaign was, therefore,
in two phases: the first of these conquered the two cities and plundered
them while the second was an offensive into Muskian territory in which Mita
was defeated twice, thus consolidating Assyrian tenure of the recently
recaptured cities. The two defeats Mita suffered in his own land were
distinct from that which enabled the reconquest of the two cities and it
may be doubted if Mita was the party vanquished in this latter victory
20because the object of the verb is plural. The two cities which he had cap­
tured in the past may therefore not have been in his hands when Sargon
—  21 attacked them, or alternatively Mita was joined by allies in his defence.
The major successes of this campaign and those most often referred to in
inscriptions are the double victory over Mita and the regaining of the two
cities which brought them back into Assyrian control. If the identification
17. Winckler: vol. I: no.8. line 8.
18. P.E. Botta, Monument de Ninive (1849) IV. pi.75;
-« y V  y Y v
19. n. 15 above; ina nagisu rapsi adi 2-su /tafrta/su askunma;
20. Winckler: AOF I. 356-370, esp. 364ff suggested that lonians should be
supplied in this sentence, citing the Cylinder Inscription in support. This 
first part of the Que campaign would then be directed against lonians not
Mi tV
21. So J.D. Bing: A History of Cilicia during the Assyrian Period (Ann 
Arbor, 1973) 74ff (also 189-212) who sees Sargon's enemies as a coalition 
of lonians, Urartians and Muskians.
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of one of these cities with later Seleucia is accepted, the first phase
of the Assyrian campaign will have taken place in Cilicia Tracheia and have
effectively sealed off Muskian access to the Mediterranean through the 
22
Calycadnus valley. The second penetrated into Muski itself through this 
valley and brought the double defeat of the Muskian army which may not have 
been involved directly in the earlier fighting around the two cities.
These Assyrian victories ensured control over western Que and were a heavy 
blow to Assyria’s enemies in southern Anatolia.
Military defeat did not prevent Mita from remaining a threat to
Assyrian domination of the south Anatolian states, witness the appeal made
v 23
to him by Ambaris of Bit-Burutas. Even so Ambaris also approached Ursa 
of Urartu which implies that Mita's reputation as an adversary of Assyria 
had diminished sufficiently for rebels to look elsewhere for aid. According 
to Sargon, Ambaris suggested an annexation of Assyrian territory in his 
message to the other kings:
ana ^Ursa ^^Urartayya u ^ita sar ^^Yluski ^a ekemi megriya ispura
—  V
mar sipri_____ . (Gadd, loc.cit: 182, 21ff;)
"To Ursa the Urartaean and Mita king of Muski he sent a messenger 
(to suggest) the annexation of my border."
This is a more serious revolt than that of Pisiri who had merely 
appealed for aid in his approach to Mita but neither Mita nor Ursa are said 
to have actually sent help to Ambaris. The defeat of Ambaris allowed the
??.. Bing: op.cit: 75
23. Annals: Lie: 32, 194-204; prisms: Gadd: loc.cit: 182, 12-33; also Winckler: 
102, 29-32; Peiser: loc.cit: 38ff, 23-24; the fragment K8536 (Winckler, I pi.46) 
may also refer to this campaign, Tadmor: loc.cit: 91 n. 295 but cf.Bing: 
op.cit: 77 & n.43; 206 & n.50; Bing admits he has not seen a copy of the frag­
ment and is relying on second-hand sources. K8536 does mention Que and perhaps 
Ursa but is too broken to permit a definite ascription to one of Sargon's 
campaigns. The occurrence of si-pir-tu might indicate the campaign against 
Ambaris which accords with Tadmor's suggestion.
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Assyrians to turn Bit Burutas and Tabal into provinces, thus extending
their direct control of territory to the borders of Muski itself. It is
24disputed whether Que was also made into a province at this time, or
previously, Sargon's silence being taken by some to imply that Que was a pro-
25vince before his reign began, while others have argued that the major
campaigns in Que in the seventh campaign are the best setting for the change 
26in administration. Sargon's reference during the account of the thirteenth 
campaign to the governor of Que's three raids on Muski prove that Que was a 
province by 709 B.C. and if these three campaigns occurred in consecutive
years, i.e. 712, 711 and 710 B.C., then 713 B.C. would be the most likely
27date for the annexation of Que.
Even after the imposition of a governor of Que and his campaign
against Muski, disaffected Assyrian vassals still turned to Mita for
support. Both Tarhulara of Marqasi and Tarhunazi of Melid sent messages
of hostility against Assyria to Mita and thereby showed their contempt 
, - - . KUR vV ki ... - a v . 28 ^(zerati assur lltapparu llqu setutu). As in the cases of Pisiri,
4 * *
Kiakki and Ambaris, Sargon's records do not mention active Muskian support 
for the rebels and the Assyrians conquered and annexed their kingdoms 
without difficulty. This is the last occasion prior to Mita's own settlement 
with Assyria when he is mentioned as her opponent or supporter of her rebels. 
Brief as the references to his influence on Assyrian vassals are, they
24. Tadmor, loc.cit: 95b; also Bing, op.cit: 81 n. 50;
25. Forrer, op.cit: 70ff;
26. Saggs, loc.cit: 205;
✓
Uj —v
27. Lie: 66.445ff supplemented by Olmstead: loc.cit: 277; sut resiya 
L1^ sakin KUR Que sa ina KUR ? - lu-/~ J  ti £  _7^i? £a ^iddi tamtlm
nipifr d5am§i agkunuma.. .* my official the governor of Que whom I had 
established in ?? on the shore of the sea of the setting sun ... "suggests 
that Sargon had in fact established the province of Que or at least 
established the governor in a particular location.
28. Annals: Lie: 34, 204-234 with Olmstead: loc.cit: 268; prisms: Gadd: 
loc.cit: 182, 41-75 and 185 for a discussion of these rebels.
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nevertheless suggest that Mita promoted hostility to Assyria amongst them 
without actually committing Muskian forces to intervene on their behalf.
On the only occasion on which Assyrians are known to have fought Muskians - 
the campaign of 715 B.C. - the total victory of his opponent convinced Mita 
that diplomacy was a more profitable way to entangle Assyria than by assault. 
The Assyrian reaction was to harass Muski directly through the campaigns of 
the governor of Que and that their policy bore fruit can be seen from Mita's 
acceptance of the desirability of alliance with Assyria.
ii) The most significant document for a study of Assyrian diplomacy to be
discovered in the last thirty years is a Nimrud letter from Sargon to the
governor of Que in which the recent conduct of Mita of Muski is discussed 
29
at length. It provides not only useful information on the terminology of 
diplomacy but also a valuable contrast to the bombast of the royal inscrip­
tions. It illuminates the Assyrian approach to diplomatic relations from 
a new angle and throws certain aspects of Assyria's attitude to Mita into 
high relief. It will, accordingly, be discussed at length.
The exact chronological setting of the letter is difficult to 
determine. From the revelation that Mita of Muski had just opened friendly 
cont acts with Assyria it seems likely that the letter antedates the treaty 
with Sargon (709 B.C.) but post-dates the three raids by the governor of Que 
on Muski.30 The letter presumably follows the last of these raids and the
29. H.W.F. Saggs: Iraq 20 (1958), 182-187, revised by J.N. Postgate:
Iraq 35 (1973) 21-34;
30. Postgate: loc.cit: 32ff; Ph. U.J. Houwink Ten Cate in Fischer Welt- 
geschichte (ed. E. Cassin) IV. 122 & nn. 10, 18 prefers the reign of Tiglath-
pileser III.
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reference it contains to men of Babylonia (lines 68f) might suggest
deportees from the campaign of 710 or 709, which would make a date of late
710 or early 709 B.C. for the letter probable. The historical background
to the correspondence,of which this letter is the only surviving part,is 
31
outlined above, the immediate cause of Mita's opening of friendly
contacts with Assyria being the raids on his territory by the governor of
Que. Pressure from the Cimmerians cannot, however, be disregarded as a
possible motivation for the sudden friendliness of the Muskians toward
• 32 Assyria.
The letter contains, as far as is preserved, nine distinct sections, 
seven of which form replies to a previous letter from the governor of Que, 
in which various information was given and orders were requested. It is 
possible to reconstruct the governor's letter, at least in part, from the 
content of Sargon's letter: the major item of news was that the governor
had received a messenger of Mita who had brought with him an embassy sent by
33Urikki of Que to Urartu. Evidently the governor was uncertain as to how
to respond to this friendly act by Mita and had written to Sargon for
instructions. Together with the messenger of Mita had come an envoy of Ur- 
bal'a' who wished to have an audience and this item too had been referred 
to Sargon. A request for more land by an Assyrian vassal(which does not 
seem to be connected with Mita's mission)was also forwarded for royal approval 
in the governor's letter.
31. above p.13
32. ABL 197 for Cimmerian pressure on Urartu at about this date; also R/E 
sub Midas 3; Ten Cate: loc.cit: 13f;
33. On Urikki: Postgate: loc.cit: 28; a more speculative reconstruction 
in Bing: op.cit: 85f;
It seems likely that the governor's letter was the first news 
Sargon had received of Mita's volte face in his relations with Assyria because 
the joy of the Assyrian is evident in his answer. The pleasure he expresses 
is matched by the engaging tone he employs in his own message to Mita and his 
encouragement of the governor to maintain close contacts with the Muskian 
court. This enthusiasm is only present in the sections directly relevant to 
Mita; even in that concerned with Urbal'S there is a noticeable constraint 
compared with the eagerness of the earlier sections.
After the greeting-formula the letter launches immediately into the 
most important subject: the newly-opened diplonatic contact with Mita.
Sargon notes that a messenger of Mita had come to the governor conducting a 
delegation which Urikki of Que had sent to Urartu and praises the gods of
Assyria as the instigators of this change in attitude of the Muskian:
^ KUR — v — v
l7a ina SA qarabi /7x)x7x-me-ni muskayya pisu ittannanasi ana
salmeni ittuar
"... and in the midst of battle has /n7ot our ^enemy?7 the Muskian 
given us his word and become our ally?"
The two actions which Mita took to open relations with Assyria were:
  V
i) to send a messenger (mar sipri) to the governor of Que.
ii) to send back the embassy of Urikki of Que which was hostile toward 
Assyria.
The second of these is obviously an unusual occurrence in itself and 
it is therefore the first which is the formal diplomatic move toward 
establishing good relations, although its sincerity is emphasised by the good­
will gesture of returning the hostile embassy. This conclusion is also 
suggested by the construction of the sentence in which the sending of the 
messenger is the main clause and the return of the embassy is a subordinate
clause. Since the turning back of this embassy was incidental to the mission
of Mita's messenger what was its immediate purpose? Sargon takes the whole
episode as proof of Mita's new attitude; thus Mita's demonstration of
friendship involved no direct communication with the king himself and yet
qualified as a substantive act from which Sargon could assume that Mita was
prepared to come to terms with him.
Sargon's exclamations on Mita's change of heart contain two
expressions of interest for diplomacy; pa nadanu and ana salmi taru. Pa
nadanu appears in only four texts, outside those of the Old Assyrian period,
34but, of these, three concern international relations, and it therefore
/\
merits a short excursus. Bel-ibni reports to Ashurbanipal that certain 
sheikhs on the borders of Elam were involved in a raid by Assyria:
— —  — V «. ^  M
... ki iplahu pisunu ittannunu ade itti PN ... iggabtu umma
- . v v KUR vv ki -r .
ardani sa sar Assur amni
"(As a result of the Assyrian action) they were afraid, gave their
word and took the oath with PN (an Assyrian official) saying, "We are
35subjects of the king of Assyria".
This perfunctory declaration of allegiance to Assyria was later 
reinforced by a full ceremony in Nineveh for at least some of the sheikhs
but the taking of the oath was certainly a valid and formal commitment to
36remain loyal to Assyria. It is not clear whether the "giving of one's 
word" and "taking the oath" were synonymous or mutually explicatory but
34. AHW: 702 ; the fourth is a neo-Assyrian letter describing the improvement 
in health of a sick man in which, the writer says, the king's gods must have 
acquiesced (pa nadanu); see A.L. Oppenheim JAQS 61 (1941) 261; Parpola:
LASEA 254=ABL 393;
35. ABL 280; esp. 24 - rev. 4; A.L. Oppenheim, Letters from Mesopotamia 
(1967) p. 172;
36. CAD S 25a; VAB 7; 42, 116-123;
their parallelism suggests a close connection between pa nadanu and a 
formal recognition of a relationship.
This conclusion is supported by the second example of pa nadinu, 
in the records of Sargon II's third campaign. The people of three towns
in the northern Zagros gave their word to Ursa of Urartu:
ana 'Sjrsa KURUrartayya ana epes arduti iddinu pi sun
37"to Ursa of Urartu they gave their word to do (him) homage".
• —  V  t
One version of this incident omits ana epes arduti but the meaning
of the phrase must have remained somewhat the same. It is therefore legitimate
to assume that pa nadanu connoted a definite commitment of allegiance - which 
is what, in this case, aggravated Sargon so much.
The third reference to pa nadanu is that contained in the letter about 
Mita and it can be seen that if the conclusions reached from the first two 
examples were extrapolated to this occurrence, then Mita would have in some 
way committed himself to friendly relations and possibly to a formal state­
ment of this. The rest of the letter does not, however, mention any agree­
ment on Mita's part nor even a message which was sent with the messenger, and 
Sargon's eagerness to please the Muskian might suggest that no formal 
relationship had as yet been mentioned. If, therefore, pa nadanu implies 
a clear commitment to friendly relations in a verbal form then Mita's 
declaration of his intent is not referred to at all in the text of the letter. 
If, however, the idiom does not imply a formal and explicit declaration but 
merely a commitment, either in word or deed, to be on good terms then Mita's
sending back of the envoys of Urikki will have constituted the basis for
— - 38Sargon's use of pa nadanu.
It must be doubted whether Mita's messenger made a formal statement of
his intentions toward Assyria, particularly because Sargon should have
mentioned it in his reply to the governor, and the only evidence of Mita's
change in attitude is his sending back of Urikki's envoys. Even without
a formal commitment to good relations Sargon was able to see Mita's action as
a hint to the Muskian's new policy and encouraged his governor to maintain the
relations, however tenuous, between the two countries. The governor's
/
v _ - LU v
hesitation in replying to Mita's overtures (balat sarri beliya mar sipriya
KUR - vina UGU muskayya la asappar: "without the king('s permission) I shall
39not send my messenger before the Muskean") implies that major foreign
policy decisions could not be made or implemented at local level but had to
proceed from the central administration. The case of Mita who had previously
been hostile to Assyria and whose friendly contacts were a major change in
40the diplomatic sphere necessitated such a mandate from the king.
Thus Sargon's reassurance of his governor was the order to attend 
on the Muskian:
LU - v. . _ KUR , ...
assaprakka mar-siprika issi pan muskayya lu la lbbattaq
"I am writing to you (that) your messenger should not be separated 
41from the Muskian".
38. The use of pa nadanu in ABL 392 suggests an informal agreement or 
commitment (see n. 33)
39. Postgate: loc.cit: 22, Ilf;
40. ABL 280 (see above p.23 ) shows how a military commander in the field 
was in a different position.
41. Postage, loc.cit: 22, 13f; K. Deller, OrNS 35 (1966) 310;
Sargon's insistence on close attendance on the king of Muski
indicates his desire to reciprocate the gesture of friendliness and to
expedite a more formal recognition of the new state of affairs. The
explicit reference to one messenger of a country being in the entourage of
another's king suggests the role of ambassador rather than that of envoy
for this messenger, but there is little evidence that in the neo-Assyrian
period envoys were despatched other than for particular missions or remained
42for longer than their specified mission required. Sargon's reference 
would imply that a semi-permanent diplomatic mission could be accredited to 
foreign courts. Alternatively Sargon's use of "your messenger" might be a 
synecdoche for a continuous communication by many messengers. In as much 
as references to messengers occur frequently both in royal inscriptions and 
letters of the period and that they are there described as performing various 
duties, this second explanation is more likely than that of a single 
resident ambassador. 3
Sargon's succeeding injunctions as to how to cultivate Mita bear out 
the belief in close communication:
—  V v V —  "T —• V , •dibbi tabute suprassu kayyamanu minu sa tensunisim/y ...
"Send him messages of good-will and hear constantly what his 
44
counsel may be ...".
42. ABL 196; Postgate: Taxation: 261f;
43. Constant or at least regular communication is stressed as an essential 
feature of good relations between kings: Gyges and Ashurbanipal, for 
example: VAB 7, 20, 111;
44. Postgate: loc.cit: 22, 14-lfj; dibbi tabute discussed further p. 1 Oil ff;
The extension of dibbi t;abute to Mita indicates Sargon's willingness
to maintain friendly relations and thereby to consolidate them, perhaps
with the intention of gaining a formalised relationship. Despite his sincere
desire for good relations, Sargon was still suspicious of Mita's intentions
as is shown by his command to the governor to take note of Mitia's plans and
45
their relevance for Assyria. Thus on the one hand Assyria was quick to
follow up the move toward a settlement made by Mita but, on the other hand,
was not suspending its watchfulness toward a recent enemy. The governor
of Que's messengers to the court of Muski had, therefore, a dual purpose:
to expedite good relations but at the same time to gain knowledge of Muskian
policy. This latter aspect need not be clandestine since Mita's replies to
the envoys must have revealed something of his intentions but even so the
messengers were probably expected to glean what they could by unofficial 
46m$ thods.
Having ratified the necessary official actions in the reciprocation
of Mita's embassy, Sargon authorised a repatriation of all Muskians in the
47
governor's custody as proof of his good-will. Furthermore he ordered his 
governor to inform Mita that he (Sargon) had specifically ordered this 
move. Nowhere is it more apparent that Sargon was attempting by every 
device to assure Mita of his personal interest in Muskian affairs and his 
willingness to entertain and further good relations between their two 
countries. Sargon was prompted to repatriate the Muskians by Mita's sending
45. Temu is more than a monarch's utterances. It implies his planning and 
intentions and, when formalised in orders, was referred to as ^ikin t;eme. 
Even then it retained the connotation of intent as well as action.
46. e.g. ARM: 2 no. 72; 6 no. 19, 17-21;
47. Postgate: loc.cit: 22, lb-2'»;
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back of certain men of Que - presumably Urikki's embassy - and it must be
postulated that the Muskians were prisoners of war captured during the
governor's raids on Muski. Sargon's insistence on the repatriation of every
Muskian so that not even one remained with the governor is certainly an
action calculated to display his wish for good relations, but behind it may
lie the knowledge that repatriation was a major issue in diplomacy and that
his reciprocal repatriation would have great influence on Mita's future
48attitude to Assyria. The necessity to discourage unlawful movement of
individuals, slave or free, from one country to another was of prime
importance in ancient near eastern treaties and prompt repatriation of hostile
elements was a common feature of relations between friendly states. In the
neo-Assyrian period repatriation was not automatic but was used - as in the
case of Mita and Sargon - to expedite relations between countries either
49seeking good relations or already in friendly contact.
The remainder of the letter to the governor of Que does not
directly concern Mita but it provides important insights for Assyrian
conduct of diplomacy. Accompanying Mita's messenger to the governor had
v 50
come a messenger of Urbal'a "for greeting" (ana sulme) and the governor
seems to have asked whether this representative should be entertained.
Sargon's answer was in the affirmative and suggests that the messenger of
51Urbal'a should come to him. The ceremony of "greeting" a king was not
48. Repatriation in treaties: for second mill, see Kestemont: DDlAO 405f;
420; 87f; first millennium e.g. Sefire 96, 4-8;
49. VAR 7, 34, 23-33; AS 5, 60ff; 87-98; 80, 77-92; Ash, 106, 28-34;
50. Postgate: loc.cit: 22, 26ff;
51. contra Postgate: loc.cit: 26, note to 1. 28;
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merely an audience with him but conveyed the recognition (and, therefore,
approval) of another king and was a formal gesture indicating the opening
52
of relations between countries. The synchronisation of Urbal'a's mission 
with that of Mita seems unlikely to have been accidental and suggests that 
Urbal'a knew of Mita's impending rapprochement with Assyria and, as a 
former Assyrian vassal, Urbal'a decided to make his peace with Sargon for 
fear of being caught between Muski and her new ally. Whether Urbal'a's 
"greeting" of Sargon implied subservience is uncertain but Mita is unlikely
to have allowed Urbal'a to make such a gesture if he was already subservient
. - 53 to Mita.
On the other hand, Sargon may have given the governor of Que 
permission to receive the "greeting" of Urbal'a (a theory favoured by 
Postgate) and his allusion to the kings of southern Anatolia "polishing the 
sandals" of the governor "with their beards" may corroborate this. This 
idiom is otherwise unknown and its closest parallel is Tammaritu of Elam's
54act of subservience to Ashurbanipal when he swept the ground with his beard. 
This is almost certainly a ceremony similar to the grasping or kissing of a 
king's feet, neither of which were greetings-gestures proper but rather 
acknowledgements of subordination and vassal-status. It would, therefore, 
have to be presumed that the governor was in some way acting as a proxy for 
Sargon in receiving the subservience of foreign kings just as Ummanigas of
52. See below: p.£0 ;
53. Sargon does not mention Urbafa' s subservience to him in his inscriptions.
54. VAB 7, 34, 28f;
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Elam kissed the ground before Ashurbanipal's messengers as a sign of his
55reverence for the Assyrian king. It would then have to be assumed that 
the jjsulmu-ceremony automatically involved prostration or abasement 
indicating subordination. This does not accord with Ashurbanipal's
assertion that he sent a messenger to a vassal-king "for greeting"
. v v 56(sa sulme).
Accordingly it is uncertain whether Sargon's reference to the kings
polishing the governor's sandals with their beards is an indication that
they physically abased themselves or whether Sargon is using a metaphor to
describe the dependence these kings will have on the governor in future.
The implication is that the petty kings of the Taurus will have to conduct
their negotiations with Assyria through the governor whose position will be
greatly enhanced by their subordination to him.
Sargon's attitude to these petty princes can be discerned from his
replies to two more of the governor's questions. He warns the governor not
to give more land to a pro-Assyrian ruler and points out that now Mita and he
57are on good terms there is no cause for the rulers to fear. Sargon is 
equally aware that Mita's friendship with him will affect the status of
the unaligned rulers between them, notably the kings of Tabal who will not
58
be free to pursue their own ends any longer. The stimulus for these 
comments on Tabal may have been a letter from Urbal'a about the activities
55. ibid: 34, 18-20;
56. AS 5: 54, 96;
57. Postgate: loc.cit: 22, 31-42;
58. ibid: 24, 43-51;
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of certain townsmen who were, perhaps, under his control and his apology
59
for their conduct demonstrates a conciliatory attitude toward Assyria.
This letter was presumably carried by the messenger who came to the governor 
at the same time as Mita's messenger and Urbal'a's act of conciliation 
parallels Mita's earnest of good-will in the sending back of Urikki's 
embassy. These coincidences strongly suggest that Mita's move to good- 
relations with Assyria was not decided hurriedly but was the result of 
prior planning of which Urbal'a was aware and in which he may have taken 
part.
Having studied the most important elements in the diplomatic inter­
course of Assyria with Mita and the rulers of Tabal and its surrounding area, 
it remains to summarise the evidence to be derived from this letter. Most 
interesting is the eagerness with which Sargon greets the news of a possible 
rapprochement with Mita and the measures he adopts to secure this relation­
ship. Sargon's desire for friendly relations with Mit& seems genuine and 
sincere and he does not attempt to extract promises or commitments from Mita 
or to force Assyrian demands upon him. Throughout he is at pains to 
demonstrate his willingness to entertain good-relations with Mita and to match 
gestures of good-will offered by him. With the minor rulers of the area he 
is less generous but even so encourages Urbal'a to "greet" him.
The diplomatic terminology used in the letter is exceptional in the
frequent use of salamu ("to be friendly"), or one of its cognates, to
— 60indicate the new relationship between Sargon and Mita. The informal nature 
of the contacts between Mita and the Assyrian authorities still allowed Sargon 
to aver that the Muskian had given his word (pa nadanu) and become
59. ibid: 28,
60. notably in lines 10, 38; 47;
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Sargon's friend (ana salmini taru). This demonstrates - unless a 
formal gesture had been made which is not referred to in the letter - that 
a formalised relationship was not obligatory for friendly intercourse 
between countries. Sargon was, however, eager to consolidate the openings 
made by Mita with the aim, perhaps, of achieving a fully-ratified settlement.
The subtlety he shows in his cultivation of Mita is far removed from the 
scheme of events set out in the royal inscriptions where Sargon is the 
victor and Mita his humbled opponent. The disparity between the "official" 
version of the treaty-making between Sargon and Mita and the letter from 
Sargon to his governor is striking and its implications for the interpretation 
of evidence derived from the inscriptions are discussed below. The major 
conclusion to be drawn from this letter is the flexibility of Assyrian 
diplomacy and the emphasis placed upon it as the instrument of achieving the 
settlements with foreign rulers of which Assyrian kings enjoyed boasting.
iii) Detailed accounts of the settlement between Sargon and Mita occur in 
both the Annals and the Display Inscription, the former being fuller but 
more fragmentary. It can, however, be restored from parallel texts.^
The three raids made by the governor of Que on Muski brought many prisoners
of war, some of whom the governor forwarded to Sargon in southern Babylonia where
62he was campaigning. The messenger who accompanied them also carried a 
"favourable report" (amat damiqti) of the fighting and Sargon rejoiced when 
he received the mission. Both sources immediately relate the embassy sent
61. Lie; 66ff, 444-456 & Olmstead: loc.cit: 277f; Winckler: 126ff 149-153;
62. zln pani (Lie: 68, 451;) may be either prisoners or spoil stripped from 
them: CADZ 122a;
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by Mita to Sargon though the interval between the governor's message
63
and Mita's embassy may have been considerable.
u su *Mita KURmuskayya sa ana sarrani alik paniya la iknusu la usannu
— ^  y % y y ^ y V 64 v —  — V  —
tensu (ana sa al sulmesun la ispura /~ rakbu/su) sakan liti kisitti qati
V W  _ ^   V  V — y y V
sa Assur ... /" tibut kakjc/eya fyepe matisu salal nisesu suknus Uperi ...
V y ^
/~ ismemg/ina qareb matisu ruquti safrarratu ittabik elisu mar siprisu
V _ V— — V t d v y
sa epes arduti u nase bilti igise ana tamti sa git Samsi adi mafrriya 
.vispura
"But that man, Mita the Muskean, who had not submitted to the kings 
my predecessors, who had not changed his mind (or sent envoys to ask 
their health), he heard of the accomplishment of my power over those I 
had conquered whom the gods ... /and, of the onset of my weapons/ of the 
destruction of his land, of the carrying-off of his people and of the 
subjugation of Uperi ..., (consequently), in the midst of his distant land 
he was terrified (lit: numbness came over him.). His messenger to do me 
homage and to bring me tribute and gifts he sent before me to the sea of 
the rising sun."
The subjection of a king who had previously been unsubmissive to 
Assyria is a common motif in neo-Assyrian royal inscriptions because it 
illustrates the power and prestige of the Assyrian king in comparison with 
both his ancestors and also the king offering submission.  ^ It confirms
63. What follows is a reconstruction of the annal's version (see note^l )
64. Room V only;
^5. e.g. VAB 7: 18, 64, 76; PIP 2: 30, 61; 31, 72;
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the belief that Sargon and Mita had not enjoyed previous good-relations 
which would have been referred to in both Sargon's inscriptions and the 
letter about Mita. Mita's embassy had two purposes: 
i) the act of homage to Sargon. 
ii) the bringing of tribute and gifts.
The expression of homage, usually by a symbolic gesture or act,
i.e. kissing or grasping the suzerain's feet,66 was the standard method 
of acknowledging one's subordination to and dependence on another king.
It was used by kings defeated by Assyria and anxious to regain whatever
67 68status they could, kings who requested the protection of Assyria, and
69
rulers who wished to gain assistance for their own cause. The ceremony 
of homage was the formal rite which demonstrated the inferior status of the 
vassal to that of the king of Assyria and recognised the right of the over­
lord to make demands upon the vassal, i.e. the imposition of tribute. In 
Mita's case Sargon does not say that he imposed tribute but merely that he
received the contributions (bijti igise) of the Muskian and it is therefore
70uncertain whether he expected periodic deliveries of tribute. Research 
on the nuances of the various terms for tribute would have to be undertaken
66. CAD E 203; TCL III: 48, 307-311 ff;
67. e.g. PIP II 34, 49;
68. e.g. Ash, 54, 32ff; VAB 7, 20, 103;
69. e.g. VAB 7; 68, 43; ibid : 34, 28-32;
70. J.N. Postgate: Taxation ... 119-130 for a short discussion of madattu;
igisfi may be comparable to sulmanu, a "greeting-gift": W. von Soden: Die
lexicalischen Tafelserien der Babylonier und Assyrer ... 2 (Berlin, 1933)
2: 275;
in order to illuminate this question.
A comparison of the annals version of Mita's submission with the
letter about him is instructive. On a most indulgent reading of the latter
it could hardly be averred that Sargon was acting in the manner of a
prospective overlord or that Mita was precipitately rushing to embrace
Assyrian domination. The Annals, on the other hand, do create this
impression - as they were, no doubt, intended to do. External factors may
have forced Mita to submit to Sargon or, in the interval between the first
contact and Mita's submission, the Assyrians may have pressurised him to
71accept vassal-status but, given the reconstructed chronology, such acts
would have had to be very swift. Disregarding these arguments e silentio,
it cannot be denied that the background to the Muski-Assyria diplomacy is
represented very differently in the letter about Mita and the annals. An
explanation of this disparity may lie in the style and purpose of the letter.
It has long been recognised that the Assyrian royal inscriptions are written
from a partisan and biased viewpoint, that their style of narration affects
the substance of their account and that the process of redaction of the
72annals confuses incidents and chronology. In this incident it would be 
reckless to deny that Mita's mission came to Sargon or that it did him homage. 
These acts are, however, interpreted by an annalistic Assyrian source and 
the consequent account is, therefore, favourable to Assyria and implies the 
total submission and capitulation of her enemy.
The letter about Mita provides an invaluable corrective to such an 
interpretation because it is the record of the official reaction to Mita's
71. See above p. 2Of*. ;
72. A.T.E. Olmstead: Assyrian Historiography ... (Columbia, 1916)5
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overtures ot friendship and not a rhetorical display of Assyrian prowess.
It is, therefore, more likely to present an accurate reflection of the 
Assyrian attitude to Mita than the highly-stylised annals. Sargon is 
portrayed as sincerely desiring Mita as a friend and that Assyria and Muski 
should enjoy a peaceable and friendly relationship. He was eager to demon­
strate good-will and nowhere implied that the relationship was to be one 
of unilateral domination. It might be argued that Sargon was baiting the 
trap by cultivating MxteT assiduously but, it so, he concealed this tactic 
from his own guvcrnoi to whom he was quite capable of revealing the more 
cynical aspects of Assyrian diplomacy, i.e. the treatment of minor rulers 
of the Taurus (lines 2H-30 of the Midas letter in particular).
The informal relationship of friendship which pertained after Mita's
initial contact with the governor of Que was accepted by Sargon as evidence
of an unchanging commitment to good-relations. Even though no formal
ceremonies of agreement are said to have occurred,the Assyrian's words
betray his belief in a continuing relationship. This permanence automatically
demanded a formal statement, hence the submission-ceremony, and it is in the
formalisation of a diplomatic relationship that an important feature of
Assyrian diplomacy can be observed. It was necessary for states to know
whether they were on friendly or hostile terms with their neighbours and the
only method of achieving this was by official action: the recognition of a
king by "greeting" him and by performing ceremonies of obeisance if applicable.
Failure to make this recognition or to discontinue to do so was tantamount to
73declaring oneself hostile. Thus it was necessary for Mita to confirm his 
relationship with Sargon with the appropriate ceremonies. The existence of
73. See below p. V l »
a relationship (not necessarily suzerain-vassal) implied good-relations
74between states but for it to be effective it had to be formally acknowledged.
The drawback with this conception of formalised relationships was 
that it favoured the party with superior power in that she could dictate 
in an almost unilateral manner the course of the relationship. Too rigid an 
application of this principle was likely to cause disaffection amongst 
vassal-states and was not amenable to alteration in the face of changing 
circumstances. It was also likely to mask behind the facade of unilateral 
domination relationships of varying degrees of subserviance. Thus the rhetoric 
of the annals, which proclaimed the principle of Assyrian-ordered diplomacy, 
concealed under the heading of ardutu ("vassalage") a wide range of relation­
ships. In the case of Mita - whose gesture of capitulation, as recorded by 
the annals, is to some extent contradicted by the letter about him - the 
inflexibility of diplomatic theory as opposed to practice is particularly 
relevant. It may be concluded that the ideological concepts of Assyrian 
diplomacy affected not only the diplomacy itself but also the recording of 
this diplomacy in royal inscriptions so that "vassalage" describes a wide 
range of relationships between suzerain and vassal and therefore that the 
vassal-motif common in neo-Assyrian inscriptions is not a sure guide to 
the true nature of the relationships.
The diplomatic contacts of Mita and Sargon reveal a fundamental 
principle of neo-Assyrian diplomacy: that the inflexibility of the theory, 
based on an ideology of unilateral dictation of the relationships, was 
tempered in practice by a willingness to come to terms with states whom
74. Ashurbanipal and Urtaku of Elam enjoyed ibrutu ("equal relations"):
AS 5, 56, 20ffy
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Assyria thought it better to cultivate. However when it was possible the
Assyrians preferred to revert to a suzerain-vassal relationship in which
they could lake control. It may also I*? concluded that informal friendly
relations, though welcome, were pursued as far as possible to a formalised
statement of the relationship. However the formal act of subordination which
a vassal, had to make was not a true index of the real relationship between
v
the Assyrian king and 1 he vassal. The importance of the sulmu-ceremony 
which registered the rt cognition of one king by another but did not imply 
subordination by one party to the other is further discussed in the discussion 
of the diplomacy of Gygesand Ashurbanipal.
 __ -4.
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Diplomatic Contacts of Assyria with Anatolia
(b) Gyges of Lydia
Tlie only sources for the relations between Gyges of Lydia and
Ashurbanipal of Assyria are several of the latter's royal inscriptions,
. . 1 2 3  4
notably editions A f B and E of the annals and also the "Harran Tablets".
5
It has been long recognized that later editions of the annals of Assyrian 
kings often compress, abridge, omit or displace incidents from their correct
chronological setting and that the earlier editions usually present a more
6
accurate account of events. In this case, edition E of the annals and the 
"Harran Tablets" are the earliest sources and their account will be preferred
1o that of the later inscriptions where they diverge.^
Edition E is the earliest and fullest record of Gyges' first contact
8
with Assyria but it is fragmentary. it can, however, be seen that the ante­
cedents to Gyges' mission - the attacks of the Cimmerians and the dream of 
Gyges - were described in greater detail and that the arrival and conduct of 
Gyges' mission at Nineveh received a different, less prosaic treatment than in
1. VAB 7, 20ff, 95-124;
2. AS 5, 43.93 - 48.4;
3. M. Cogan & H. Tadmor, Or. NS 46(1978) 65-85;
4. VAB 7, 166ff, 13-21;
5. A.T. Olmstead: Assyrian Historiography (1916); as propaganda, J.E. Reader 
Iraq 34 (J972) 87;
6. Cogan and Tadmor, Io< .cit. (hereinafter: Cogan and Tadmor) 83; this study
is valuable for both tlie literary and historical background to the contacts with
Gyges.
7. H. Tadmor: 2 5th International Congress of Orientalists I (Moscow, 1962)
240f; supplemented by A. Spalinger, JAOS 74 (1974) 316ff;
8. Cogan and Tadmor, 66ft; A.R. Millard, Iraq 30 (1968) 98ff., on E and its
Iiterary transmission.
A V  V  - V
Later inscriptions: rak/busu it/~ / ana sa'al sul/me7ya ana migir
—  y/A —  V  —  a V  v  A
matiya nise matiya imurusuma uiannume utta ahu rqbusu sa matema rakbukun
daraggu la iskuna ana kisurri ana Ninua al belutiya J  Hbilunissu ina
v— y v v y v vv a i   v— v
mafrriya lisane sit samsi ereb samsi sa Assur umallu qatua bel lisanisu ul
V— , . >✓ a v _ . v v
ibsima lisan/su/ nakratma la lsemmu atmusu ultu mi$ir matisu / / lttisu
ubi/la/ ... (K1821/A7920; Cogan and Tadmor, 68).
" ... /Tie sent7 bis envoy to enquire of my well-being. He reached
the border of my country. My men saw him and asked him, "Who are you, stranger,
whoso (country's) envoy never travelled the road to the frontier?" They brought
him C  • • • -7 Nineveh, my royal city, into my presence. (Of) all the languages
of East and West, over which the god Ashur has given me control, there was no
interpreter of his tongue. His language was foreign, so that his words were
not understood. From his territory ... he brought with him ...".
From this narrative it emerges that Ashurbanipal's subjects'first
duty, on encountering the envoy, was to ascertain his country of origin. This
may be a reflection of a diplomatic protocol whereby envoys were obliged to
establish their identity and that of their sender. In this case the envoy's
language was unknown and the fragment breaks off before the means of communi-
9
cation was provided. However in other E fragments the envoy is made to transmit 
a long message,in the first person,from Gyges which suggests that these two 
recensions of E contained differing accounts of the mission or that the envoy's 
message was eventually understood. Both recensions, however, make it clear 
that Gyges' dream overawed him so much that he undertook to submit to Assyria 
and pay annual tribute.^0
9. Cogan and Tadmor, 71-/4; BM 1344S, 121018, 127823, 134455;
10. Ibid. BM 127923, 134455;
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After edition E, the Harran Tablet is the earliest version of the 
Gyges-incident and its form was adopted in all subsequent editions:
a) C.ycjes' and his predecessors' contacts with Assyria and the 
location of Lydia
b) The dream of Gyqes (abbreviated in later versions)
c) The despatch of a messenger to Ashurbanipal
d) Gyges' victory over the Cimmerians
e) The despatch of Cimmerian prisoners and heavy tamartu to Nineveh.
Sections b) and c) are of interest for a study of diplomacy and
particularly for the terminology of servitude. The text of Gyges' dream is 
(after edition E) longest in the Harran Tablet which may be compared with the 
abbreviated version of edition A:
HP.
V  VV- „  V
umina sa assurbanapli sar
K.IJR w  ki . .v d vv v - .assur tjisifrti assur sar llam
be 1 gimri sepa11 rubutisu sabatma
V  /» ,  —  V  —  V
sarrusu pitluhma sulla belutsu sa epes
V 11
arduti u nadin mandattilillikus suppuka.
HT.
..."Lay hold of the feet of (lit. the 
foot of the greatness of) Ashurbanipal 
king of Assyria, beloved of Ashur (the 
king of the gods,) the lord of the totality,
A.
v II id v v  ,- , .umma sepa______Assurbanapli
v KURd w  ki . . . .sar assur sabatma ina zikir
sumisu kusud LUnakrutika.^
A.
..."Lay hold of the feet of 
Ashurbanipal, the king of Assyria, 
and in his name conquer your 
enemies. "
11. VAB 7, IbO, 16; also n.9 above.
12. VAB 7, 20, OBf;
revere him as (your) sovereiqn and 
beseech him as (your) master. Let your 
message of prayer offering homage and 
tribute come to him."
Common to these two exhortations to submit to Ashurbanipal is the
v   _  13
idiom sepa gabatu, "to lay hold of (another's) feet." This is certainly a
 v _
gesture of submission as is proved by the references in JIT to epesu arduti
14 — - ^
("to make an acknowledgement of subjection" ). Similarly beluti sullu ("to
beseech/beg a person to be one's master") is commonly used in Neo-Assyrian
inscriptions to indicate the recognition of subordination to Assyria by a
. V • 15vassal-king.
These characteristically neo- Assyrian expressions of submission in 
a dream of a king of Lydia may demonstrate the universality of such expressions 
or alternatively are the Assyrian interpretation of the Lydian's embassy. Thus 
the dream would reflect customary ceremonies of subservience to Assyria which 
the Lydian envoy undertook, or was expected to undertake, in Ndneveh.^
Gyges' response to these exhortations in his dream was to send an 
envoy to ask after the well-being of Ashurbanipal:
_ v   z' v v v _ v 17
umu sutta annita emuru rakbusu ispura ana sa'al sulmeya.
"On the day he had this dream he sent his envoy to enquire of my
well-being."
13. CAD S 17a for examples;
14. CAD E 203;
15. >-?. g. VAB /, 24.16f; ibid, 3b, 33;
lb. It is interesting to note that only edition A explicitly states that
Gyges' envoy repeated his dream to Ashurbanipal, all other editions either 
omitting it or taking for granted the envoy's narration of the dream.
17. VAB 7, 20, lOOf; on the rakbu see ?l0ff below;
> _
The sending bv foreign kings of envoys to enquire about the Assyrian
king's health is a common motif in neo-Assyrian inscriptions, being used not
18 19 20only by Ashurbanipal but also Esarhaddon and Sargon. The actions of
sending and of asking may be placed in parallel (e.g. ... la ispuru la isalu
v 21 lu * v v . v _ 22
sulum . ..) or the phrase may be abbreviated ( rabkusu sa sulme ispuru ...).
in the majority of cases the Assyrian king remarks that previously the foreign
king had not "asked his well-being" or that ot his predecessors but that now
23his own might overawed the foreigner and made him send a mission to Assyria.
It might be thought that these enquiries about another ruler's health were a 
tacit gesture of submission by the king sending the envoy but Ashurbanipal
V  V  9himself sends an envoy sa sulme to a king, Ualli of Mannai, who was certainly
24 v — vsubordinate to him. It seems, therefore, that sa'al sulme was a ceremony of
25recognition of another king, whether of inferior or superior status. However 
in the case of outright vassals - as Gyges acknowledged himself to be - there
was an obligation to keep up the enquiries of the overlord's health and if
18. VAB 7, 593 for refs.;
19. L.g. Ash. 47, 49;
20. l'CL III, 48, 309f; Lie, 70, 2;
21. E.f . Weidner: AfO 7 (1932) 4, 17 and 23;
22. B.C. Thompson; AAA 20 (1933) 87; VAB 7, 24, 21;
23. e.g. VAB 7, 70, 60ff;
?4. AS 5, 54, 95;
25. on sa'al sulme below £0 - p/i
this process were interrupted, good-relations might be endangered. When, 
therefore, Gyges allowed his embassies to the Assyrian court to lapse he was
condemned by the Assyrians:
LU , . v v .-I v . . . v v . • -i . 26rakbusu sa ana sa'al sulmeya kayyan istanappara usarsa batiltu
"He caused an interruption (in the missions) of his envoys whom he
sent constantly to ask my health."
It emerqes that the ceremony of asking the king's health was not a single act 
undertaken at the start of a diplomatic relationship but rather an act which 
had to be frequently repeated. It was clearly the customary method of main­
taining formal relations with another king, thus - in the case of vassals - 
ensuring loyalty, and implied mutual recognition. A discontinuation of the 
embassies would indicate a cessation of good-relations and possible hostility 
but as long as missions between kings continued, hostility was theoretically 
out oi the question. This emphasis on the importance of constant communication 
as the expression of good-relations, with its corollary of implied hostility 
if communication were interrupted, finds expression in Ashurbanipal's attitude
, to Urtaku of Elam who invaded Babylonia but maintained communication with 
27
Ashurbanipal. The Assyrian complains of the unexpectedness of the attack and
that Elamite envoys were still in constant attendance on him in Nineveh, an
. . v—activity not consonant with diplomatic practice if Urtaku were attacking (sut
— — v v V
seranisu sa sulumme istanappara ina mafrriya: "His envoys of friendly-relations
he kept sending to me ... ") .
Thus Gyges sent his envoy to Ashurbanipal in order to open diplomatic 
relations with him and to acknowledge his submission to Assyria. The envoy
20. VAB /, 20, lllf;
27. AS 3, 56ff, 18-48.
repeated in detail Gyges' dream, prefacing it with an account of the back­
ground to the mission, and concluded by making the formal gestures of grasping 
Ashurbanipa1's feet and beseeching him to be Gyges* overlord. Subsequently, 
however, Gyges failed to maintain diplomatic relations with Ashurbanipal and
exacerbated his crime by sending aid to Psammetichos II of Egypt who was in
28
revolt from Assyria. Ashurbanipal called down the wrath of the gods on the
Lydian and exulted in the latter's death at the hands of the Cimmerians who 
29re-invaded Lydia. The death of Gyges brought his son Ardys to the throne
of Lvdia and he again acknowledged Assyrian suzerainty:
- - v , . v . v . V v v
... ina gat mar sipnsu ispuramma igbata sepe sarrutiya umma sarru
v AV _ 'Vv _ V _
sa ilu idusu atta abu'a tarurma lemuttu issakin ina panisu iati ardu paliljka
. v — v 30kurbannima lasuta absanka
"(News of Gyges' death) he sent to me oy the hand of his messenger.
He qrasped my royal feet saying, 'You are the king recognised by god. You
cursed my father and misfortune befell him. Acknowledge me, your obedient
subject, and I shall pull your yoke'."
The use of karabu in this context is unusual because it is more
commonly used of gestures of adoration, of gods or political superiors, and
praise.^1 However it does seem that it was used on some occasions as a gesture
32purely of greeting without any overtones of hierarchy and it is this gesture 
of recognition for which the Lydian was petitioning. By greeting him Ashurbanipal 
would )>e renewing Assyria's relationship with Lydia and accepting her submission
28. VAB 7, 22, 114f;
29. ibid., 117ff;
30. ibid., 125;
31. AD K 194bf, cf. 197b;
32. OIP 2, 43, 55;
-  1,6 -
again. This motif of greeting a king and thereby recognising him as on good
terms is also observed in Ashurbanipal's attitude toward ualli, king of Mannea,
/
jrj   ^  y
to whom he sent his messenger "of greeting" ( mar sipriya sa sulme uma'ir
- w  % 33 sorussu).
The importance of opening relations with foreign kings by sending 
v — v
envoys ana sa'al sulme ("to ask the health of __") and of thereafter continuing
to communicate frequently is best expressed in Gyges' relations with Assyria.
Equally the responsibility of the overlord, in cases of unequal relationships,
to acknowledge his vassal is also expressed. The accounts of Assyrian relations 
with Lydia do not clarify the manner in which a king acknowledged subservience 
but this gap may be filled from a study of Ashurbanipal's relations with two 
kings of Urartu.
33. AS 5, 54.96;
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Diplomatic Contacts of Assyria with Anatolia
(c) Urartu
Two embassies from kings of Urartu, Rusa II and Sarduris III, are 
recorded in the inscriptions of Ashurbanipal, only that from Sarduris, however, 
beiny related in the annals. Both are of interest because they exhibit diplo­
matic techniques more clearly than elsewhere in Assyrian inscriptions.
The sources for the embassy of Rusa II to Ashurbanipal are (i) a 
superscription on a relief and (ii) a tablet listing these superscriptions, 
but not verbatim:1
s'
I — KUR LU v V  V  _  V  V'
Rusa sar urartu ... MAH.MES-su ana sa'al sulmeya ispura
"Rusa the king of Urartu, ... sent his envoys to enquire of
my health."
De-spite the prominence in the superscription of the reference to
the Urartian envoys, two of whom are shown on the relief being presented to
Ashurbanipal, the focal points of the relief are the exhibition of two Elamite
envoys who had delivered insolent messages from their king, Teumman, and the
2
execution of two rebels. The superscription states that the Urartian envoys 
were shown both these scenes, the implication being that breaches of diplomatic 
etiquette and breaches of faith with Assyria were severely punished. These 
public spectacles were no doubt intended to impress the Urartian delegation but
the annals do not refer to the embassy whereas there are two references to the
3
Elamite envoys and one to the punishment of the rebels. The exclusion of the 
Urartian mission from the annals of Ashurbanipal suggests that it did not bring
1. (l) VAB 7, 316, (and cf. ibid., 332, 28f); this text is given above, 
(ii) ibid., 430. Sm 1350, 9ff, also in E.F. Weidner: AfO 8 (1932)180, 12
which edits all these lists and superscriptions.
2. J.E. Reade, AMI NF9 (19"/6) lOo and Tf. 22,2; also A. Paterson: Assyrian 
Sculptures: Palace of Sennacherib (1915) nos. 65-66 where the Urartians are 
portrayed watching the executions on the left of the relief and on the right 
being presented to Ashurbanipal.
AS S  60ff, 94-98; 72ff, 57-65; 74, 83-86;
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Ashurbanipal any material success or prestige and was therefore not a fit 
subject for inclusion in a document specifically intended to glorify the king 
of Assyria and his gods.
Ashurbanipal writes, in the superscription, that Rus5 of Urartu 
had sent his envoys to enquire of his health when he heard of the prowess of
Ashur, i.e. Ashurbanipal' s victories (IRusa sar ^^rar^u da nan dAssur beliya
v _ v _ . . v 4  —
ismema pulufrtu sarrutiya ist>upsu-ma). This implies that previously Rusa had
not corresponded with Ashurbanipal and that it was only Assyrian military
success which led him to open relations with Ashurbanipal. However it is known
that Rusa had enjoyed a treaty-relationship with Esarhaddon, probably on
5
terms of equality. It would be unusual for a king to refuse to recognise
‘ 6
the legitimate successor of an ally for fifteen years and the Assyrians might 
therefore be expected to have commemorated Rusa's embassy in the annals as an 
event of diplomatic significance. It must be postulated either i) that Rusa's 
embassy was not his first diplomatic contact and, therefore, that Ashurbanipal's 
reference to the Urartian's hearing of his victories did not imply this or (ii) 
the Urartian embassy did not merit inclusion in the annals. It was noted7that 
the ceremony of askir^ the king's health is not evidence of the first contact of 
two countries and Ashurbanipal's insertion of the clause describing Rusa's awe 
on hearing of the Assyrian victories may be no more than rhetorical exaggeration 
in order to extract the maximum political prestige from the incident. Had Rus"a 
been acknowledging Assyrian suzerainty the annals would have been almost certain 
to record the event but their silence, the evidence of his relations with Urartu
^  —  Vwhich Ashurbanipal gives elsewhere and the likelihood that sa'al sulme does not
4. VAB 7, 316, 3-5;
5. Ash. 106, iii, 29, 32ff;
6. The date of the Assyrian campaign against Teumman: AS 5, 62, 5-8; ibid., 
105-108;
7. above p. Ml ;
- U9 -
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indicate an act of subservience all contradict this view.
The second diplomatic contact between Ashurbanipal and Urartu occurred
in c644 B.C. when Sarduris III sent an embassy to Assyria, recorded in two 
9
texts. The annals contain a fuller version than the Ishtar slabs but both
agree on the principal features:10
1istar-dufi sar KUV arti sa sarrani abesu ana abeya istanapparuni
— I V v   y  /\ ^  ^ ^ ^ ,
ahutu enenna ( Istar-duri) dananu epsetu sa ilani rabuti isimuinni ismema
—  v    — V  -v________________ _ ->/ —  —  V
(kima sa maru ana abisu istanappara belutu u su ki pi annimma) istanappara
_ v v — — , v v V V v_urnma lu sulmu ana sarri beliya (palfois kansis tamartasu kabittu usebala adi
mafrriya)
"Sarduris, king of Urartu, whose ancestors had always sent brother­
hood to my ancestors, now heard of the might of the deeds which the great gods 
had decreed for me and (as a son sends sovereignty to his father, so he in that
manner) kept sending saying, 'May it be well with the king my lord'. (In
reverence and obedience he sent his heavy tribute before me.)"
The omission of the reference to tribute in the later text may 
indicate that at this later date Sarduris had ceased to send tribute. Alter­
natively, and perhaps more likely, it was omitted for the purpose of abbreviation 
just as the phrase about father and son was replaced by the more standard motif 
"fear overcame him".11
In terms of contemporary politics Ashurbanipal was exulting in the 
acknowledgement by Sarduris of his subordinate position vis-a-vis Ashurbanipal.
8. A.T. Olmstead: History of Assyria (1923), 4 most clearly expresses the 
belief that sa'al £ulme indicated submission; also VAB 7, 20 n.6; Ashurbanipal 
and Rusa VAB 7 84, 40-50 and below p. 5>0f f . ;
9. R.C. Thompson: AAA 20 (1932) 87, 121ff; written in c639 B.C.^ VAB 7, 84,
40ff; the date of the embassy rests on the dating of Prism A in which the last 
historical event recorded is this embassy. It may therefore be assumed that the 
embassy occurred shortly before the writing of the prism. On the date of A:
H. Tadmor, 25th International Congress of Orientalists vol.I (Moscow, 1962) 240f;
10. The annal passage (VAB 7, 84, 40ff;) is given here, bracketing those’
phrases not found in the slabs which, however, have the phrase hattu elisu 
imqutiha("fear fell upon him") instead of kima sa maru ... kT pi annimma.
11. e.g. VAB 7, 120, 85; other refs.: CAD H, 150bf.
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This recognition was all the more pleasing to Ashurbanipal because previously
Urartian kings had corresponded with Assyria on equal terms. Before discussing
Assyrian concepts of sovereignty, vassalage and equality, it is necessary to
analyse the phrase l?a'51 sulme whose meaning is in this passage clarified as
nowhere else in Assyrian texts.
The frequent references in neo-Assyrian records to diplomatic missions 
y — vbeing sent ana sa'al sulme (Mto ask the health of") another king demonstrate
12the importance of this motif for diplomatic communication. As suggested
13above, the enquiry did not indicate submission but rather the recognition 
of another king by the opening of diplomatic relations. The standard method of 
communication was by letter in which the greeting formula at the beginning 
established or re-established the relationship between sender and addressee. 
These greetings invoked the gods to bless or protect the addressee, often using
V •• V y J. —
the word sulmu; e.g.: lu sulmu ana sarri beliya ("May it be well with the king, 
14my lord."). It might, therefore, be supposed that the enquiry about a king's 
health mentioned in records of diplomacy corresponded to the greeting in the 
letters which the diplomatic envoys carried. This supposition is corroborated 
by the occurrence in late Babylonian letters of the greeting-formula PN^ ^ulum 
sa PN^ ... isal ("P^ enquires the health of PN2 ...").15 No neo-Assyrian 
instances of this phrase are known but their absence might be due to literary 
fashion particularly when the stereotyped nature of the greeting-formulae in 
the letters is considered. It can be shown from the occurrences of the formula: 
PN, sulmu sa PN^ ... iM4l that it was not used solely as an introductory 
greeting at the head of a letter but also appears in the body of a letter when
12. e.g. VAB 7, 42, 134; ibid., 204, v.36; ibid., 64, 89; AS 5, 86, 56;
13. p. J; 3;
14. e.g. ABL 144, 145 and passim in greetings.
15. E. Salonen: St.Or. 38 (1967), 78-114 esp. 86ff;
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the writer wishes to send a message to a person or persons not named in the
16introductory address. The phrase is also used outside the heading of a letter 
when the writer wishes to pay his respects to a person other than the addressee 
even though he has no message for that person.17 in these cases the formula 
is purely a formal gesture of politeness and respect, and is best exemplified
s’
in a letter which "greets" sixteen people and ends: Nadna sulum sa ta^metum-
tabnl, MIIna-Esagila-belit, "^ Sirku, ILiblut, IBurku, /-^I*^Naria-etirat /" J7
biti gabbi isalu, ("Nadna enquires of the health of Ta&rietum-tabni, Ina-Esagila-
—  —  —  —  18 belit, Sirku, Liblut, Burku, Nana-etirat £  andJ  of the whole house.").
The similarity of the greeting-formulae in neo-Assyrian letters to
those of the late-Babylonian period is clear and it is reasonable to assume
that though neo-Assyrian did not use the particular formula PN  ^^ulum ¥a PN^ ...
is&l as a greeting nevertheless the ^a'al sulme motif in royal inscriptions
corresponds to the greeting-element in the diplomatic correspondence. It may
further be postulated that this greeting was a formal gesture of politeness
and respect, indicating recognition.
The act of greeting itself did not constitute an admission of either
inferior or superior status and such a hierarchial distinction was made by
appending a word or phrase to the greeting. Thus in most neo-Assyrian letters -
no matter what the exact greeting was - the inclusion of the word beliya by the
sender indicated his subordinate relationship to the addressee; e.g. lu sulmu
v - - 19
ana sarri beliya ("May it be well with the king, my lord.") in this respect
the embassy of Sarduris is particularly significant because the Assyrians
describe the manner in which his greeting was made:
—  V  _  —  V  y  _  —  v —  —  y
kima sa maru ana abisu istanappara belutu u su ki pi annimma istanappara
_  V  V _____________ —
utnma lu sulmu ana sarri beliya.
16. E. Ebeling: Neubabylonische Briafe (1949) nos. 6, 40, 326.
17. ibid. nos. 39, 224, 254, 301;
18. ibid. no. 6; also no. 301;
19. e.g. ABL 384; belu was not confined to the king: e.g. ABL 382, 500, 505;
- 5? -
" ... just as a son always sends (messages acknowledging) sovereignty
to his father, so he in that way kept sending (messages) saying, 'May it be
20
well with the king, my lord'."
The editors of this text were clearly at pains to explain Sarduris'
action as one of submission because they included the phrase about a son's
21
relationship to his father in order to clarify Sarduris' act of homage. As 
further reinforcement of the change in status which Sarduris was making, the 
text specifically states that previous Urartian kings had written as "brothers"
to Assyria (^ arrani abesu ana abeya istanapparuni afrutu. "His ancestors had
22always sent (messages of) brotherhood to my ancestors. nS Such a greeting of 
"brotherhood" is given in a letter from Esarhaddon to Urtaku, king of Elam
in which the Assyrian greets the Elamite as his brother and wishes health on
23his family, land and nobles. In Assyrian sources a clear statement of the
implications of recognising another king as one's brother is lacking but from
the embassy of Sarduris it can be seen that the Assyrians conceived of those
rulers in communication with them as either "brothers" or subjects who acknowledged
their sovereignty. In the sense that a "brother" was not subject to the Assyrian
king and was recognised as such he may be said to have been on equal terms with 
24him.
Although the use of belu was the only true indication of submission
V
to another ruler, in some cases sarru ("king") also indicated an acknowledgement
y ^  ^ -
of vassalage. This may be inferred from the expression ana sa'al sulme sarruti 
("to ask my kingly health", i.e. to ask my health as king.) which is used in
25
the inscriptions of Ashurbanipal to describe missions coming to make submission.
20. VAB 7, 84, 40ff;
21. This elucidation is omitted from the Ishtar slabs (above p. i|9 n. 9 ?) 
version of this incident but without loss of meaning. This confirms the 
explanatory nature of the phrase.
22. VAB 7, 84, 40ff;
23. ABL 918, obv. 1-8; similar "fraternal" greetings in ABL 879, 1151;
24. further discussion of parity in diplomacy, below p. 60 ff; 
war 7 AO. iia. ibid.: 204, v.36; 64, 89; AS 5 86, 56;______
_ _
One of these missions was sent specifically to greet Ashurbanipal (ana sulme)
26but then put before him requests to be recognised as an Assyrian vassal.
These were two distinct phases of the diplomacy: first the greeting then the
v _ Vrequests for Assyrian patronage, but both were subsumed under sa'al sulme 
sarrutit.
Kings used each others’ titles in the address and greeting-section 
27of their letters, but vassals and subjects usually addressed their sovereign
merely as <£arru.28 This is probably the distinction to be made on the greeting
v — V y _
of a king as monarch (sa'al sulme sarruti) and the greeting of him as an equal,
29whether using afru or just putting the king’s full title. Thus independent 
rulers could address a king using his title (e.g. sar ^^ssur^1) but if they 
denoted him as ^arru alone then they were tacitly acknowledging him as overlord.
The status of the correspondents in international communication was
established in the headings of the letters by the use of at)U to indicate nominal
equality, belu or, less common, sarru alone for relationships of vassal and 
suzerain but it may be significant that only in letters between equals reciprocal
wishes of good-will are included while a suzerain writing to his subject writes
v —■ v 30only sulmu iasi ("it is well with me"). It was therefore incumbent upon a
subject to enquire of his lord's health but not vice versa. If such patterns
of greeting are comparable with diplomatic custom then the paucity of references
v
to Assyrian missions ana sulme may be explained because, as senior partner in 
most of its diplomatic relationships, Assyria would not have taken the initiative 
but would have awaited the greetings of its vassals. Even the two occasions
26. AS 5, 86, 54-63, cf. M. Weippert, WO 7 (1973-74) 78, ii 50 - iii, 11;
27. e.g. ABL 918, 1151;
28. e.g. ABL 338 and passim in neo- Assyrian letters.
29. Winckler: AOF. I, 394, n.l is a succinct discussion of jfa'al sulme but 
misinterpreted by Streck: VAB 7 20 n.6, 85 n.5;
30. e.g. ABL 287, Iff; ABL 288 et seq.
on which it is recorded that an embassy "for greeting" was sent to a foreign 
ruler can be seen as reciprocal gestures or recognition of a king who was 
already known to Assyria. In the first, Ashurbanipal responded to the mission
of Ualli of Mannai, which had come to express submission to Assyria, by sending
v v 31his messenger sa sulme ("of greeting"), and in the second Ashurbanipal
complained that even when he protected Elamite princes and nobles and returned
them to Elam they rewarded him by making captives of the messengers which he 
v 32had sent ana sulme. These cases show conclusively that the enquiry about a 
king's health did not imply subservience and they also support the supposition 
that Assyria undertook reciprocal gestures of good-will but did not formally 
initiate a relationship since to do so might have been considered an act of 
weakness.
33It has been shown that the Assyrians required a vassal to maintain
relations with them by a constant flow of messages. Interruption of this inter-
34course by the vassal might result in Assyrian hostility, as in Gyges' case.
V — . . .The use of the iterative form of saparu (to send), indicating repeated, constant
or uninterrupted correspondence, in descriptions of diplomatic missions underlines
the importance of this aspect of the relationship between rulers, whether on
equal or unequal terms.35
The most significant facet of Sarduris' embassy to Ashurbanipal is
the change in diplomatic status which he undertakes by recognising Ashurbanipal
31. AS 5, 54, 86-96;
32. ABL 1260, obv. 8-15; the presence of the Elamites at the court of Assyria 
may have placed them under an obligation which allowed Ashurbanipal to treat 
them differently from other independent rulers.
33. above, pj-|3ff»;
34. VAB 7, 20, lllff;
35. n.34,Gyges; VAB 7, 84, 40-48, Sarduris; cf. AS 5 58, 41 Urtaku; VAB 7 
314, E, 2 and 328, 32 , Teumman (see below);
as his overlord. The historical background to his mission is unknown and 
therefore the cause of his submission to Assyria remains uncertain but the
depradations of the Cimmerians and/or Scythians may have been a major factor
36in his willingness to submit. It has also been suggested that Sarduris'
accession or soon after it would be the most suitable occasion on which to
37undertake such a mission. In support of this view it may be noted that both
v_
Gyges' son Ardys and Ahseri of Mannai's son, Ualli, sent missions to Assyria
38when they succeeded their fathers. This suggests that it was desirable to
re-open relations with other rulers as soon as possible after the death of a
king and that the opportunity might be taken to re-establish previous good
relations or change the status of the relationship.
The practical outcome of submission to Assyria is not immediately
apparent in the cases of Gyges and Sarduris. The texts do not make it clear
whether they were soliciting active Assyrian support or military aid and it
is difficult to see how Ashurbanipal could have satisfied their pleas in any
effective manner. Moreover if Ashurbanipal had sent forces to Gyges then an
explicit reference to it in the annals would be expected. Closer co-operation
between Sarduris and Ashurbanipal, if such existed, may have been directed
against the Scythians whom Ashurbanipal claimed to have defeated but there is
39no proof of Assyrian collaboration with Urartu. On the other hand, Gyges and 
Sarduris must have hoped to gain something from submission to Assyria, especially 
if their motive was fear of invasion by the nomads. Esarhaddon had accepted the 
vassalage of some rulers of the Zagros and on their behalf defeated their 
enemies but the text of this incident states quite explicitly that they requested
36. R. Labat in Fischer-Weltgeschichte (ed. E. Cassin) 4 (1967), 90; CAH III, 118
37. C. Lehmann-Haupt, ZA 9 (1894) 342ff., VAB 7, CCI^XXVI, n.3;
38. VAB 7 22, 120ff; AS 5 54, 86ff;
39. R.C. Thompson; AAA 20 (1933) 88f;
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aid (erisuinni kitru). It is, therefore, obscure what advantage Sarduris
and Gyges hoped to gain from their submission to Assyria.
41
It was observed that the stereotyped formulae of the Assyrian
annals conceal, with or without intent, the reality of relationships between
Assyrian and foreign rulers. The ideological necessity to promote the king of
Assyria and his power prevented a completely accurate representation of the
varying statuses of foreign rulers in relation to Assyria, all of whom were
ardu (vassals) who were overwhelmed by Assyrian might. As was seen with Mita,
the "submission" of foreign kings was not necessarily as abject as the Assyrians
portrayed or would have liked to believe, and Gyges' opposition to Assyria
shows how in practice the Assyrians were powerless to punish their more distant 
42vassals. It may, therefore, be proposed that the diplomacy practised by the 
Assyrians was circumscribed by ideological concepts which insisted, in formal 
terms, on a highly-stratified order of international relations in which the 
king of Assyria was pre-eminent and conceded no equals. Their practical dip­
lomacy, which strove to maintain this ideology but which had to recognise its 
limitations, can best be observed in the letter about Mita in which the 
exigencies of practice prevailed over the ideology. Similarly the "submission" 
of Gyges and Sarduris may have counted for little in practical terms but were 
significant for the ideology of Assyria, especially that of Sarduris who was - 
as Ashurbanipal exultantly proclaims - forfeiting the privileged relationship 
with Assyria which his ancestors had enjoyed.
40. Ash., 54f; 32-45;
41. above p. 37 •
42. VAB 7, 20f, 111-120;
Diplomatic Contacts of Assyria with the East
(a) Elam, c670 - c640 B.C.
From Ashurbanipal's royal inscriptions and the correspondence in the 
Nineveh archive it is possible to study in detail some of the diplomatic 
encounters between Elam and Assyria. Attention is concentrated on three 
incidents or relationships which are of particular interest for diplomatic 
history. The background to the history of Assyria's contacts with Elam at this 
period is better known than her dealings with Phrygia, Lydia or Urartu because 
not only were those contacts spread over a longer period and achieved greater 
prominence in the annals but also many letters relating to the relationship 
between Assyria and Elam are extant.1
i) Urtaku
In c664 B.C. Urtaku, king of Elam, attacked Babylonia while Ashurban-
2ipal was occupied with the second campaign against Egypt. Previously he had
been on good terms with Assyria, being addressed in a letter by Esarhaddon as
_ 3
afriya ("my brother") and with full diplomatic punctilio. Moreover Ashurbanipal
had provided him with relief when there was a famine in Elam which demonstrates
that friendly relations between Urtaku and Ashurbanipal had continued the
4
relationship begun under Esarhaddon. Ashurbanipal castigates the Elamites' 
conduct on several grounds;
1. Studies of the history of Elam: G.G. Cameron, History of Early Iran (1936) 
185-211; W. Hinz, The Lost World of Elam (1972) 152-161; recent studies of the 
period in greater depth: S.S. Ahmed, Southern Mespotamia in the time of 
Ashurbanipal (1968) and F. Malbrun-Labat, JA 2 63 (197 5) 7-37;
2. TWA, p.56, Rm. 281 vs. 1-7;
3. ABL 918, 1-8; see also Ash., 58, 26-33 on Elamite relations with Esarhaddon.
4. AS 5# 5bff, 18-26; ABL 295 obv. 4-12;
I V —  . t  -  . —  —  . -Urtaki ... sa tabti abi baniya la hassu la i$$uru rbrute ...
V — — . V V — V ^sa tebussu itti libbiya la dabbaku la hassaku gilitsu ... sa la agrusu
"Urtaku ... who was not mindful of my father's beneficence, who 
did not keep faith with the parity-agreement ... whose onslaught and attack 
I had never considered or imagined ... with whom 1 was not in conflict ..."
These indignant and self-righteous remarks indicate that the 
unexpectedness of the attack was a breach of diplomatic propriety between kings 
in friendly communication with each other. Ashurbanipal did not account himself 
"at war" with Urtaku and was therefore shocked when he was attacked. Urtaku's 
subterfuge was carefully planned and involved a ruse to delay Ashurbanipal's
reaction to the invasion of Babylonia:
V — LU —  _ . v v . . v . . 6sut geranisu sa sulumme istanappara ina mafrnya
"As for his envoys of good-relations he kept sending before me ..."
First reports of the Elamite invasions of Babylonia had already 
readied Assyria but the presence in Nineveh of Elamite envoys affirming the 
good-relations with Assyria caused Ashurbanipal to despatch his own messenger 
to establish the truth about the invasion before launching his counter-attack.
This deliberate attempt to conceal hostilities by maintaining diplomatic 
contacts combined with the unexpectedness of the attack to hamper Assyria both 
diplomatically and militarily. Ashurbanipal emphasises, by his use of the 
iterative form of the verb saparu ("to send"), that this was not a single 
embassy which chanced to be in Assyria when fighting broke out but rather a 
normal, regular flow of envoys designed to create the illusion that good-relations 
were still in force.
?. AS r>, 56ff 18-33 (Cyl. B which is the most detailed account of Uitaku's
mission).
t?. AS S8, 40f;
Ashurbanipal's anger at the uncalled for and unforseen invasion 
suggests that there may have been customary diplomatic gestures preceding 
a foreign attack, i.e. a declaration of war. There are no references to such 
a formal declaration in neo-Assyrian texts apart from the alleged message of 
'iVumman of Klam:
vv — . . v . v— . - 7ul umassir adi allaku ittisu ippusu mitfrusutu
"I shall not give up until I go and fight a battle with him
(Ashuibanipal) ."
This statement was the culmination of a diplomatic campaign which, 
the* Assyrian sources imply^was aimed to provoke a conflict, and it followed the 
refusal by Ashurbanipal of Teumman's demand for the return of Elamite refuges.0
In this respect it is interesting to note a message which Ashurbanipal sent to
v' . . .  9Indabigas of Elam about the failure to repatriate Assyrians captive in Elam.
The Assyrian threatened to invade Elam and dethrone Indabiga£ because Nabu-bel-
v
sumate, the Assyrian rebel, and his family had not been sent back to Assyria. 
The threatening and abusive tone of the message and its subject - the refusal 
to repatriate exiles - is similar to Teumman's vow to attack Ashurbanipal and 
these similarities suggest that such messages were the standard response to a
10refusal to repatriate. They may, therefore, be a type of declaration of war.
Apart from these communications giving warning of belligerence, 
Assyrian texts do not refer to specific declarations of war. However the 
misconduct, of vassals either by not communicating with Assyria,11 by omitting 
to si id tribute,1^  or by sending to other kings messages of hostility to
7. AS L>, 64, 2 it; cf. VAB 7, 190, 9;
B. As , 62, iv 96-v 3; see below p. 6
9. AH 7, I42f., viii cf. IWA, 17 ix and 23; also TWA 19, K.3073; see below
P-
lu. \i instance of a her.ald prior to a battle: TCL III, line 111;
II. .‘i. tivges: above, p. )• 3f* ; VAB 7, 20, 1.1 If;
13. A.i H2, >; *lx:L 111, line 312;
Assyria,* each of which was, in Assyrian eyes, iust cause for regarding the 
vassal as hostile frequent. The regular fulfillment of these statutory
obligations by vassals was therefore a convenient method of ascertaining their 
1ova 1;y,showing that sins of omission were of equal weight with those of 
commission. Independent kings, however, were not subject to such impositions 
and their attitude toward Assyria could not be measured in the same way.
Regular correspondence was a partial substitute because by maintaining mutual 
friendly communieation with a ruler one could presume that he wished to remain 
on tr iendly terms. The suspension of diplomatic intercourse was, therefore, a
signal of possible hostility. Urtaku broke this important dictum by opening
hostilities while at the same time maintaining a flow of envoys tc the Assyrian 
court..
Ashurbanipal's censure of Urtaku includes the phrase la issuru ibrlite
("--- he did not keep faith with the parity agreement.. . .  The use of ibru
("colleague/equal") in neo-Assyrian historical texts is confined to three
incidents apart from this one: i) Esarhaddon's description of the revolt of
I v KUR —Ba'al of Tyre who relied on Taharkah of Nubia ( ... ana Tarqu sar____ Kusi
ibrisu ittaklumaff ii) Ashurbanipal's comment on some Assyrians captured by
A _ v —  , V  —
the treacherous Nabu-bel-sumate with whom they had been on guard ( ... sa kima
— — v v 15
ibri u tapi*? nagar matisu ittanallaku ittisu); iii) an account of Teumman of
Elam's >>ulraqeous conduct toward the family of his predecessor, Urtaku, and his
—  —  —  16relationship with Assyria ( ... ibru la kenu tappu la nagir tabtj
The use of ibru, especially when linked with tappu, to describe
1 <. above, p. f; also VAB 7, 12, L29f; ibid. 64, 91 for examples of anti-
Assyrian piots.
14. Ash. ^ /!*, vs. 12 cf. ibid. ^ b7 vs. li;
l1'. \ ' , Mil, Mil;
In. IWA, /I; K2672 VS. 20; ibid. pi. 28;
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comrades or colleagues is well attested in Akkadian literature. In social
or economic contexts it denoted companionship and community of interest as
well as collegiality but its transposition into diplomacy and international
politico creates interpretative problems. The association between Ba'al of
Tyre and Tuharkah of Nubia was one of association or alliance against Assyria
but it annot be proved to be a formal relationship bounded by a treaty or sworn
agreement. Similarly Ashurbanipal's charge that Teumman of Elam was a disloyal
ally who did not keep faith with Ashurbanipal's beneficence does not imply that
a formal relationship was in force. The use of nasaru ("to guard, keep faith
with'M might suggest a formal agreement since nasaru is frequently used of
18treaties and oaths, but also of royal orders, justice and, as in Teumr.tan's 
case, of beneficence. On the other hand, it can be argued that if a sworn 
treaty botween Elam and Assyria had been in force Ashurbanipal could have used 
either adu or mamitu which he employs elsewhere for formal treaties. Ibrutu 
itself would, therefore, have to imply a sworn agreement embodying oaths if a 
formal alliance were postulated. This seems unlikely not only because ibrutu 
describes a particular relationship, not the instrument by which it is brought 
into beinq, but also because of the consistent use in neo-Assyrian historical 
texts of mamitu and adu, both of which refer to the instrument not the relation­
ship, for a sworn agreement.
If ibrutu was only an informal association between rulers their mutual 
obligations must have been formally undefined. Such a relationship would not 
have been conceded to an obviously subject or inferior ruler and ibrutu could 
therefor* onlv exist between independent powers. It may be significant that
17. Notably in the Gilgames epic but also in the Old Assyrian economic texts: 
CAD I >b-Ha for examples.
18. e.g. Ash. 46, 41; VAB 7, 12, 118f;
19. e.g. VAB 7, 12, 118f; ibid. 70, 67 and 76, S4;
- 6^
Assyria's only concession of ibrutu was, as far a- is known, to Elam with 
whom she had had an unstable but long-standing relationship. Urartu is the 
only other power likely to have been on terms of ibrutu with Assyria but it is
likely that Esarhaddon had a formal treaty with Rusa II which makes ibrutu -
20if it only denoted an informal agreement - unlikely.
It is known that correspondence between Urartu and Assyria was
21conducted on terms of ahutu ("brotherhood") and that Urtaku wrote to Lsar-
22
haddon as a^iya ("my brother"). It is not clear, however, how addressing a
fellow-ruler in letters as afru related to ibrutu. An explanation may lie in
the terminology of diplomacy used in neo-Assyrian inscriptions. Previously no 
concessions to the equality of foreign rulers with the king of Assyria had been 
granted by the editors of these texts, from ideological reasons, but the rela­
tionship with Elam required the use of a term implying equality of status.
However the use of afru was confined to correspondence and to use ahutu in
inscriptions would have been anachronistic in the extreme. Therefore ibrutu 
may well have been coined to denote the relationship of Assyria with Elam. It 
also emphasised the element of friendly association which the more technical 
and formulaic a^utu did not.
The use of ibru and ibrutu in Ashurbanipal's inscriptions shows that 
he was prepared to concede that Assyria could and did participate in diplomatic 
relationships in which the state did not claim to be recognised as master.
Even so this did not indicate that Assyria was willing to acknowledge true 
parity-status, defined in formal terms ratified by a treaty. Ibrutu, as argued 
above, was not a formalised treaty-bound alliance but a relationship of close-
2°. Ash. 106, 32;
21. se« above p. 119 f; VAB 7, 84, 40ff;
22. abov' •, p. 1>Y f; ABL 918, 1-8;
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association and amity based on peaceful communication. it did not impose 
obligations of a defined nature on either party but demanded continuing peace­
ful co-existence which in this case was shattered by Urtaku's invasion of 
Baby J on i a.
i i >Teumman
•"he diplomatic contacts of Ashurbanipal and Teumman of Elam, as
preserved in Assyrian records, aroused great rancour on both sides perhaps
2 ibecause their relationship prior to the dispute had been amicable. The
Assyrians claimed that Teumman had sent aggressive demands (mer»htu) for the
extradition of some Elamite princes and nobles who had fled to Assyria when
Teumman came to the throne. It seems that it was not only the request itself
but also the insolent form the message took and, perhaps more significantly,
Teumman's arrogant behaviour within Elam which annoyed the Assyrians.
The request for extradition of exiles was not unreasonable especially
since Esarhaddon is known to have repatriated Urartians whom he encountered in
one of his campaigns, though he explicitly mentions a treaty (adu) which may
24
have stipulated repatriation in one of its clauses. Teumman, on the other
hand, was acknowledged as an ibru by Ashurbanipal but this did not necessarily
25obligate the Assyrian to return Elamite exiles to their home-land. It may tx= 
in the interpretation of the duties of ibrutu that the dispute between Ashurbani­
pal and Teumman arose since the Elamite could argue that such close association 
was pxcjudiced by the harbouring of influential Elamite exiles by Assyria; it 
was, therefore, within the spirit of ibrutu for Ashurbanipal to return the exiles .
23. AS 5, bOff, iv.87 - v.3; IWA, K2672, obv. 20; ibid, pi.28;
24. Ash.. 10b, 28-34;
25. IWA 7|, K2f>72, vs. 20;
The Assyrians would have stressed that no such obligation was implied by
ibrutu and that the Elamites had, by graspinq Ashurbanipal's teet, put them-
26
selves under his protection.
This difference of interpretation may have been the underlying cause 
of the dispute between Teumman and Ashurbanipal but it was exacerbateu by the
persistence and insolence of the Elamite messages to Assyria:
- . — - - I - I d / ' -  v v 27... merehete ina qata Umbadara u Nabu-damiq istanappara arhisam
" ... the insolent/aggressive (messages) he kept sending month by
month iii the hands of Umbadara and Nabu-damiq."
[t is possible to suggest the way in which Teumman's message was
said to be meientu: after the refusal of the extradition-request Teumman
called out his forces and vowed to fight with Ashurbanipal which utterance is
28also called metohtu. This vow is similar in style to a message sent by
29Ashurbanipal to Indabigas of Elam about the Elamite's failure to repatriate 
some Assyrian subjects, and it may be that Teumman's merehtu consisted of 
threats if his extradition-request were not granted. Threatening messages 
would also explain the strength of Assyrian hostility to Teumman and his request.
The conduct of the Elamite missions to Ashurbanipal was in the hands
— Z'of two envoys, Umbadara (Hutnban-tahrah) and Nabu-damiq. It is unusual for
v V V
envoys to be named and the prominence given to these Elamites, both in 
inscriptions30 and reliefs,31 demonstrates the strength of feeling their mission 
aroused in Assyria. Ashurbanipal made an exhibition of them to visiting Urartian
26. Assyiiun reluctance to surrender the exiles may also have been based on 
thoii usefulness as potential allies of Assyria it they came to power in Elam.
A similar situation which states this more explicitly.: VAB 7 , 34ff, 23-41;
27. AS 5, 02, 97ff;
■■ —  —  -
28. AS 5, 64, 20-25
29. VAB ' I42f, viii; cf. above p. 99 f; a message very similar to Ashurbani-
pal's: IWA 09,Sm. 252, 2 ff, which is called meiehtu;
M. .-\S_ '2, '*7; 72, 60;
31. i. t uvudo : AM 1 . NF 9 (1976) 100 and Tt. 22, . epigraphs on the.. reliefs:
VAB >, t) M. v f. ibid. 4l9f Sm. I <50 vs II, Rs. Jtf;
-  by-
envoys, stiessing the meientu of the messages they had brought, and, later, 
made them look on Teumman's severed head when it was brought to Nineveh.
Ashuibanipal also states that he had held the Elamite envoys in 
Assyria and trom his complaint about Elamite detention of his own envoys it 
may be concluded that diplomatic envoys were not inviolate. The status of 
foreign envoys is not made clear in Assyrian records but these detentions, 
though arousing Ashurbanipal's indignation when his own envoys were seized, 
are not represented as illegal. It may be that no distinction was made between
envoys and other royal officials since Ashurbanipal refers to one Llamite
v_ _ v- 33
envoy as the sut-resi ("official") of Teumman and elsewhere seems to refer
— v, _  -gt*. _ v -  34
to one of his own mar-sipreti as sut-resiya. This is the only evidence from
neo-Assyria on the position of envoys in the administration and it suggests
that diplomats were not a separate corps within the Assyrian bureauc racy but
rather individual members of the administration, commissioned to fulfil a
35specified diplomatic mission, 
v
(in) Indabigas
After the death of Teumman Elam was ruled by the pro-Assyrian
Ummanigas but two civil wars within four years resulted in the accession of
v 36 . .Indabigas. The sequence of events m  the relationship between Ashurbanipal
and Indabigas is uncertain but the initial contact seems to have been made by
g  V —  , A
Indabigas who sent his messenger sa fubi u sulumme ("for good-relations and
friendliness") with a request to Ashurbanipal to act favourably toward Elam and
37 . v'not to invade her. As an earnest of his good-will Indabigas returned some
32. Ab r-, 72f f; 57-61; ABL 1260, 15; perhaps also AS 5, 76, 38f
•»: <-
33. VAB 7, 314, E, Iff. cf. 328, 31ff; this Elamite envoy is also named and 
his mission too is described as erbanis, "insolently", conducted.
34. AS 5, 76, 37 f f;
36. on Mic: status of envoys see below p.
36. . » ameron: History of Early Iran (1936) 190ff; Fiseher-We 1 tgeschichte
4 (oa. * . '*assin) (1967) 88f;
37. Ab . 80, 77-92;
_  ( t
Assyrians who had been captured in earlier clashe by Nabu-bel-sumate.
This gesture is reminiscent of Mita of Muski's initial contact with Jargon II
when he returned Assyrian subjects as part of his diplomatic mission. The
desirability of such gestures of good-will, particuLarly when opening diplomatic
relations, is demonstrated by these two incidents.
VIndabigas' appeal to Ashurbanipal to support, him and not to invade 
Elam r« l Loots his concern as a usurper about possible Assyrian aid tor the
previous king of Elam, Tanwnaritu, who had been received at the Assyrian court
39 Vand who was urging the Assyrians to restore him. Indabigas spec 1fioally
—  A  V
asked Ashurbanipal not to invade Elam (la hate tnitjir matisu) just as Esarhaddon
40
claims Elamite messengers had done in his reign. By making concessions and
V
adopting a deferential tone toward Ashurbanipal, Indabigas hoped to prevent
Assyrian involvement in Elam and he may have been temporarily successful,
because Ashurbanipal did send him a letter with cordial greetings, though not
41
as fulsome as those between Esarhaddon and Urtaku:
. v idvv v KUR vv ki I . v v
yuppi sa Assur-ban-apli sarru sar Assur ana Indabigas sar
vnjj k i  v v _ v    v  42
Elamti abi.su sulmu iasi ana ekalliya /~.... Z7 lu sulmu /I ...._y
V
"Tablet of Ashurbanipal the king, king of Assyria, to Indabigas, 
king of Elam, his brother. It is well with me, with my palace £...._/, may 
it be well /with you, with your palace
v
Ashurbanipal in this greeting recognized Indabigas as a legitimate 
and friendly king and as a political equal. The rest of the letter is broken
and its contents cannot be restored but from the greeting alone it may be
18. On Nabu-bel-sumate: F. Malbran-Labat, RA 26j (1975) 7-37;
39. AS 3, 78f f 58-76; VAB 7, 34ff, 23-36;
40. Ash., 58f, 26-33; the author of this request was presumably Urtaku.
Assyrian concern about Scythian invasions is similarly (ihrased in the Large 
Ishtar Slabs: R.C. Thompson: AAA 20 (1933) 89, l5bf;
41. ABL 9 I 8
42. AMI IIM. cf. M. Dietrich: Die Aramaer Sudba by Ionic ns im der .^argonidze it 
( 700-048' i Nc ukirchen—Vluyn, 1970) 106f and 110 it. 4;
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assumed tnat the import of the message was essentially friendly. Ashurbanipal's
• V .account ol his contacts with Indabigas m  edition B ends with the Elamite
mission to Assyria which might also be taken as proof of Ashurbanipal's
v. 43
acceptance of Indabigas' overtures. However in edition C there is a frag-
v
mentary account of later dealings with Indabigas which reveals a change in the
44 V
relationship. Edition C recounted Indabigas' mission in the same words as
B but followed it immediately by an account of Ashurbanipal's reply in which
v
the Assyrian claimed that Indabigas had not restored all the Assyrians
captured by Nabu-bel-sumate nor the rebel himself; Ashurbanipal gave warning
v 4
of his intention to invade Elam and dethrone Indabigas because of these lapses.
Edition C has telescoped the chronology of these events in order to
v
give the impression that Ashurbanipal's reaction to Indabigas was one of
unqualified hostility. However, both the evidence of edition B, which suggests 
v
that Indabigas' mission was successful, and the letter from Ashurbanipal to
v
Indabigas prove that good-relations were in force between Ashurbanipal and
Indabigas for at least a limited period.
It has been necessary to reconstruct the relationship between Ashur- 
v
banipal and Indabigas in detail in order to show the importance of diplomatic 
recognition as a formal act and also the subordination of such formal gestures 
to the dictates of political expediency. Ashurbanipal aimed to nullify possible 
Elamite aggression by supporting those rulers of Elam who were pro-Assyrian 
and maintaining good relations with others. After the faithlessness of
V
Ummamigas, the Assyrian nominee, and the equally hostile attitude of Tammaritu,
v
Ashurbanij>al was probably unsure of Indabigas' policy toward Assyria. He was
43. AS HO, 77-92;
44. VAB /, 142ff, viii 47-74, to be supplemented by IWA 13ff;
45. TWA I /, ix (65)-(76) + IWA 20, 81-2-4, 172 col. (b) 1-12 makes it clear 
that Indabigas' mission and the Assyrian reply were related consecutively. 
Additional «onfirmation: E.E. Knudsen, Iraq 29 (1967) p.68, tablet 55i3| and 
pi. XXV
vable, however, to reciprocate the friendship requested by Indabigas while
y
simultaneously supporting Tammaritu in Assyria as a possible rival to Indabigas
46
as lie had supported the sons of Urtaku as rivals to I'eumraan. His threat
vto dethrone Indabigas and the resulting orders to the Assyrian army were
v
sufficient to cause an internal rebellion in Elam which overthrew Indabigas
47and replaced him with Ummanaldas.
It can be seen that though Ashurbanipal certainly opened friendly 
v
relations with Indabigas, but probably refused to give a guarantee of non­
intervention in Elam, this did not prevent him from later threatening to attack
v y___
Elam. Indabigas' messengers are specifically said to have been sent sa tubi u
/\ 4b
sulumme ("for good-will and friendly relations") and if this was the
relationship implemented by Ashurbanipal then it does not seem to have implied
49close links of a particularly friendly nature. Ashurbanipal attempted in
V
edition C‘ to disguise his recognition of Indabigas and subsequent hostility by 
maintaining that his immediate reaction to the Elamite's mission was unfavourable
v
but this assertion is contradicted by his letter to Indabigas. It may be
concluded that Ashurbanipal realised that he had committed a breach of diplomatic
v
conduct by first receiving and later rejecting Indabigas with whom he was 
probably on terms of sulummu u tubtu. Ashurbanipal may also have been aware 
that his threatening message to Indabigas was reminiscent of a similar message 
sent to Assyria by Teumman which was regarded by the Assyrians as mer#^tu 
("insolent").^0 Though neither of these messages were such serious breaches 
of diplomatic propriety as Urtaku's unannounced invasion of Babylonia, never­
theless; they certainly promoted stress on an international level, as they were
46. see above p. 6 ?
47. VAB 7, 144, 67ff;
4«. As HO, 91;
49. .sulummu u tubtu below p.93 ff; it may be significant that later versions
of Ashurbanipal's dealings with Indabigas seem to >mit the references to
tviendlv relations: K3073, llff (IWA, 19) and al .• Kl 749 ix 4 81-2-4, 172
( IWA 1 r. 2d)
SU. s> above p. ff;
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probably intended to. It is, therefore, not surprising that later recensions
of Ashurbanipal's annals were edited so as to contain no references to his
v
abortive friendship with Indabigas.
The tensions between the formality of diplomatic practice and political 
or military advantage can best be seen in the relationship of the letters 
between monarchs with their historical background as presented in the Assyrian
y/ #
inscriptions. Indabigas’ precarious position within Elam is illustrated by
his request to Ashurbanipal not to invade his land but even so Ashurbanipal
51extended to him a greeting on equal terms. Similarly Ashurbanipal wrote to
Tammaritu of Elam in cordial terms though the most likely date for the letter
52is after the Elamite's restoration as king of Elam by the Assyrians. Both
these kings were nominally independent but their position was dominated by
Assyrian interference and influence. Nevertheless they were still acknowledged
as equals and independent princes in official documents.
y
whereas both Indabigas and Tammaritu might have still claimed some
stature as kings, Utrenanaldas III was ruler of only part of Elam which in his
53
reign had been devastated by repeated Assyrian invasions. Even so Ummanaldas 
still addressed Ashurbanipal in a greeting-formula as abiya ("my brother"), 
though his deference to the king of Assyria is clearer in the body of the letter
A —  V  —
where he agrees to the extradition of Nabu-bel-sumate. Diplomatic protocol 
dictated that he maintain formal greeting with Ashurbanipal on equal terms 
despite lus lack of any political or military strength.
The formality of diplomatic greeting and recognition in neo-Assyria
51. see above p. 6); and 65 ; AS 5, 80, 90; ABL 1151;
52. ABL 1022, S.S. Ahmed, Southern Mesopotamia ... p. 180; ABL 1260, obv.5-15
may refer to Ummanigas who was another Assyrian nominee who received Ashurbanipal's
recognit.ioni i.
53. Most .onvcnicntly in G.G. Cameron; History ot Early Iran (1936) pp.l95ff;
on the dau see M. Falkner, AfO 17 (1957) 113f;
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can be seen to be artificial when the effective political status of the various
rulers is considered. Kings of Elam were nominally the equals of the kings of
Assyria as were the kings of Urartu. Assyrian jubilation on Sarduris III of
54Urartu's surrender of his equal status can therefore be explained.
Ummanaldas of Elam did not, however, disavow any of his rights although his
V
political position vis-a-vis Assyria was far worse than that of Sarduris.
The artificiality of diplomatic etiquette is a corollary of the 
formalised approach toward international relations as a whole. This has been
noted in the discussion of the contacts of Sargon with Mita of Muski where their
—  55relationship, as revealed in the letter about Mita, was seen to be different 
from that implied by the formalised diplomatic language of the historical 
inscriptions. The weaknesses of such a rigid artificiality were apparently 
noted in the reign of Ashurbanipal when the king of Elam was accorded a 
relationship (ibrutu) previously unknown to neo-Assyria in order to attempt to 
introduce flexibility into diplomatic relationships with equals. However the 
failure of ibrutu with both Teumman and Urtaku and the instability of Elam 
thereafter put an end to this experiment. The tensions between, on the one hand, 
formalised diplomacy, the ideology of Assyrian superiority and the enshrinement 
of these concepts in official records and, on the other, the dictates of 
practical diplomacy remained unresolved.
54. see above p. *'9 ff;
55. above', p. ♦
Diplomatic Contacts of Assyria with the East
( ' Zagros tribes: Medes, Persians and Mannea
References to Assyrian contacts with the tribes of the Zagros, the 
Medes and Persians in particular, occur in the records of Shalmaneser III and 
his successors- but only from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III onwards is 
sufficient evidence available on diplomacy to permit a detailed study. Im­
portant aspects of Assyrian diplomatic practice are, however, revealed in 
accounts of her dealings with Medes, Persians and Mannea from the reigns of 
Sargon II, Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal.
Tiglath-pileser III claimed in a stela to have received mandattu
-  -  -  2 from all the city-rulers (bel-alani) of the lands as far as Mount Bikni and
from the annals it is known that he organised the conquered lands into provinces 
3
with governors. It seems therefore that Tiglath-pileser preferred to annex 
these territories and add them to the provincial system rather than to allow 
them to remain tributaries. This policy may have been influenced by the 
political fragmentation of the tribes of the Zagros who did not acknowledge
4 _
an overlord, preferring to follow several leaders, the "city-rulers" (be 1- 
alani). This is particularly true of the Medes whose be 1 alani seem to have 
been their highest political authority. Such a multiplicity of petty rulers 
would have been difficult to control as independent tributaries and it was, 
therefore, more advantageous to incorporate their lands into the Assyrian 
provincial system.
1. K. Michel, WO 1 (1949) 472, 3f; WO 2 (1954) 36, 35; 228, 172f; 230, 185; 
also 156, 120 for a reference to tribute (mandattu); R.C. Thompson, AAA 19
(193?' 113 Q 11; P. Hulin, Iraq 28 (1966) 84f. ND 5571, 4; J.V. Kinneir-Wilson,
Iraq 24 (1962) 94, 19; E.F. Weidner, AfO 9 (1934) 102, 32; JR 30 ri 40, iii 
27, 3 3; ibid., 35, 7ff; R1A 2 (1933) 428ff C b 1. 8, 17f, 24-31 and rev.4;
cf. 5fn' 348, 24;
2. On ’•ho historical geography: L.D. Levine, I) an 11 (1973) 1-28 and 12 i 1974) 
^9-124; The stela: L.D. Levine, Two Neo-Assyriai stelae from Iran .'Ontario,
19 72) 11-24;
<• !'- Kost, Die Keilschr iftexte Tiglat-pi leser ITT (1893) (hereinafter, Post)
Vol.ri .1. XXX, 3ff, pi. XXXII, 18 - pT. XXX iff. Y, pi. XXVI 29-38
I* It is possible to studv in detail several asp- of Assyria's relationship
with Mannea from the reign of Tiglath-pileser II' that of Ashurbanipal, a
longer period than any other international liaiso onsidered above. Most 
instructive arc the detailed accounts of Sargon II's dealings with Ullusunu
*
of Manned.
Tiglath-pileser III did not include Mann* a in the territories he
5
annexed out received its ruler Iranzu as a tributary. Sargon later supported 
Iranzu when some Mannean territory revolted and it may be assumed that Iranzu 
had remained loyal to Assyria from the date of his reception by Tiglath-pileser 
Sargon's intervention was followed soon after by the death of Iranzu but when 
his son Azd was put on the throne of Mannea by Sargon some Manneans were 
suborned by Rusa of Urartu to attack and kill Aza. Another son of Iranzu, 
Ullusunu, became king of Mannea but, probably influenced by Urartian pressure 
and his brother's death, he did not renew contact with Sargon, preferring to 
approach Rusa. Sargon undertook a campaign (his sixth) to restore Mannea to 
its former allegiance but was forced to burn Izirtu its capital before Ullusunu
Q
came to beg forgiveness. Ullusunu was reinstated as king and he acknowledged
himselt an Assyrian vassal, remaining loyal to Assyria thereafter. In the
seventh campaign Sargon again restored territory which had been appropriated
by Rusa of Urartu to Mannea and commemorated his onquests by settina up a stel 
9in Izirtu.
4. (tmni previous page) TCI. 3, 12, 66;
5. Levine, Two neo-Assyrian Stelae ... 18, 24ff;
6. Lie, H, 58ff;
7. Win* Kb i , 104, .16-38; Lie, 12ff, 78ff; Levine, 1 wo neo-Assyrian telae ...
36ff, 23-32; ~~~
8. Winck iei, 104, 38ff an account which corflates at least two camt>aigns;
Lie, 14, 81-89; Levine, op.cit., 36ff, 23-30; ABL i058, obv. 7ff may relate 
to Ullusunu's hostility.
9. Lie, Uiff. 101-109; cf. Wi ickler, 104ff, 39-' ■<; these accounts conflict
on details and interpretation bf the territory 1< • ’ to Urartu and subsequently
res tor* d
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Sargon's most forceful campaign in thi:. area was his eighth, best
known from the "Gottesbrief^ From this detailed account several important
features of Assyrian diplomatic relations with their vassals emerge, principally
in the description of Ullusunu's conduct toward sargon. Their first encounter
during the eighth campaign was at the fortress til sinihini where Ullusunu
presented his tribute (mandattu) and kissed Sargon's feet.11 Since Ullusunu
was already an Assyrian vassal and was not attempting to apologize for some
misdeed it can be seen that kissing the feet of one's overlord was a normal
act upon meeting him, not a gesture reserved for extraordinary occasions.
Grasping or kissing a king's feet was an overt gesture of subservience to him
- v - 12and of recognition of his sovereignty (epes arduti).
Sargon's campaign then turned away from Mannea but when he returned
13Ullusunu awaited him with stores of wine and flour for the army. This was
one of the duties of an Assyrian provincial governor, as Sargon himself states,
and Ullusunu's obedience in this respect is stressed in order to emphasise his 
14loyalty. Explicit demands for provisions are not well attested in treaties 
and Ullusunu's action, therefore, shows a remarkable degree of loyalty.1?
Apart from stressing Ullusunu's obedience in action Sargon remarks upon the 
commitment he and his people showed to being vassals of Assyria:
10. TCL III; annals in Lie, 22-28;
n * tc*1j 111 8' 32“36?
12. above p. ^9 ; E.G. Klauber, Politisch-religiose Texte ... 
(191J) 105, 13;
13. TCL III, 10, 51ff;
14. The translation of Luckenbill (ARAB II § 148) is misleading.
4
15. Sefire, 18, 37ff and 71ff notes ad loc.; cf. E. Lipinski, Studies in 
Aramait Inscriptions and Onomastics (Leuven, 19751 42-44 and 52;
V  —  v — . lc. ina tagmirti libbi sa epes ardutiya
"... wholeheartedly disposed to beiny my subjects".
This phrase is reminiscent of some elau-.es in treaties where true
loyalty - as opposed to lip-service - is demanded.11
Ullusunu made two other significant gestures, apart from providing
the supplies, on the arrival of Sargon's army:
V A y •—  # V* ' # , y /
inarsu rabu itti igise sulmani usatlimannima ana kunni sanutisu
a v  18 lpqidda aarasu.
" ... he presented to me his eldest son with yreeting-gitts and 
entrusted his stela to me in order to safeguard his rule."
The passage presents two interpretative problems: first, it is not
v v — Aclear to whom the suffix -su ("his") on sarruti and nara refers, second, the
A —
meaning of nara pagadu is dubious. The proximity of the son's presentation 
to sarrutu could suggest that Ullusunu was ensuring the succession of his son 
but there may be no significance in the juxtaposition of the two events. The 
phrases recording them are joined by -ma but similarly -ma joins the phrase 
describing Ullusunu's provisioning of the troops with his presentation to 
Sargon of his son. The use of enclytic -ma in linking these phrases is, there­
fore, not a sure indication of any causal link between each of the actions 
described.
vThe use of sutlumu ("to make a present of, to hand over") is
unusual here since it is employed most commonly at this date in royal epithets
19to describe the gods' bestowal of qualities on the king. It is also used of
i6. T< 1, III 10, 52.
17* XilL' lines 51, 53, 9 8 , 152, 169, 310, 38b; k. Frankena, OTS 14 (1965) 
140f; Sef'ire, 80 B.5; E.F. Weidner, AfO 8 (1933) 25.iv.3;
l8* Tbh 1 U , 10, 54;
19. M.J. Seux, Kpithetes royales ... (1967) 3J4f;
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V V . . .Assur granting a king the capture of a town ami t ’lie giving of offerings
20 Vto the gods. It seems that sutlutnu indicates act of outright oift-
qivinq, not a presentation in the sense of appealanee before a king. Ullusunu
was, therefore, Vianding over to Sargon his eldest son.
A  «.
Nara paqadu is an idiom otherwise unattested. It is more common
a
for naru to indicate the stela itself, not its writ ten contents and had Sargon
v _ *
wished to commemorate the inscription he could have used sataru ina nan
21which is found elsewhere in neo-Assyrian inscriptions. It is possible that
nara here is a Viapax but such an explanation affords no solution to the problem
of interpretation.
The phrase kunnu sarruti ("to safeguard the kingship ") is more
22commonlv used by kings protecting or confirming their own kingship, but one
example of the establishment of dominion by a king on behalf of his sons is 
23known. This phrase cannot, therefore, provide an unequivocal answer on 
whether Ullusunu was safeguarding his own or his son's succession.
The historical context of Ullusunu's gestures provides some evidence 
with which to interpret them. Ullusunu is not known to have feared deposition 
either by Sargon or hostile rulers such as Rusa of Urartu, although the un­
certainty of his neighbours' intentions may have influenced him to make a formal 
gesture to Sargon. The sending of the eldest son to the Assyrian court as a 
pledge of good-relations is attested in neo-Assyria but it is not certain
whether they were always retained as hostages or were allowed to return as a
24sign of Assyrian good-will. In Ullusunu's case there may have been another
2°. VAB i, 198, 29ff; £IP_2, 116, 70; 125, 50;
A A  —
21. see A11W 749a sub nara 2a; a possible paral!* t to nara paqadu is suggested
by W.F. Albright; JAOS 36 (1917) 228;
A
22. for example, CAD K 167a, kanu 3k;
23. AHL 7, rev. 4, 6 (=LAc no. 143);
24. :.e* Ix low p. 8P - 8 ' ; Lie, In. >2;
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< ause for the surrender of his son to sargon. wi ,t they first met at Sinihini
Sarqon comments that Ullusunu came balu li£i ("wi nout hostages"), an indication
25that Assyria did not require such pledges from a 1 >ya1 vassal. Ullusunu may 
have realised that Assyrian confidence in Mannea was now so strong that he
could entrust his heir to Sargon in the knowledge that if he himself were to be
26deposed Assyria would promote his son in his pla • . To this end he made- his 
son a voluntary hostage of Assyria but at the saim t imo gave sargon '.he docu­
ment, on which he nominated his son as heir.
It cannot be concluded with certainty that Ullusunu by presenting 
his eldest son to Sargon was protecting his son's future exercise of kingship 
and not his own nor can the significance of the entrusting of the steLa to 
Sargon be fully explained. The bond of loyalty In*tween Ullusunu and his over­
lord can however be asserted with confidence and Uliusunu's subsequent courting 
of Sargon confirms this.
The elaborate preparations made by Ullusunu for Sargon's arrival were 
not altrustic. He intended to make specific requests of Sargon in order to make 
sure that the Assyrian subdued the enemies of Mannea. Apart from providing the 
supplies for the army, the gifts and his own sop ullusunu gave mandattu to 
Sargon in addition to that which he had presented on their first meeting at
Sinihini. However, while Sargon was receiving these contributions Ullusunu
w  v 27supplicated him assu turru gimillisu ("to return an act of kindness tor him"'..
Turru gimilla is used of avenging dead ancestors cr vassals but it is also
found in contexts where vengeance is inappropriate. For instance Sargon 
Vsupported Ispabara as a claimant to the throne ot Fllipi, an action described 
28as l urru gimi 11a. Similarly Marduk-apla-iddinci [ I of Babylon gained the
25. TCI. Til , 8, 33f f ;
'-O
26. rf. VAB 7, 18ff, 81-94;
27 * 111 - 10, 55;
28. Winckler, 118, 118-120;
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V
support of Sutruk-nahhunte of Elam by bribing hi He thereby put the Elamite
. .   # , y
under an obligation and the Assyrians called him M s  be 1 qimillisu ( "bene- 
2‘3factor"). Ashurbanipal proclaimed his own st.e «ing qualities as a king who
• —’ • V —• v'returned kindnesses to a loyal subject (ana palit,. i natjir amat sarrutisu utirru 
„ 30gimilli dumqi) and Ullusunu himself is said to have benefited from Sargon's
V V V  V  v'
annual camjiaigns (assu ana turn gimillisu sattisam la <ap> parakku: "because
31I (Saigon) had not ceased to return kindnesses upon him every year.")
In all these cases there is an element of obligation or reciprocity 
v
but not of vengeance. Sutruk-nahhunte and Ashurbanipal were under an obli­
gation to return the acts of good-will done them by their adherents and it 
may be significant that the party repaying the debt is always the superior.
This suggests that there were certain obligations on a king to support his
32loyal vassals and that by their loyalty they ensured this support.
Ullusunu enumerated the ways in which he wanted Sargon to "repay
his kindness" and though these requests are framed in a rhetorical manner
33their veracity should not be doubted:
i) to exclude the Kakmeans from Uliusunu's territory, 
ii) to defeat Rusa of Urartu in open battle, 
iii) to return the scattered people of Mannea to Ullusunu, 
iv) to triumph over Uliusunu's enemies, 
v) to attain all his (i.e. Sargon's) desires.
29. Lie, 54, 369; cf. CAD G, 75a;
30. NRGL) nos. 9-12 lines 9, 10;
31. TCL III, 8, 32;
32. A contractual obligation of turru gimilla occurs in the treaty of Hattusil 
III of Hatti and Ramses II of Egypt: PDK II, 11*-, 23;
33. TTi. Ill, 12, 56;
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It is important to notice that Sargon made a commitment to these
aims and fulfilled them all either wholly or in part during the rest of his
/
*4 v KUR , TjU  . _  -  . V -  .campaign. sepa Kakme nakri lemni ultu gen l> matisu tiarasimma (no.n
is paralleled directly in the description of the 3ttermath of the defeat of
S
— jjj KUR 3 5
Urartu: sei>a J nakri lemni ultu qereb Mannayya aprusma. The fulfillment
of Uliusunu's requests is even clearer in the cast of iii): libbi ULLusunu
belisunu u^ibma ana nisesu dalpate use$* nuru '^ ... "1 gladdened the heart
of Ullusunu their lord by liberating his harassed people (lit.: lotting light
go out. to his harassed people)."
The explicit reference to Ullusunu makes it clear that Sargon was
aware of the fulfillment of his vassal's requests and his commitment to do so.
The second request, to defeat Urartu, is implicitly fulfilled in the success
37of the campaign as a whole, as are i v ) and v) .
Uliusunu's petition to Sargon was couched in the proper subservient
language but it contained genuine grievances which Sargon was expected to put
right. The expulsion of the hostile Kakmeans from Mannea could only be
effected if Uliusunu's principal opponent, Rusa of Urartu, were conclusively
defeated. Sargon could then restore those Manneans who had been lost by
depradations to their homeland. Ullusunu may not have meant by this request
that Sargon should send back to Mannea those Manneans who were outside its
borders but rather that Sargon should restore lost territory to Mannea. This
v
is supported by Sargon's answer to Uliusunu's request: turn migrisun ("(I
38
promised) to re-establish their (the Manneans') borders"). Further
34. TCL III, 12, 61;
35. TCL III, 26, 155;
36. ibid. cf. 12, 61; also Winckler, 148, 21; F. Weissbach, ZDMG 72 (1918)
178, Hf; D.G. Lyon, Keilschrifttexte Sargon's ... (Leipzig, 1883) 5, 31;
37. TCL III 24, 142ff; the fulfillment of a king's desires is explivitlv 
connected with the defeat of his enemies in E. F. vtfcidner: Afo 8 (1932) 1M,
186, 11; 200, 74;
38. IV!. Ill, ] 2, 61;
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confirmation is provided by the restitution to Mu >*_a of the province of 
V vUisdis which had fallen away some years earlier.
Sargon agreed to Uliusunu's requests and lurther confirmed his trust 
in his vassal by preparing an honorific banquet t i the Manneans and the 
Assyrians together. This banquet served to affirm and consolidate the 
relationship between Sargon and Ullusunu and their respective lands. rt was
perliaps followed by a ceremony in which the two contingents solemnly acknow-
v v — ______ v , —  v — 4 0
ledged Sargon as their king (mafrar Assur u ilani matisunu lkrubu sarruti).
Sargon's relationship with Ullusunu is illuminated more clearly from 
these incidents in the eighth campaign than any similar relationship from the 
neo-Assyrian period. It may be concluded that although the vassal was in an 
avowedly subservient position he nevertheless had the right to appeal to his 
overlord for the redress of grievances. By remaining loyal the vassal both 
obliged the suzerain to continue to support him and expected to receive 
favourable treatment. Ullusunu was not a vassal ot long standing and had been 
anti-Assyrian on his accession so the responsibilities of the suzerain can be 
seen to apply to all vassals, not merely the traditional or wholeheartedly 
faithful. However the historical circumstances must have affected each 
relationship of vassals with Assyria and in Uliusunu's case Assyria needed an 
ally in the central Zagros to offset the hostility of Urartu and her satellites. 
Assyrian treatment of him may therefore have been more lavish and have received 
longer description in the eighth campaign but the underlying implication of 
the Assyrian treatment of Ullusunu remains the same: loyalty on the part of
subjects or vassals bound the king to respond in a similar manner.
39. TCL ITT 16, 91; 28, 163; Lie, 24, 163f and K, 78ff;
40. TIL ITT, 12, 63;
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Assyrian diplomacy with the tribes ot * Zagros is also attested
in the correspondence of the archives of Nineveh and NLmrud. A coherent
reconstruction of Assyrian policy cannot, however made trom the disjointed
references of the letters. Nevertheless the recurrence of Assyrian diplomatic
terminology, e.g. dibbi tabute ("words of good-will"), sulmu ("greeting"),
and the attested intervention of Assyria in the diplomacy and politics of the
area show that Assyrian diplomacy was active. Of particular importance was
the desirability of maintaining good relations with tribes and of formalising
41these relations by a sworn agreement. In some cases Assyria resorted to
42threats if her plans were not fulfilled by local rulers. Behind this open
manipulation of the tribes lay a highly-organised information-service which
reported on all activities of interest to the central authorities in Nineveh
43who co-ordinated policy.
ii) Esarhaddon's relations with the tribes of the Zagros are dominated by
44the documents known as the Vassal-Treaties of Esarhaddon. These agreements,
whose sole concern was the succession of Esarhaddon's sons, Ashurbanipal and 
v v v —Samas-sumu-ukin, to the thrones of Assyria and Babylonia respectively, were
45concluded with a number of rulers of the Zagros in b72 B.C. It is not 
intended to discuss the treaties here but rather to concentrate on the historical 
background which reveals several features of interest for diplomacy.
41. ABL 208; 1046; 1454; 126; 129;
42. ABL 17*; 713;
43. On the workings of this "Deuxieme Bureau", «ith reference to Urartu in 
particular, R. Follet, RSO 32 (1957) 61-81; also Il.W.F. Saggs, Iraq 20 (1958) 
182f f;
44. D.J. Wiseman, Iraq 20 (1958) 1-100;
45. ibid., 9-13;
Esarhaddon's control of the central Zaciios was not as complete as
, 46
that of Sargon and Mannea was almost certainly hostile to Assyria. However
it is likely that Assyrian influence was still pit valent because three city-
rulers (bel-ali) of Media appealed to Esarhaddon when they were threatened by
47other local rulers.
/
y V — y— ** V V LU — — — V —V — — —
... issiqu sepaya assu bel-alani sa gatu idkusunuti beluti
A —  v— . . . .
usalluma erisuinni kitn
" ... they kissed my feet. On account if the city-rulers who had 
threatened them they begged me to be their overlord and appealed to mt for 
aid. "
Esarhaddon responded to these requests for military support by
despatching the nearest Assyrian officers to subdue the enemies and, having
48fulfilled his obligations, made the three rulers Assyrian tributaries.
One of these three, Ramataia of Urakazabarna, was a party to the
treaties of 672 and he is likely, therefore, to have remained an Assyrian
49vassal in the interim. His formal contractual obligation dates from the 
earlier incident when he certainly acknowledged Assyrian sovereignty and the 
Vassal-Treaties must therefore be seen as a supplement, not the full record, 
of the relationship of Esarhaddon with Ramataia or any of the other signatories.
Parallels to the mission of the three Zagros chieftains are found in 
incidents from the reigns of Tiglath-pileser III and Sargon II. In the former 
a ruler, almost certainly of an area in the Zagros, came before Tiglath-pileser 
with tribute and kissed his feet. An Assyrian official was then dispatched to
46. Assyrian hostilities against Mannea, A. H e i d e l ,  Sumer 12 (1956) 16, 16-19;
47. Ash. 55, 39-41,
48. ibid. 55, 41-45;
49. At least three years - the prism published by Heidel (p. 81 n. '.6 )
is dated to 676 B.C.
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the land of the Medes, perhaps to undertake some action requested by the
50 . . . .suppliant king. The inclusion of this mission separately from the submission
of other areas of the Zagros suggests that it wa- an unusual event not felt
to cohere with their submission. The despatch of the Assyrian official might
also indicate a situation very similar to that or the three Zagros rulers in
Esarhaddon's reign.
The second incident concerns the dispute over the throne of Elam
51 von the death of the loyal Assyrian vassal Talta. His two sons Ispabara and 
Nibe appealed to Assyria and Elam respectively for assistance (kitru) in much 
the same manner as in the later incident from Esarhaddon's reign.
These three incidents all seem to have embodied requests to Assyria 
for military assistance from rulers who were not Assyrian vassals but who 
offered to become subjects of Assyria in return for aid. Two of them were 
certainly motivated by fears of intervention by a third party and preferred 
to acknowledge Assyrian sovereignty. This suggests that the overlord in a 
vassal-relationship had responsibilities and obligations toward his subjects 
even though no clause guaranteeing these rights is known to exist in first- 
millennium treaties. In acknowledging himself a subject of Assyria a king 
was automatically making his enemies the enemies of his overlord and thereby 
placing the responsibility for defeating them on the overlord.
iii) Ashurbanipal is known to have conducted only one campaign into the Zagros 
but he was successful in making the new king of Mannea, Ualli, recognize
50. The text is badly preserved: P. Rost, Die Keilsehrifttexte Tiglat-pilesers
III (Leipzig, 1893) II pi. XXXVI lines 38-42"! A translation in ARAB I 9 795.
A similar but shorter text does not mention this mission, Rost, op.cit. XXX if;
51. Winokler, 118, 119-120;
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52 vAssyrian authority. The previous king, Ahseri, 'nad not acknowledged Assyrian
sovereignty but the campaign caused his downfall and murder at the hands of
his people. Ualli sought to improve his positioi by submitting to Assyria:
V V  V  — V  A A —  —  X________________
assu balat napistisu upnasu lpta u§alla beluti Erisinni mar
.v ki . v w. v--- 53
ndutisu ana Ninua ispuramma unassig sepaya.
"To save his life he spread forth his hands and besought me to be
his lord. He sent his heir, Erisinni, to Nineveh to kiss my feet."
The use of the sons of a vassal as envoys in missions to Assyria
v v
is attested also for Ba'al of Tyre, Kuras of Parsumas and Mugallu of Tabal.
Ba'al's son may have been sent to Assyria as a possible hostage but Ashurbanipal
54 vreturned him to his father. Kuras' embassy is described in two slightly
55differing accounts: in the first a fuller version is given including the
reference to his son as a member of the embassy whereas in the second the
s'
embassy is merely described as ^^erane ("envoys"). The most conclusive 
evidence that a son acted as his father's envoy is contained in the description
of the embassy of Mugallu of Tabal who not only sent his daughter with tribute
- V  v v —  V V—
but also his son: marsu sattisam la naparka mandattasu kabitta usebilamma
vv v- — 57
unassid sepaya.
" ... his son he sent yearly without ceasing to bring his heavy tri­
bute and kissed my feet."
52. AS 5, 50-56;
53. ibid., 54, 91-94;
54. VAR 7, 18, 58-62;
55. E.F. Weidner: AfO 7 (1931-32), 4, 7-13;
56. R.C. Thompson, AAA, 20 (1933) 86, 115-118;
57. Thompson, loc.cit. 88, 141;
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Since Mugallu sent his son every year the Latter cannot have been
retained in Assyria as a hostage. In this case at least Ashurbanipal wished
to verify his vassal's loyalty by receiving the h* it to the throne of Tabal
every year. Similarly in Ba'al's case Ashurbanipal made the sending of his
heir a test of loyalty. Ualli's son, Erisinni, may have acted as a possible
hostage but he also undertook the requisite gesture of homage to Ashurbanipal.
v
Similarly both Kuras' son and Mugallu's son are said to have implored Ashurbani-
a  —  _ 58
pal to be their overlord (sullu beluti). These actions are those of envoys,
59not necessarily a member of a royal family. From Assyria's point of view,
the regular sending of the heir to a foreign kingdom as an envoy was likely to
inhibit revolt by his father and the performance of the submission-ceremonies
by a high-status individual was desirable because it gave a stronger guarantee
of the vassal's willingness to remain loyal. This can also be seen in the use
of other high-status envoys ($erani) in neo-Assyria, even though their exact
60identity is not known.
The frequent sending of the daughters of vassals to the Assyrian
court was a more permanent means of guaranteeing the loyalty of a vassal.61
Ualli's sending of his son to Ashurbanipal received a favourable response from
62the Assyrian and subsequently Ualli sent his daughter to the Assyrian court. 
Just as the value in diplomatic contacts of the eldest son was as a proxy for 
his father, the daughter was esteemed as a permanent sign of the relationship 
between the Assyrian king and his neighbours. It is difficult to be certain
58. ibid. and p. 83 n. 55 ;
59. e.g. VAB 7, 144, ix, 41-49; Thompson, loc.cit., 86, 117f;
60. see below, p. 1 1 7ff ;
61. VAB 7, 16, 55 - 18,80;
62. AS 5, 54, 96f;
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whether there was any element of status-defining in the sending, as opposed
63to the receiving, of a daughter.
v
The mission of Kuras of Parsumas, the grandfather of Cyrus the Great,
to Ashurbanipal provides one final interesting diplomatic feature. It arrived
in Assyria with the embassy of Pislume of Hudimeri and both embassies are
described, in the fuller account, as having implored Ashurbanipal to be their
lord (usalla beluti).6  ^ In addition Kuras mission was sent ana epes ardutu
("to acknowledge my sovereignty") while Pislume's envoys are described as 
v v 65sa sulme ("for greeting"). However the abbreviated account states that the
V _  A
envoys were sa fcubi u sulumme ("for good will and fnendly-relations") and
also unassiqu sepaya ("they kissed my (Ashurbanipal's) feet").66 The gestures
of kissing a king's feet and requesting him to be overlord can be seen to be
part of the same ceremony of the acknowledgement of subservience. Similarly
the messengers "for greeting" were recognising Ashurbanipal and implicitly
asking for his recognition of their sovereign. This greeting did not, however,
of itself confirm a particular status. The expression which seems out of place
is ^a t;ubi u sulumme, sometimes assumed to have been a relationship between
equals.67 The clear identification in this text of the recognition of vassalage
with fubu u sulummu contradicts this interpretation, but on some occasions it
68was used of alliances of equality. It therefore seems not to have carried
69
an implication of either inferior or superior status.
63. some discussion in PKB 142, n.856 and ABC, 209 Ashur-bel-kala?
64. E.F. Weidner, AfO 7 (1931-32) 4, 13 and 25?
65. ibid.;
66. Thompson, loc.cit. 86, 117f;
67. Grayson's translation "entente cordiale" av- ids this error but seems 
obscure : ABC 162 ii 1 and note.
68. e.g. Mabopolassar and Cyaxares: ABC 93, 29-
69. Further discussion of sulummu u tubu below p. 1 1!i ff?
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Assyrian diplomatic activity with the tribes of the Zagros can be
seen to have been intensive. The same diplomatic techniques employed in
areas with more sophisticated forms of government are in evidence but the
Assyrians were clearly uneasy with tribes who recognised no overlord and who
70neglected oaths and agreements. By the reign of Tiglath-pileser III rulers
such as Ullusunu were fully capable of fitting into the Assyrian diplomatic
and political stereotype as the evidence of his manipulation of the eighth
campaign shows. The same can be said of many of the other tribes in the
Zagros, the Medes in particular, but only in the reign of Ashurbanipal does a
v vclearly identifiable native king, Kuras of Parsumas, appear in the Assyrian 
records as a suppliant to the Assyrians. By this date the Zagros tribes 
were certainly aware of and able to comprehend Assyrian diplomacy.
The requests of Ullusunu and of the other Zagros rulers from the 
reign of Esarhaddon show that an overlord did have certain obligations to 
defend and protect his vassal in return for loyalty. Ashurbanipal's records 
demonstrate thatthis loyalty was continually being tested by embassies to 
Assyria, often including members of the royal family.
70. TCL III, 12, 66; ABL 1237, 16;
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Terminology of diplomacy
(a) sulummu
The only analysis of this word and its semantic range to date is by 
von Soden.^ His study concentrated on the qutulla^form of the noun, not on t ’c. 
meaning of sulummu itself. His conclusion on the meaning of this nominal form"
will, however, be seen to apply to sulummu although whether the use of sulummu
3
automatically implied a formal agreement will be disputed. Occurrences of
A
sulummu, including those not directly associated with international relations,
will be analysed in order to establish its significance in the diplomatic
language of the ancient near east.
In an Old Babylonian hymnic-epic text Adad is said to have somehow
a 4
encouraged warfare at the expense of sulummu:
... sasmam ilqema e sulumma
" ... he (Adad) took conflict as against (?) friendliness ..."
This translation is problematic since the idiom is otherwise unknown.
A
However the phrase salimu lequ is attested in two Old Babylonian letters where 
the context demands a translation of accepting or initiating friendly relations.^ 
This suggests that sulummu was not only contrasted with hostilities (sasmu) but 
also connoted a state of friendly relations. This is confirmed by two Amarna
1. Festschrift Koschaker, 199-207, esp.205;
2. ibid., 200 "... die Form qutf^ulla* nie ein zufalliges Ausuben der durch
das zugehorige Verbum ausgedruckten Handlung bezeichnet wird, sondern stets ein 
planmassiges, an bestimmte Gelegenheiten und oft wohl auch Verfahrensweisen 
gebundenes Tun."
3. ibid. 205 " ... sulummu ... den formlichen Eintritt in der Zustand der
Freundschaft durch ein 'Bundnisvertrag' bezeichnet."
4. HSAO 1 (]967) 186, i, 9 and 193;
5. J. Laess^e, The Shemshara Tablets, a preliminary report (Copenhagen, 1959) 
80, 29; id., AS16, 193, 25;
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Vletters in one of which the friendly mutual recognition of Tusratta of Mitanni
6 ^
and Amenophis IV of Egypt is shown by the use of afru ("brother"). Tusratta, 
however, wished to elicit a more definite statement of Amenophis' friendship 
and hinted that Amenophis might now communicate with him on terms of sulummu, 
although Amenophis' father had only been on terms of ramu ("love") with Tusratta.
A
It seems, therefore, that rulers could enjoy ramu, which probably implies good 
relations, without sulummu. Hence sulummu is a more explicit statement of 
friendly relations, perhaps a formal treaty - as suggested by von Soden's 
definitions of it.
In the treaty between Ramses II of Egypt and Hattusil/s III of Hatti
sulummu is shown to be an integral part of a properly formalised international
relationship:7
/adi um^7 anni ana nadani sulumnva damqa afcfruta damigta ina birinni
adi dariti
" (Ramses ... with Hattusilis ..., his brother) to establish favourable
sulummu and good brotherhood between us from that day forever ..."
This is the only occurrence of sulummu in a text which contains
many examples of other cognates of salamu and it is important to note that it
occurs in the section describing the conclusion of the treaty.While both sulummu
and afrfrutu are promulgated and affirmed in the treaty, they are not synonyms for
0
it nor do they describe it. This bi-lateral concept of friendly relations may
y
be compared with that implied by sulmu elsewhere in the same text where Ramses
—  V  V  ,is said to have seized (accepted?) the treaty ana epesi sulmi ("to accomplish
6. EA 29, 6f and 42, 18f; a new edition of the first in H-P Adler, Das Akkadische 
des Kbnigs Tusratta von Mitanni (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1976), 230?
37. PDK 114, 15f; trans. in ANET , 201ff.;
8. The editors of this text consciously chose sulummu in this context whereas 
elsewhere they preferred salamu. This subtle distinction of the two terms 
recurs in later documents.
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9‘11-being"). This seems to be a universal claim and to go beyond the strictly
10
L-lateral nature of the treaty.
Another important feature of this treaty is tin- antithesis drawn 
‘tween, on the one hand, friends and brothers (salmu anhu) and, on the other, 
lemies (nakru).11 The principal aim of the treaty was to establish the friendship 
id brotherhood (salamu u ahfrutu) of the partners, thereby automatically obviating 
jstility.
In the historical introductions to the treaty between Suppiluliumas 
fid Mattiwaza1" of Mitanni sulummu again appears:13
*Takuwa £ar URUNiya sulumme ana mat URUMuki£ho ana paniya ittalka 
"Takuwa, king of Niya, (for) sulummu came before me to the land of Mukis." 
Suppiluliumas had not conducted hostilities against Takuwa and it was
14resumably to forestall any such attack that Takuwa waited on the Hittite king.
t is possible therefore that sulummu here refers to the relationship defined in
- 15 treaty.
Two fragmentary references to sulummu occur in the historical introduc- 
ion to another Hittite treaty;^ in the first of these the citizens of a city 
eem to have requested sulummu from Suppiluliumas after seeing his opponents 
tfeated; in the second the inhabitants of Vfesukkanni are said not to have agreed 
o sulummu and subsequently the Hittites entered Wasukkanni.11 Two conclusions 
ay be drawn: i) not only rulers but also the inhabitants of a town could request
• ibi-d. , lib, 26;
v
0. Sulmu1s singularity in this context is emphasised by the fact that it occurs 
>nly once in this treaty.
1. PDK, 114-116 passim;
.2. On the reading of this name: C. Zaccagnini, Or.Ant. 13 (1974) 2 5-14;
.3. PDK 10, 30f;
.4. On Niya and the Hittites: H. Klengel, Geschichte ^yriens ... II (Berlin, 1969)
'0-74 and III (Berlin, 1970) 220f;
5. Weidnei (see note 13) translates sulumma as "Fried* n" explicitly dismissing
"Bundesgeno1 s«. nsehaft". Goetze (ANET^  318b) has "t ' .u* lor j*-ac« " and Laroc he
(Ugaritica (1969) 371f) uses "paix".
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16. PDK 46, 45 and 49;
17. The context of this second reference is so fragmentary that the identity 
of the other party to this sulummu is obscure.
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sulummu from a foreign monarch, and ii) sulummu may have been offered or 
requested as an alternative to hostile treatment by an enemy army. This 
second point corroborates the conclusion drawn from the im ident involving
A
Takuwa and suggests that sulummu was not necessarily a tully formalised treaty 
but could be a settlement concluded in more informal c.ir< umstances. The first
A
point shows that sulummu was not confined to an interpersonal relationship
between monarchs. However the bilateral structure of the relationship is still
apparent though functioning in a more sophisticated way.
That sulummu continued to be used for the intercourse of individual
monarchs can be observed in a letter - perhaps from Tukulti-Ninurta 1 of
18Assyria - found in the archives at Boghazkoi. The letter calls the writer's
father a be 1 nukurti ("enemy") of the Hittite king but claims that the writer
is be1 sulumme sa afoiya ("the friend of my brother"). Both the connection
between sulummu and afou and their antithesis to nukurtu ("hostility") are
19reminiscent of the treaty between Ramses and Hattusilis. It is again apparent 
that sulummu implies friendship between rulers and their states, a relationship 
which implicitly forbade any hostile actions or ill-feeling (nukurtu). However 
the writerwas apparently at pains to emphasise the juridical overtones of 
sulummu by calling himself bel sulumm4 where salmu ("friend") would have had 
a nearly identical meaning.
Even if the letter from Boghazkoi is only doubtfully attributed to 
Tukulti-Ninurta I, his own inscriptions provide a significant reference to 
sulummu.2  ^ The Assyrian king despoiled and plundered five cities of KadmuJju
18. ITN 40 no. 36 and cf. A.K. Grayson, ARI 1, 132f., 42;
19. See above p.8 8 ;
20. ITN, >>, 24; cf. ARI 1, 103, 692;
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which had attacked Assyria ... ina sulumme u sararfi ... (" ... through
friendship and trickery"). If sulummu refers to a state of friendly relations
between rulers then here it must denote a relationship which Tukulti-Ninurta
had with the cities of Kadmuhu and despite which they at tat ked him. This
treachery ( sarartu) may be compared with that of Urtaku of Elam who attacked
Assyria though being in correspondence on terms of sulummu.“ 1
The Assyrian indictment of the Kadmuhean cities' conduct rests on
their enjoyment of a positive relationship of good-will (sulummu) with Assyria
at the time of the attack. This association was not merely a passive
a  22co-existence, as might be implied by a translation of sulummu as "peace",
but rather a friendly co-operation of the two parties. This use of sulummu
shows that it denoted the state of friendly relations existing between rulers
who were on good terms.
The earliest references to sulummu in first millennium sources appear 
2 3
in the Synchronistic History where sulumma forms part of a stereotyped phrase
24repeated in several different places:
tubta sulutwna gamra itti a frames iskunu
"Good relations and complete unity they established with each other."
The combination of tubtu ("good relations") with sulummu confirms
a
the proposal that sulummu was a state of genuine good relations and co-operation 
and not merely a lack of hostility. It can also be concluded from at least one
A
incident that tubtu sulummu could be concluded after the victory of one party
over the other, which makes it unlikely that this phrase was an indication of
25 asome sort of parity settlement. The use of fcubtu sulummu in the Synchronistic
History suggests a purposeful determining of international relationships but
21. abovi . p. 1'7 ♦ and below p. 9l| ;
22. Weidner (ITN 3, 24) translates the phrase, "...die im Frieden und mit
Heimstucke"; Grayson (ARI 1, 103 /fe 92) "... during a dei eitful peace ...";
23. ABC 53 a-b;
24. ABC, 165 ii 27; 162 ii 1; 166 iii 18; 167 iii 2 4 and 2; also I■'-5 .6 where 
tubtu is rendered ideographically (DUG-tu) not syllabi' a 11/.
25. ABC, 16 iii 10-19;
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not necessarily the settlement itself. Rather it indicates the good-will and
friendship created by the agreement between the two parties.
Later Assyrian use of sulummu is confined to the inscriptions of
Sargon II and Ashurbanipal. In 720 B.C. Sargon defeated Iaubi'di of Hamath who
had instigated a revolt in the western Assyrian provinces. The rebel was
flayed alive, Hamath incorporated into the provincial system but Sargon's only
26comment on the other rebels is:
ina qereb alanisunuti bel ftitfi aduk sulummu usaskin
"I executed the evildoers in those cities and caused su1ummu to be
established."
A
Sargon cannot be employing sulummu as a formally agreed relationship 
since he names no partner and it can be concluded that at least in this case
A
sulummu connoted a friendly and peaceful state rather than a ratified relation­
ship. Furthermore Sargon is speaking of a relationship with his provinces, not 
independent or semi-independent rulers. This makes a reference to diplomatic 
agreements proper less likely. Whereas earlier references to sulummu had implied 
a state of good-relations arising from a bi-lateral diplomatic settlement, Sargon
seems to be using sulummu in a less specific manner, to denote normal, peaceful
• 27conditons not necessarily arising as a result of diplomacy.
Sulummu was still, however, closely linked with formal diplomacy
2 8as is shown by a reference in the annals of Ashurbanipal:
eli tarqu sar ^^Scusi ana sakan ade u salime uma'eru ^rakbesun umma
A V v —  —  —  V  A
sulummu ina birinni lissakinma nindaggara afoames matu ahenna nizuzma ai ibbasi 
ina birinni sanumma belum
26. Winckler, 102, 35; see RLA sub Hamath, Jau-bi'di;
27. TukuLtminurta's use of sulummu (above p. 9^ ) the closest to sargon's
in that he too seems to imply a state of good-relati* -us tather than a relationship.
28. VAB 7. 12, 23ff; cf. ibid., 160, 38;
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"To Taharkah, king of Kush, they (the Egyptian princes) sent envoys 
to estabLish a treaty and friendship (saying), 'Let us torge friendly relations 
between us and come to a mutual agreement. We shall divide the land between us 
(so that) no other man shall become lord among us.'”
The most important feature of this letter for a study of diplomatic 
terminology is the clear differentiation between sa1imu ("friendship") and 
sulummu ("friendly relations"): the envoys were instructed to seek a treaty 
(adu) and friendship (salimu) but the text of their message requested sulummu. 
This implies that sulummu combined both adu and sallmu, thus supporting the 
hypothesis that sulummu was the practical expression of a formal - i.e. treaty- 
bound - relationship which ensured friendly relations between two states. The 
letter also establishes that sulummu was closely connected with salimu but that 
the two terms were subtly distinguished.
Sulummu appears several times elsewhere in Ashurbanipal's annals, 
in most cases being associated with diplomatic missions. Urtaku of Elam used
29a ruse to delay Ashurbanipal's reaction to the Elamite invasion of Babylonia:
/
geranisu sa sulumme istanappara ina mafrriya
"He kept sending before me his envoys of good-relations..."
In view of Urtaku's known friendship with Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal's
support of him it seems more likely that these envoys were i>art of the customary
30 .diplomacy between friendly states. The continuing missions of Elamite envoys 
led Ashurbanipal to believe that friendly relations were still in force even 
when he had earlier been informed of the Elamite attack. Urtaku's relationship 
with Ashurbanipal was one of sulummu but was probably not bounded by a treaty."
29. AS S, 58, 40;
30. Esarhaddon and Urtaku: ABL 918 see also above p. 1 & ;
31. above p.feOff ;
This shows that monarchs corresponding on equal terms could enjoy sulummu.
Similarly sulummu could be established with politi<a! infi t 1 >rs: Natnu of
-  . ANabayyatu is explicitly stated to have gained sulummu from Ashurbanipal when
32he acknowledged Assyrian sovereignty:
V - A  A — V  A _  _
ana sakan ade sulumme epes arduti uganalla belut1 
" (he sent his messenger) to bring about a treaty and friendly 
relations, to do me homage and he begged me to be his over I»<rd."
The connection of sulummu with a formal agreement (adu) is here
emphasised and it can also be observed that it was compatible with vas.saLage 
(ardutu). However if sulummu were automatically the outcome of a treaty it 
is difficult to see why it is explicitly mentioned in addition to adu but it 
may be that sulummu was conceived of as separable from a formal agreement.
The juxtaposition of sulummG and tubtu in the Synchronistic History 
is repeated in texts from the later years of the reign of Ashurbanipal, all of 
which record missions to Assyria by foreign rulers. In the first, Indabigas 
of Elam attempted to gain Ashurbanipal's good-will by repatriating Assyrians 
who had been carried off to Elam and by sending a message to the Assyrian court;33 
LUniar siprisu sa tubi u sulumme usebila adi mafcriya
" ... he sent before me (the Assyrians by the hand of) his messenger
of good-will and friendliness."
vIndabigas, who had recently come to the throne, could not have opened
good-relations with Ashurbanipal prior to this mission and the envoy is therefore
_  A  3 4
probably attempting to bring about pibu u sulummu between Elam and Assyria.
32. AS 5, 86, 57ff; VAB 7, 144, 42ff; M. Weippert, WO 7 (1973/4) 78 iii 7;
33. AS 5, 80, 89ff; Borger, Bi.Or. 16 (1959) 139;
34. above p. £>5> ;
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There is, however, no evidence that Indabigas sought to become an Assyrian 
vassal.
However, when Dugdamme, the Scythian chieftain sent "envoys of 
good-will and friendly relations" (serani sa tubi u sulumme) t o  Assyria
Ashurbanipal imposed a settlement upon him in which the Assyrians tried to
t A
ensure the Serbians' loyalty. Here tubu u sulummu wore compatible with
vassalage. In the settlement imposed upon Dugdamme there is no reference to
tubu or sulummu though this had been the mission with which his envoys had
been entrusted. The implication should be drawn that there was no necessity for
such terms to be explicitly included in the formal settlement.
Envoys of good-will and friendly relations (serani sa tubi u sulumme)
are said to have been sent to Ashurbanipal by some unnamed rulers and also by
Kuras of Parsuma^ and Pislume of Hudimeri.36 All these rulers requested
Ashurbanipal to be their overlord and acknowledged their subordination to him.
y
The missions of Kuras and Pislume are recorded in two texts which give parallel
37
versions and it is clear that the abbreviated version chose to use tubu u 
sulumme in preference to longer descriptions of acts of submission to Assyria. 
Sulummu was, therefore, a relationship not necessarily confined to equal partners.
The arbitrary and seemingly capricious manner in which sulummu is 
included in or omitted from Assyrian records of diplomacy suggests that it was 
not reserved for a narrow category of actions but was a fundamental postulate of 
all friendly relationships. It could, therefore, be omitted without loss of 
meaning to the text or included if a rhetorical or more explicit statement of the
35. R.C. Thompson, AAA 20 (1933) 89, 153ff. restored by A. Millard, Iraq 30 
(1968) 109, 17ff;
36. E.F. Weidner, AfO 7 (1931/2) 4, 2ff; cf. R.C. Thompson, AAA 21 (1933) 86,
115ff; The identity of the first group of rulers is lost in a gap at the start 
of Weidnei's text; this group of envoys is said to be ana tubi u sulumme;
37. Thompson, loc.cit.;
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iti arelationship was required by the editors of the text. Whereas sulummu alone 
still retained some association with the means of achieving a settlement, i.e. 
the treaty, its combination with tubu seems to have given it a less specific 
interpretation which could be applied to any friendly international relationship. 
It might even be suggested that tubu u sulummti was the normal state of healthy 
relations between friendly countries and, therefore, not a type of special 
relationship.
Some scholars have maintained that sulummu was an archaic term confined 
39to diplomatic contexts but it appears in a report sent by Assyrian astronomers 
to the king :
X v V   — A v V
rubti sa sarri be1ini niltadad u sulummu sa sarru nitamar 
"We have brought the anger of our lord the king (on ourselves) but 
we now see the friendliness of the king."
This letter does not mention diplomacy or international relations
a . 41
and sulummu here cannot refer to the friendly relationship of rulers. It
was being used to describe the friendly attitude of the king (as compared with
his anger) and it may be significant that sulummu - the expression of friendship -
was employed in preference to sail mu which tends to have more abstract,
theoretical connotations.
In an omen text from the library at Nineveh sulummu is contrasted 
42with nukurtu:
a  vv
... ina egel nukurti sulummu issakkan
" ... friendly relations will be established with a hostile region."
• . v —  —38. Similar indiscriminate use of phrases denoting subservience, e.g. sepe
sabatu,beluti ?ullu, etc. can also be observed.
39. B. Landsberger and T. Bauer, ZA N.F. 3 (1927) B6f;
40. R.C . Thompson, The Reports of the Magicians and Astrologers of Nineveh 
and Babylon ... (London, 1900) no. 170 v.5? cf. AHW 1122a, ^adadu 14a'
41. E.F. Weidner, OLZ 15 (1912) 319, 16 (1913) 205; the letter concerns the 
observations of the planet Jupiter whose appearance is transferred to the 
actions of the king.
42. IT II, 50, 13;
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Sulummu, whether explicitly denoting a friendly relationship with a 
foreign ruler or the friendly intercourse proceeding from such a relationship, 
requires an expression of association. Even when Sargon established sulummu 
in his western provinces a bi-lateral connotation is present. Thus to translate
A V  V
ina eqcl nukurti sulummu issakkan as "in an enemy region there will be pea^e",
a 43is to pervert the meaning of sulummu because it presents no partneis between
whom sulummu can exist. It is more likely that the omen should be read from
an Assyrian point of view, implying the institution of friendly contacts with
a previously hostile land.
The antithesis between nukurtu and sulummu is reminiscent of that of
sasmu and sulummu in the Old BabyIonian hymnic-epic text and also the references
44from the second millennium treaties. This pairing of the derivatives of
salamu ("to be friendly") and nakaru ("to be hostile") indicates an important
conceptual antithesis which is of particular significance in diplomacy. Perhaps
its clearest expression is found in the account of Nai>onidus' diplomatic contacts
45when he was in Taima :
y KUR . . URU _ KUR . v _ . . . - *sar migir madayya arabi u napfoar sarrani nakirutu ana sulummu
u tubbati isapparuni ana maforiya
" ... the king of Egypt, the city of the Medes, the land of Arabia 
and all the kings hostile to me sent (envoys) for friendly-relations and good­
will to me. "
These kings were attempting to gain good-relations with Nabonidu; 
though previously they had been nakiruti ("hostile"). It is not, however, clear
43. CAD E 2 51a;
44. above p. 87f and also below p. 101 ;
45. C.J. Gadd, An. St. 8 (1958) 58, 93ff;
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what nakiruti implies since actual hostilities with Egypt and the "cities of
the Medes" (presumably referring to the Persians) are unknown. Both Nabonidus
and Amasis of Egypt were allies of Croesus of Lydia which suggests that they
46were or came to be on good terms and it is often assumed that Nabonidus and
4Cyrus the Great were in agreement against their mutual enemy, Astyages of Media.
Even if neither Cyrus nor Amasis had previously been in contact with Nabonidus
there is no evidence that they had been openly hostile to him. Nakru in this
case may therefore imply no more than an absence of previously friendly contacts.
This conclusion implies that in diplomatic terms kings were either
friendly (salmu), having had friendly contacts but not necessarily a binding
relationship, or hostile (nakru), having no previous friendly relations.
V
Nabonidus confirms this by invoking Istar, the goddess of battle, "without whom
d v _ -hostility and friendly relations do not exist in the land" ( Istar belit tafrazi 
v a  — v _ vv^ 48
sa nukurti u sulummu ina balisu ina mati la ibbassu). The stress laid by
Nabonidus on nukurtu u sulummu in this invocation and in his description of
the foreign kings' missions shows that such contrasts were not only an effective
literary motif but also a dominant concept in international relations.
The only other reference to sulummu in neo-Babylonian records is the
agreement between Nabopolassar of Babylon and Cyaxares of Media after the fall
49of Ashur in 714 B.C. :
46. Hdt.; I 77 ii-iv;
47. Gadd, loc.cit., 76-78 but cf. W. Rollig: ZA NF 22, 250-252 and 229;
48. Gadd, loc.cit., 58, 39f.;
49. AEC 9J, 29;
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sar Akkadi^1 u Iumakistar ina muhfri ali ahamc-s ittamru tubtu u 
sulummu itti a frames iskunu
"The king of Babylon and Cyaxares met near the city. They established 
good-relations and friendliness between them."
This incident is recorded in a chronicle and the phraseology conforms
V  —
with that of other references from chronicles. It seems therefore that sakanu 
tubtu u sulummu was a stereotyped literary formula in the chronicles for the 
establishment of friendly relations between countries. Nabopolassar and Cyaxares 
are not known to have been hostile previous to this encounter so a "peace"-treaty 
is unlikely.
This review of the extant occurrences of sulummu in Akkadian has 
established several points of interest for diplomatic terminology:
i) there was a fundamental antithesis of sulummu and nukurtu as 
the two conditions of international relationships.
ii) sulummu was connected with formal agreements, i.e. treaties, in 
many cases and originally seems to have been used only for the friendly 
relations consequent upon such an agreement.
iii) sulummu was not used as a synonym for treaty.
A
iv) In neo-Assyrian references sulummu seems to have been employed
with a less specific meaning, indicating a friendly state of affairs not necessarily 
a result of a treaty.
/i
v) A distinction was made between sulummu as the active expression of 
a friendly relationship and salimu, its conceptual counterpart.
The most important of these conclusions for diplomacy is i). Formal 
international relations were not conducted in terms of the diametrically opposed 
states ot peace and war, as in the modern world, but in terms of relationships, 
friendship and hostility. Thus states, represented by their rulers, were said 
to be "friendly" (salmu) when a relationship, whether formal or informal, was 
in force and hostile (nakru) when good relations were larking.
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Terminology of diplomacy
(b) salmu
Previous studies of this word in neo-Assyrian texts have assigned
to it the meaning of both "friend" and "foe".^ Landsberger and Bauer argued
that originally salmu was understood as "friend" alone and, as such, was
included in the merism salmu u nakru ("friend and toe"). They also suggested
that this close association led to a conflation of the two terms and their
subsequent misunderstanding as synonyms for foe or enemy. These hypotheses
rest on the postulate that salmu meaning "friend" was no longer current in the
neo-Assyrian period.
It seems unlikely that close cognates of salmu such as sulummu and salamu
should have been used in neo-Assyrian texts to indicate friendship while salmu
alone gained the transferred meaning of "foe". Furthermore Landsberger and
Bauer's arguments are refuted by the use of salmu in a Nimrud letter from Sargon
2
II to the governor of Que in which the former expressed his joy over the impending
good relations with Mita of Muski and claimed that the gods of Assyria had effected
— vthe change whereby Mita had given his word and become Sargon's salmu (pisu
v -  3ittannanasi ana salmini ittuar). The context demands that salmu mean "friend"
or "ally" and this is confirmed by the references to good-relations elsewhere
v , 4
in the letter.
Having established that salmu was current in neo-Assyrian for "friend" 
it is necessary to examine its other occurrences in neo-Assyrian documents.
1. Most explicitly B. Landsberger and T. Bauer, ZA NF 3 (1927) 80;
2. ND 2759. H.W.F. Saggs, Iraq 20 (1958) 182, re-edited by J.N. Postgate, 
Iraq 35 (1973) 22ff;
3. Postgate, loe.cit., 22.10; on Mita and Sargon see u I < V p.20 - 2v ;
4. ibid., 22, 38; 23, 47;
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Tukulti-Ninurta II claimed that he had imposed on Ammeba'Li, the ruler of
_ 5
Bit Zamani, an oath which included the clause:
v - - _ ^ v —summa attunu sise ana nakrutiya (KUR.MES-ia) salmeya tadnuni
dAdad xxxxxx f ... J
"If you give horses to my enemies (or) friends then Adad / ... "
On the analogy of other Assyrian treaties it is more likely that
the lacuna conceals a penalty than a blessing and therefore the stipulation
prohibits horse-dealing with anyone (except, presumably, the king of Assyria).
Nakru salmu here stands as a merism, a usage not uncommon in neo-Assyrian texts.
A similar phrase occurs in the Vassal-Treaties of Esarhaddon, where
vassals are forbidden to entertain any evil reports about Ashurbanipal whether
from members of his family, courtiers, priests or anyone else:**
- - LU .s/ s V - — v 7
... lu ina pi nakrisu(KUR-SU) lu ina pi salimesu
" ... whether from the mouth of his enemy or from the mouth of his
friend ..."
This line stands at the head of the list of specified individuals 
who might speak against Ashurbanipal and it acts as a merism subsuming the 
following categories. Its use is deliberately rhetorical, relying on the diplo­
matic connotations of nakru and salmu and it is, therefore, particularly suitable 
in treaties.
The clearest use of salmu u nakru as a merism appears in the inscriptions 
8of Sargon II;
5. V. Scheil, Annales de Tukulti-Ninip II (Paris, 1909) 10, 24f.; re-edited by 
W. Schramm, Bi.Or. 27 (1970) 147-160; Scheil's suggestion that PAP/KUR be read 
nagiru is not now accepted.
6. VTE, 37, lllff;
v
7. variant: salmesu.
8. TCL III, 22, 132;
- icn -
V  —... sa asar nakri u salmi la ipparakku
"(the troops who go at my side and) who do not leave (me) in
hostile and friendly country."
A similiar expression occurs several times in some of Sargon's 
inscriptions:
V V — _ 9
... sar asar salme idaya la ipparku
"(the troops) who do not leave my side in friendly country ..."
The contexts of these phrases all concern special detachments of 
troops, an elite corps distinct from the rest of the Assyrian army, who were 
on hand when needed and not part of the call-up system.10 The exclusiveness of
this group reinforces the merism of the first phrase from which it is clear
that this special detachment never left Sargon's side, whatever the country.
The second phrase requires the translation "the troops who do not leave my side 
even in friendly country"11 and it then conforms with the first. Both phrases 
are rhetorical figures to demonstrate the inseparability of Sargon's personal 
detachment and they make a greater impact if salmu means friend than enemy since 
to state that this elite corps did not leave Sargon in hostile country is to 
state the obvious.
It may be concluded that salmu meaning "friend" was current in neo- 
Assyrian texts and that it most commonly occurred in the merism nakru u salmu 
meaning "anyone". It did not have a separate meaning "enemy" derived from 
conflation with nak.ru in this merism.
9. Winckler, 112, 85; 114, 99; 118, 114; restored in Lie, 40, 256f;
10. Winckler, 114, 97ff; TCL III, 22, 127-132; the elite corps is contrasted 
with the rest of the army.
11. So A.L. Oppenheim, ANET3 286a;
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Terminology of diplomacy
(c) tabu and its derivatives
The technical use of t^bu and its derivatives in descriptions of the 
international relations of the neo-Assyrian and neo-BabyIonian periods necessitates 
a discussion of the concepts they imply. In particular their use in conjunction 
with salSmu and its derivatives makes them significant diplomatic terms. This 
discussion does not attempt to survey occurrences of tabu earlier than the first 
millennium B.C. but its use in documents of the second millennium is recognised.1
T&bu was written either syllabically or with the ideogram E>bG. (GA) . 
However the ideogram MUN was commonly used for t^btu but for no other form of 
tabu.2 This alternative writing of j.cibtu may have originated in the phonetic 
identity of the words for "salt" and "goodness, kindness, favour", J&btu.
Hence MUN, which originally represented "salt" alone, became the more common
V
orthography of "goodness" to the virtual exclusion of DUG.GA which was, however,
A  3retained for all other forms of tabu.
It is convenient to discuss separately the relationship connoted by 
tabu between (a) monarchs of different states,
(b) a monarch and his subjects - either as individuals or en masse
(c) private individuals within a state.
Though (a) is of most interest because it is most closely connected 
with diplomacy it should not be assumed that it differs markedly from either
1. W.L. Moran, JNES 22 (1963) 173-176 on tabu in the second millennium; also
Sefire, 74;■
2. M. Weippert, WO 7 (1973) 41 n.8; also VAB 7, 70, 66;
3. Exceptionally ABL 358, 26-29 and Iraq 37 (1975) 14, 19;
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(b) or (c) .
(a) Tcibu in international relationships.
The importance of opening or maintaining friendly communication with
a foreign ruler is stressed in several neo-Assyrian letters. In one of these
Sargon II urges his governor in Que to expedite communication with MitS of
4Muski, who had only recently opened friendly relations with Assyria; 
dibbi tAb&te (DUG.GA.MES) suprassu 
"Send him messages of good-will ..."
It was very important for Sargon to capitalise on this breakthrough 
by sending such messages to his former adversary and by keeping in touch with 
the Muskean's attitude toward Assyria. This incident occurred before the formal 
settlement of the dispute between Assyria and Muski and, though paving the way 
for a formal agreement, these messages of good-will should not be regarded as 
part of or directly heralding the later treaty.5
The concern shown by Sargon II over Assyrian relations with the city 
of Kuluman in the Zagros emphasises the advantages of friendly intercourse 
between Assyrian local officials and native populations.6 He urges his
A _  N  V  , y
subordinate to "speak words of good-will" (dibbi tabute (DUG.GA.MES) issesunu
dubba) with the people of Kuluman and is told that constant affirmations of
7
good-will are being given. It is known that the Kulumeans entered into a 
formal relationship with Assyria but it is uncertain whether this letter was 
written before or after the settlement. Sargon's eagerness to communicate on 
friendly terms is more easily understood if the Kulumeans were still independent
4. J.N. Postqate, Iraq 35 (1973) 22, 14;
5. On Mita and Sargon see pp. 1L{. - 3®>
6. ABL 129, esp. rev. 21ff; Iraq 20 (1958) 191, 10; ABL 1454;
7. ABL 1046, 8-12;
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a parallel with his attitude with Mita would then be observable - but messages
of good-will are known to have passed between a king and his subjects so this
supposition is not capable of proof.
Another instance of "messages of good-will" being conveyed to a
presumably foreign population occurs in a letter from an Assyrian official to
8
his king in which the former writes:
sarru belT dibbi t^buti issesunu lidbubu sarru be 1i lusarfrissu basi
lillika dibbi tabute (DUG.GA.MES) ana nise matisu u ana ajjesu liskun
"May the king, my lord, speak words of good-will to him and encourage 
him so that he will come and establish the message of good-will with the people
of his land and with his brothers."
The third party is most plausibly a subject-ruler or prospective ally 
of Assyria whose support was necessary if a good relationship were to be achieved 
with his country. The concern of the Assyrian authorities to establish good- 
relations with prospective or substantive allies or subjects can be seen most 
clearly in these three examples.
Having gained a relationship on good terms the Assyrians were anxious 
to protect their own interests if they felt that the other party was making 
extravagant claims or presuming upon Assyrian good-will. This appears frequently
(
in the description of foreign "crimes" prior to an Assyrian retaliatory campaign. 
In some cases the nature of the Assyrian kindness is specified: the reception of
refugees from Elam in time of famine or the installation of a king on the throne 
in Elam. It is clear that these acts were regarded as tabtu - a kindness or 
favour - and as such should have been remembered by the foreign king whose
8. ABL 608, 7-11;
9. VAB 7, 70, 66; 126, 93ff. (cf. 28, 78); AS 5, 5b, 18f; ABL 1380, 9ff.;
the most common form of describing the sin of the foreign ruler is la hassu tabti/
deqti, "he was not mindful of the good (I did him)". The interchangeableness
of t^btu and deqtu can be observed in several texts but the former is more common
at this period.
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behaviour in returning evil for good was, therefore, particularly wicked in 
Assyrian eyes.
Ashurbanipal emphasises the crime of returning evil for good in a 
10
letter to the Rasheans:
ana gabbi tabtu (MUN) epus u sunu lemutti etepsuni
"1 did good to everyone and yet they (the Elamites) have done me wrong.” 
Although Ashurbanipal goes on to specify only the famine in Elam which 
he had helped to alleviate, he is recounting the numerous acts of kindness which 
he had bestowed on various kings of Elam.
Just as this letter was a warning to the Rasheans to remain faithful 
to the Assyrian-imposed king of Elam so Assyrian kings urged their vassals to 
be loyal and have no truck with those who were not similarly loyal.11 This 
extended not only to deed but also to word as Ashurbanipal emphasised in his 
description of Samas-sumu-ukln's faithlessness:12
elis ina saptesu itamma tubbati saplanu libbasu kasir nirtu 
"Outwardly with his lips he swore good-relations (but) deep in his 
heart he plotted murder."
Castigation of opponents of Assyria was not confined to those who
plotted in secret but applied equally to open enemies. Iaubidi of Hamath sought
a 13to bring evil on Assyria, an action described as "not good" (la tabtu). 
Commendation of subjects for their good-will toward the king was, however, 
extended on occasion but pointed enquiries about wavering loyalties were not 
unknown.14
10. ABL 295, 4ff.;"
11. ABL 571, rev. 9-12;
12. VAB 7, 28, 80;
13. H.W.F. Saggs, Iraq 37 (1975) 14, 19: Iau-bi'di ... ana Assur matisu nisesu 
lemuttu la tabtu (obG.GA.-tu) ubauma, "Iau-bi'di —  sought evil not good against 
Assur, his land and his people".; cf. VTE, lines 197, 232; ABL 1105, 35;
14. ABL 2H7, rev. 14f.; ABL 289, rev. 8f. + Dietrich, Aramaer, 186ff.:
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(b) Tabu between king and subject.
The acts of beneficence of the Assyrian monarch to his own subjects -
as opposed to independent or semi-independent rulers or groups - are frequently
attested in cuneiform sources. The tabtu of the king is mentioned as a specific
act - the appointment of a tutor for the crown prince,15 royal patronage for
the family of the beneficiary,1^ the installation of Esarhaddon's sons as heirs
17to the thrones of Assyria and Babylonia, the release of a detainee (perhaps
18on the request of the beneficiary) •
These individual acts are subsumed in the overall quality of bene­
volence and kindness which the king manifested to his subjects and which he 
himself proclaimed in his royal titles as a kingly quality. Ashurbanipal uses
—  V  Athe epithet e}jes t^ abti ("the one who does good") in three grants of land to royal
beneficiaries and once to introduce an act of kindness to the rebellious
19vassal Necho of Egypt. These are the only instances of this epithet in royal
inscriptions and it is probably significant that they occur in contexts where
the king is being beneficent.
The king's dibbi ("kind words") to his subjects are often
20linked to specific acts of beneficence, in contrast to the dibbi tabute 
spoken to foreigners which cannot be proved to accompany such acts. It may be, 
however, that dibbi tabute did not refer solely to favours bestowed by the king
15. ABL 604 (=LAS 34) rev. 4-11;
16. ABL 358 (=LAS 122) passim;
17. ABL 870; cf. LAS 129 for a complete text;
18. ABL 6 (=LAS 125) rev. llff.;
19. NRGD, nos. 9-12, line 5; VAB 7, 162, 51 + IWA, 33 n.3;
20. see nn. 15, 16;
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but also to his benevolence as a whole because in the second millennium officials
21praised the king's dibbi t;abute in general terms when being received in audience.
The importance of hearing favourable responses from superiors is demonstrated
22
in neo-Assyrian times by Nabu's reassurance of Ashurbanipal: 
ariaku dababu t;abu (d6g.GA) attanaddanakka 
"I shall give you unceasing kind words."
Just as the nature of the "kind words" is not always stated explicitly
so subjects could refer to their lord's favours to them in general. This
frequently occurs when they wished to express their gratitude for previous
beneficence but it also automatically reminded the king of his responsibility
23to them as loyal subjects. That the king had such obligations to his subjects
is shown by a letter from an Assyrian king (possibly Esarhaddon) to a pro-
Assyrian in (perhaps) Babylon. After several references to the recipient's
24
loyalty to and work on behalf of Assyria the king concludes:
tabate (MUN.MES-te) sa umandu lu^ezib gimiltum ittika usallimka
... " (your) good deeds which I acknowledge (?) let me repay and I s iall
make it good to you with a reward ..."
This reciprocity in personal obligation has been observed alread/ in
the sphere of international relations and is also reflected in the attitude
of Ashurbanipal to the recipients of land mentioned above. He is at pains
to list in each document the loyal actions of the beneficiary and then establishes
25his recognition of this loyalty:
21. H. Radau, Letters to Cassite Kings from the temple archives of Nippur 
(Philadelphia, 1908) no. 38, 9; no. 89, 11; H.F. Lutz, Selected Sumerian and 
Babylonian Texts (Philadelphia, 1919) no. 36, 8;
22. ABRT no. 5, 11 (=VAB 7, p. 342 ff.;);
23. ABL 52i, 4, 9; cf. ABL 283, ABL 793;
24. ABL 53'.', rev. 22; translation is problematic; see Hartmann, Or .M.S. 7, 
372f.T~CAD <’., 75b and CAD I/J, 32b;
25. NRGD n<»s. 9-12, line 21f.; Postgate translates " ... I planned to do nim
good ..." but jabta hasasu, in historical inscriptions at least, is notcorrerned
with planning but rather considering and respectinq another's kindness (sea n.9 
above) .
—  a  Vina bibil libbiya milik ramaniya fabtasu ahsusma
" ... voluntarily and after mature consideration T acknowledged his 
kindness ..."
Ashurbanipal was honouring an obligation to reward the loyalty of his
subjects, a loyalty expressed in actions of "kindness" (fcabtu) toward the king.
Tt is therefore established that a king could receive as well as bestow fabt u
and confirmation of this is found in a letter from a scholar to Esarhaddon when
26he thanks the king for a favour:
aju be 1 fabti (EN DUG.GA) sa aki anni ana be 1 tabtisu (EN L)UL».GA-su^  
tabtu uterruni
" ... what friend has returned a favour in such a manner to his friend 
Though the writer may not have meant that he was the king's bel t;abti 
or vice versa he was enunciating a principle of mutual obligation between 
individuals on good terms with each other.
(c) Tabtu between private individuals.
The tabtu of private individuals occurred in both personal and buiines
contexts and was regarded as an integral part of friendly dealings. The
27complaint of one who believed his partner to have failed him was: 
aga k^ afrutu u be 1 tUbtutu 
"Now is this brotherhood and friendship?" 
which corresponds with the mutual obligations expressed by subjects to the king.
The obligations of partners extended to the suppression of hostile rumours - a
. . .  29case of a "favour" rather than an explicitly stipulated mutual responsibility.
26. ABL 318 (=LAS 122), 26ff; cf. ABL 291 rev. 3 for turru tabtu;
27. YOS 3, 26, 6; this may have been a formula since it was copied on a school-
t.ext: BRM 4, 34;
2H. note 26 and ABL 2 (=LAS 121) rev. 16;
29. CT , 1S5, 20;
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Similar beneficence was relied on by suppliants to more influential members 
of the community30 or business partners.3  ^ It was common for private individuals 
to address each other as bel tabti or to refer to theii relationship as one of 
bel tabtutu but since these categories are also used f.oi all types of relationship 
it is more convenient to discuss bel tabti and its implications separately.
(d) Bel fabti
T^btu has been shon to have existed between individuals in personal,
business, diplomatic and religious contexts and its impact on relationships in
these spheres must now be considered. The clearest example of t;abtu being
directly allied to a personal relationship is in Adad-¥umu-usur's paean to
Esarhaddon's beneficence where tabtu is explicitly linked with the relationship 
— 32between be le t; a bate. This relationship was called bel tabtu tu and if one partner
a  3 3defaulted then the other might invoke their bel tabtutu in reproach. Third
parties could refer to bel tabtutu when such a breach occurred which suggests
34 .
that it was not a completely informal understanding. A well-placed bel tabti
could expedite one's grievance at court if one offered him a present and,similarly,
recommendation of one's bel t^ ibti to higher officials was customary even to the
extent of emphasising that one such was a particular "friend" (Bel tabtiya sa
.vx 35 adannis).
At this personal level bel fabtutu seems not to represent friendship
30. CT 22, 43, 23;
31. CT 22, 182, 12;
32. see n.26 and ABL 295, 4ff + Dietrich, Aramaer, 170f.;
33. see n.27;
34. BIN 1, 34, lOf (=NBr 234^  , a difficult letter in which one party seems to 
have abandoned the other.
35. ABL 2 (=LAS 121) rev. 16; ABL 221, 8;
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as much as mutual aid and, when extended to relationships between individuals
A
of different social status, it may have resembled clienthood. Thus Bel-ibni
wrote to the king that he, his brothers, his sons and his bele tabate would come
and render the king service and it was reported that Ummanaldas, king of Elam,
36assembled all his bele tuibate. Similarly an Elamite noble had such "friends"
and Nabu-bel-sumate was said to have become the adherent of another Elamite.
At international level there are only two references to kings having
a beltSbti. The first is in a letter, possibly from Tukulti-Ninurta I to a
Hittite king, in which a third party is described as the bel tabti of the Hittite
38
but the letter is too fragmentary to allow of further conclusions. The second 
occurs in the description of the perfidious attack of Urtaku of Elam on Ashur- 
banipal:
IUrtaki sar KURElamtikl bel t^ iEtiya (EN.t^N-ia/) ul umas^ar ittisu 
sitkuna /adu^u7 salimu
"Urtaku king of Elam my friend I did not forsake (because) with him 
/a treaty (?) an^7 friendship were in force."
Another version of this incident does not refer to Urtaku as a bel 
tabti of Ashurbanipal but invokes his failure to remember the favours of 
Esarhaddon (... tabti(MUN) abi banlya la frassu). ° Both of these passages, but
- A
particularly the first, emphasise the importance of loyalty to a bel tabti, a
36. ABL 283, ABL 793, ABL 281, 24;
37. ABL 281, Ilf, rev. 13f. + CAD S, 25b; cf. AfO 19 (1959) 117, 28;
38. ITN, no. 36, 5f. (cf. ARI 1, 132 no. 42)   sa afriya bel tabtika sut,
"of my brother he is your friend."
39. E. Nassouhi, AfK 2 (1924/5) 102, lOf.;
40. AS 5, 56ff., 18;
J
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concept as binding at international as at interpersonal level. Ashurbanipal
was incensed by Urtaku's faithlessness and even quoted his misconduct in a letter
41 *
written approximately ten years after Urtaku's attack. Had tabtu and the
relationship it implied been of negligible significance it is unlikely to have
aroused such indignation.
Tabtu may have had overt characteristics since a man could be 
a 42accused of being the bel tabti of a rebel but the extent of the formalisation 
of the relationship bounded by tabtu is as yet vague.
(e) The nature of tabtu
References to sworn agreements in close proximity to tabtu do occur,
both in interpersonal and international relationships, and this suggests that
tabtu could be linked with a formal acknowledgement of a relationship. Sargon II
attempted to gain support in Babylonia by offering favourable terms and he
encouraged his supporters to speak kindly with those who spoke kindly (dibbi
t&bute dubba) but to answer hostility with hostility.43 Similarly Esarhaddon
44encouraged a pro-Assyrian in Babylon by commending his loyalty* 
ana iftbflsfya (MUN-ia) u ana mametiya ul tahti
"You do not sin against my beneficence or against the oath with me."
The close connection between the oath and the king's favour are indicated 
by their juxtaposition. The tcibtu of the king seems also to have punished those 
who plotted against it just as treaty-oaths were effective against those who
41. ABL 295, 4ff., be 1 tabtiya(EN MUN-ia) u bel saltiya ul ubaqqar, "I do not 
differentiate between my friend and my adversary." Dietrich, Aramaer, 170f.;
a contrast was also drawn between bel tabti and bel dab&bi, ABL 326 rev. 10;
42. ABL 896, 5f., ... ma su itti INabu-sezib bel tabti(EN.MUN) sa sar Babili 
tukulti^unu ..., "(They slandered me) saying, 'He with PN is a friend of the
king of Babylon, their helper'."
43. ABL 571, rev. 3-12;
44. ABL 5 39, 6f.;
-  1 1 ? ! .  -
45 abroke the treaty. In the "treaty" of Zakutu la t^ abu and la damgu are used
consistently of speech or plots against Ashurbanipal and bel tabatekunu ("your
friends/adherents(7)") appears in the list of people whose seditious words must
be reported.*6 Moreover the occurrence of references to t;abtu alongside treaties
in descriptions of international relations strengthens belief in the juridical
nuance of _t£btu.
The combination of ttib(t)u u sulummu in chronicles and neo-Assyrian
royal inscriptions to indicate an international agreement bears out the close
4&connection between goodness/good relations and formal settlements. However
it has been argued that sulummu was not a synonym for treaty but rather denoted
the relationship arising from a formal agreement. In as much as tub(t)u is
closely linked with sulummu it probably shares the same implication and this is
49supported by the fact that it too is never used as a synonym for treaty.
Hence t^ktu u sulummu indicates the state of formal good relations but not the 
instrument of formalisation.
A relationship of tubtu u sulummu between rulers probably implied 
t£btu, manifested both in overt acts of good-will and respect for and loyalty 
to the partner. Ashurbanipal complained that his acts of t&btu toward Elam
had been disregarded and repaid with hostility, a reference to Urtaku's deceit when,
a . , 50 . . .thou^ia bg1 fabti of Ashurbanipal, he invaded Babylonia. This incident suggests
that an individual was expected to keep in mind the tlbtu done him by his bel
tabti,51 but it cannot be proved conclusively that at an international level this
45. LAS 247, 19 - rev. 4; cf. ABL 350, rev. 5; also Ash., 103, 23; see W. von
SodenT~ZA 44 (1938) 182 n.7 and K. Deller, Or.NS 30 (1961) 251;
46. ABL 1239, passim esp. rev. 22;
47. VAB 7, 70, 66f.; 126, 93-96; AfK 2 (1924/5) 102, lOf.;
48. For sulummu see 92-97 above; examples of this phrase ABC 162 1 ; also
A.R. Millard, Iraq 30 (1968) 109, 17; E.F. Weidner, AfO 7 (1931) 4, 3f.; R.C.
Thompson, AAA 20 (1933) 86, 117;
49. see n.47;
50. see n.10 above and n.39;
51. cf. ABL 358 (=LAS 122) 26ff.;
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relationship was called tubtu u sulummu. There is evidence, however, that such 
good-relations between kings were called tflbbati; Ashurbanipal complains that
^  V V “  /\ ^ ____
Samas-sumu-ukin continued to swear"good-relations" (itamma tubbati) while
52
secretly plotting against him and Nabonidus refers to the missions of foreign 
kings coming to him, "for friendship and good-relati > n ( ana sulummu u t;fibbati) .
Conclusions
The implications of £abtu varied with its social and political context 
but common to all settings was the notion of tabtu as an aspect of a friendly 
relationship, usually implying material acts of good-will, but also respect for 
and consideration of the other partner. This respect which, in political 
relationships, amounted to loyalty was a mutual responsibility, not an imposition 
by a superior or an inferior. The yabtu ("beneficence") of a king toward his 
subjects or other rulers obliged them to respect him and remain loyal, which in 
turn obliged the king to continue to show his favour to them. Tabtu was used for 
both an act of kindness and for the loyalty and acknowledgement of mutual obli­
gation which lay behind such acts. It did not indicate the relationship itself 
for which, in international contexts, tfob(t)u and, in personal or business 
relationships, bel tabtutu were reserved. The meaning of bel tabti varied from 
business partner to client depending on context.
The "kind words" (dibbi tabute) of a king or official could be addressed 
to subjects, vassals, independent rulers or groups and do not seem to imply an 
already formalised relationship. However the references to tabtu/tubtu in 
international relations strongly suggest a close connection between formalised 
international relationships and "good relations" (tubtu/tubbati). The invocation 
of tabtu in such relationships, with its implications of overt acts of good-will,
A
differs from sulummu, in that the latter describes merely the state of the
52. VAB 7, 28, 80;
53. C.J. Cadd, An.St. 8 (1958) 58, 44f.;
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relationship and not its outcome in concrete terms. The combination of fcubtu 
and sulummu, which are best translated as a hendiadys, indicated both the state 
of friendly relations (sulummdi) and its outward manifestation (tubtu) . Thus 
formalised good-relations in the ancient near east automatically involved the
implementation of tAbtu but it should not be assumed that every occurrence of
* 54
tabu or one of its derivatives must imply a formal relationship. The
combination tubtu u sulummG was not a special kind of relationship but the fullest
expression of friendly relations between ancient near eastern states of this
period.
54. J.S. Croattof A.I.O.N. NS 18 (1968) 385-389 whose discussion, though useful 
in establishing Hebrew parallels for tflbtu u sulummu, makes this error.
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Foreign Diplomats In late neo-Assyria
In the texts of the neo-Assyrian period mar ^ lprl Is the most 
common term for a messenger or envoy. It is used of both 
Assyrian and foreign envoys and of diplomatic and non-diplomatic
personnel. The Assyrians also employed specialised messengers
1 2 or couriers, the laslmu ('runner*) and the allaku (’courier1)*
but these seem to have been engaged in non-diplomatic communication.
Assyrian envoys to foreign rulers are mentioned infrequently but
are referred to as mar ^iprl^. Foreign envoys to Assyria are
accorded two specific terms in the royal inscriptions, seru and
rakbfo though not to the exclusion of mar slprl^.
a ) seru"*
Seru is written either syllabically^ or, far more commonly, 
with the ideogram LU.MAH. In some contexts, notably lists of 
witnesses appended to legal documents where no further aid to 
identification is available, it is uncertain whether LU.MAH 
denotes the seru or the lumahhu-priest^.
Seru is used exclusively of non-Assyrians from the provinces
• O
or from countries beyond the Assyrian frontier and, from its
1. ABL 154 passim (see J.N. Postgate, Taxation, 258 ff.). ABL 
382“T £  f., ABL 1382 r. 22; H.W.F. S a g g ~ “Traq“20 (1958) 193 
no. 1*3 8 ;
2. YAB 7, 8 62; 138 16, 158 9; cf. 11* 27; see also
J.V. Kinnier-Wilson, Wine Lists (1972) 57 - 62;
AS 5 » 5U 96; VAB 7. 3k 19 f; J.N. Postgate, Iraq 35 (1973), 
22 13; ---
k . e.g. AS 5 , 80 91; YAB 7, 20 1 0 2;
5. The mo3t recent study of the seru is in Postage, Taxation;
12ij. - 128; he concentrates on thdir function as tr ibute-be’arer s;
6. e.g. ABL 1117 o; ABL 1385 7; S. Langdon, Tammuz and Ishtar
(1911+) p t : h i ,  i n  ------------------
7. So ADD 24-92 2 (=ARU 14.3 2 ); ADD 192 rev. k cf. 258 rev. 3 (= ARU 
65 + 65&T5 on the lumahhu see J7 Renger, ZA 59 (1969) 127 n a 67E7 
CAD L, 2V;b and H. Wohl, JANES 3 (1970 -” 1 ) 112 - 118;
8. ABL 1385 7 is a possible exception;
etymology, seems to designate a high-ranking official or noble,
perhaps of comparable status with Assyrian ^abti (LU.GAL)^. In
—  13some texts seru Is likely to retain Its meaning of noble and
• 11
there are others where the meaning Is equivocal but In many
texts the seru appears in the context of diplomacy and
1 p
particularly of the delivery of tribute to Assyria . The 
ceremonial delivery of tribute was, In particular, an occasion 
for a demonstration of Assyrian power vis-'a-vis Its tributaries
^  y  ^  S V  y  ^  ^
kl sa umu annlu LU. MAH MES- nl sa matate gabbu Ina pan jab 1 ka 
etlqunl kl annlmma Ina jpan mar sarrl re'u 1 -1  im sanate let lq i
!Just as today the ambassadors of all lands passed before 
your father, so may they pass before the king’s son for a 
thousand years’•
It would be incorrect, however, to assume that trlbute-
delivery was the only duty of the seru since several royal
inscriptions refer to 3eranl of not only tributary but also
independent rulers^.
Teumman of ELam and his predecessor Urtaku, neither of whom
— — 1 cr
wore Assyrian vassals, sent seranl to Assyria In one text
9. W.F. Martin, St. Or 8/1 (1936)26; LTBA 2, 2 32;
10. H.W.F. Saggs, Iraq 17 (1955) 30, N.D. 2700 A 7ff + p. !+7 ;
11. ABL 2^2 JjTf; 306 1lj., 205 passim; ADD 1102 Ij., r 3;
12. Saggs, loc. c it, I3l|ff ND 2675 rev 3Uff, id. Iraq 20 (1 958) 
187, ND. 265b Zj.ff; Iraq 21 (1959) 159f. ND 2762 9^f; 169f. ND
2783 5ff; abl 196 8177*252 ifff.;
13. ABL 9^8 rev. 5 - 1 0 ;  CAD E, 386b; Postgate, Taxation. 126;
1i|. R.C. Thompson, AAA 20 (1933) 85 97, 86 117 , 89 153; VAB 7, 
316ff, 3 5, 7; VAB 7, Jj.19f • ( Sm. 1350) vs. 11, rev. 9ff;
AS_^, 58 k O f. ; 60 9lji*.S 72 58ff.; also infra pp.58ff;
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Urtaku1s 3eranl are described as 3a sulumme 0 ( 1 of friendly
relations’ ) Which is paralleled by the reference to the <se'ra^ n_l
v A 1 7 * ~sa tubl u sulumme of Dugdamme, the Cimmerian . Since messengers
(mar ^iprl) are elsewhere^ described identically it Is /ery
likely that sera.nl means envoys or messengers in these contents.
Confirmation that the seru is an envoy is provided by two te^ts
with parallel descriptions of the mission of Kuras of Parsumas
and Pislume of Hudimeri to Ashurbanipal :
S ^  _  A y_ — 19
LU. RA»9A j£ p- su m  J 7ana _tub 1 ja _suljomme . . . u sebilun I
’Their rakbu for good relations and friendliness they sent.’
*  v' y  v  _  a  _  _  2 0
LU.MAH MES- sunu sa tubl u sulumme job 11 unI mraa
’Their seranl of good relations and friendliness they sent,’
The interchangeability of rakbu, which certainly describes a 
21 ~foreIgn envoy , with seru shows that the latter should be 
regarded as a word for foreign envoy and not solely for foreign 
noble 0
This conclusion does not imply that seranl were not nobles
but rather that the original connotation of high status had been
submerged by their function as diplomats and that Assyrians
usually applied the meaning ’envoy’ to seru.
In the earliest reference to j^Qrani, in Assurnasirpal II* s
’Banquet-Stela1, it appears that the meaning ’noble’ was current :
✓
£-lira LU _MA.H Js^rate J a  ^ __Sujjt _ . 22
’^ ,000 nobles,the envoys of Suhl, ...’
16. AS 5 > 58 l*0f.
17. A.R. Millard, Iraq 30 (1 9 6 8) 109 1 ; restored from R.C. Thompson, 
AAA 20 (1 933) 89 1^Iff.
13. ASJ?, 80 9lf.; cf. AS 5 , 5U 96;
19. E.P. Weidner, Af0„ 7 (1931) k 3;
20. R.C. Thompson, loc. clt. 86 115f and A.R. Millard, loc. cit.
21 c See below p. 121 ;
22„ D. . Wiseman, Iraq 1!| (1952) I4I4. 1 *4.1; 35 39;
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Sapratu is used by Assurnaslrpal in other inscriptions to
indicate a mission or embassy2^  and since in the Banquet Stela
it would be tautologous to use two words with the same meaning
seranl here probably retains the meaning ’nobles’ « Confirmation
of this can be derived from several later texts where ^sqranI
has the meaning nobles. It therefore seems possible that
originally Assyrians referred to foreign envoys as seranl, i.e.
nobles, but that by the seventh century, when foreign embassies
to the Assyrian court were very common, though they kept the
same word, the original meaning was obsolescent and seru usually
*
designated an envoy.
The high status as diplomats of the serani can be Inferred 
from the missions which they undertook. Apart from representing 
their rulers at special ceremonies, such as the opening of a new 
palace, seranl were despatched on missions of good will el the-’
• ■ * p f
without a specific object or to do homage to the Assyrian king”4',
27or to demand the extradition of exiles This last miss Inn 
angered Ashurbanipal and he detained the envoys, exhibiting tin01 
to the seranl of Rusa of Urartu who had come to greet hin2' .
b) * Rakbu29
The rakbu is attested in the royal Inscriptions of 
Shalmaneser III and every king of the Sargonld dynasty, being 
most common In the inscriptions of Ashurbanipal. The meaning of
• • o o o . o . o o .  y
2 3 . AKA 1, 231 16 and 332 99; a parallel text has saprute;
21|, Saprate therefore means ’envoys* contra A.K. Grayson, A. ft I 
2 , 1 iU antt 160 who translates daprutu as ’officials’. This 
translation does not accord with OF." Postgate, Iraq 35 (1973)
22 5f. where ’envoys’ Is preferable; ’
25. Urtaku; AS_£, £8 kOf.;
26. Dugdamme; Thompson, AAA 20 (1933) 39 I53ff.;
27. Teuinman; AS i5 , 62 9lpf.;
28. sa’aljsulme: VAB 7. 316 0 and 20 (Sm* 1350) 9ff.; this
exhib it Ion waV~port rayed on a relief: A. Paterson, Assyrian 
Sculptures of Sinacherib (1915) no. 6 6 ; also In J.E. ‘fteade,* AMI 
nr. 9 51*9*767 1*5(5 and 22, 2; and Reade in Power and Propaganda 
(ed. M.T. Larsen, Copenhagen 1979) 333 and fig. *5^fafter p7 }Go’T;
2 9 . This discussion Is based on neo-Assy/*Ian attestations of rakbd, 
most of which are cited In AHW sub. loc.; the rakl/u of tne 0B period 
was also an envoy;
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rakbu is elucidated in a lexical text where it is synonymous vita
arad ekalll (lit, 1 slave of the palace')^0 .' In the royal
inscriptions rakbu occurs In fifteen different incidents, in all
but two of which he acts as the envoy of a foreign ruler-' . His
^most frequent duty was to ’greet1 (su’al sulne) the Assyrian 
king* “, sometimes coupled with the delivery of tribute . The 
ceremony of ’greeting’ another king was a most important 
diplomatic protocol of recognition and, implicitly, of a desire 
for friendly peaceful relations. It was undo-taken not only by 
independent rulers Initiating relations witn Assyria but al3o by 
vassals who were duty-bound to demonstrate their continuing
loyalty through missions to ’greet* the king. Failure to do so
I5,was tantamount to a disavowal of the relationship witn Assyria .
Apart from missions of ’greeting’, the rakbu conveyed
diplomatic documents Including terms of alliance between ruler3- ^ t
undertook to establish good-will and friendly relations (tubtu u
sulummu) * sought aid from Assyria to put down revolts and, In 
“ 37
contrast^ , suborned Assyrian vassals to revolt from t.nel- 
38master^",
These activities are all diplomatic In character and, i.n the 
majority of cases, seem to have beon important missions. The
30. 0.4. Gurney and P. Hulin, The Sultantepe Tablets II (I96/1) 
39U1?1; ----- ------  ------
31. The exceptions are in fragmentary texts anl may refer t ;> 
foreign envoys: T. Bauer, IAsb, 71 (K2672) obv. 22; in id. 78 
(K7673I 20; '-----
32. VABJ » 20 100, 111; paralleled In Ai> I4.fi 9 7 ; VAB J , 1 oof F 
J-M ICyriarj, Le prisme du Louvre A0 19.9T9 (19^7) 36 T $\ “cf,
R.C. Thompson, ~XXK ~ (T9 3 5 T B 1 5f*,; R • Bo rye r, Ash I4. I 1+9; 
Winckler, 116 110‘; 12.F. Weidner, AfO 7 (1932) 4 2 -~f>, 17 _ o^;
33. TCL 3, i+8 3 0 9 f f L i e ,  70 2; Thompson, l>c.cit., 8 ’’ 133ff.;
3t. See also above pp.i^f;
3£. JAB^J., 12 12 3f f .; 160 38ff.;
36. Note 3 and R.F. Weidner, AfO 7 (1932) 4 9 - 6, R.CThompson, 
AAA 20 (1938) 37 1 32ff,;
37. E. Michel, WO k (1967-68) 30 1f.j cf. A3*1, 167 ill 2.VT.;
38. Lie, 72 ?3ff.;
raldm wa3 not a more messenger (a^f^slprt), though his duties
Included the delivery of diplomatle letters, nor are there any
references In neo-Assyrian letters to the ^akbu accompanying
V  * 39
deliveries of tribute, as there are for toe noru^ *
That there was a similarity between the rakbu and t.ne 3era 
can he 3een from the parallel use of the two terms for the sane 
mission (see above) which suggests that they were not n e c e s s a r i l y  
distinguished from each other*, at least In neo-Assyi* lan royal 
laser Ipt Ions**
A
The possible etymologlcally-based connection of ralcbu with 
riding Is not illuminated by the tests. There Is no suggestion 
that he was a mounted messenger or that he was employed only on 
urgent missions requiring swift communication* Morenover, there 
are specific terms for express-mesaonger in the royal 
inscriptions^* The various duties of the r.akbu suggest that he 
was, like the seru, employed on missions of importance and *;s is 
po33ible, therefore, that rakbu was a term indicating an envoy 
of higher status* The choice of rakbu in the following passage 
to epitomise the foreign envoy may be significant :
— AV v — / _
mannume atta afru lqbusu sa matema LIT *RA .OAB-ukun daraggu 
la l^kuna ana klsurrl  ^ *
’Who are you stranger’ they 3aid to him, ’the envoy of whose 
country has never blazed a trail to the frontier?’
The rakbu is here characterised as the foreign envoy oa'* 
excellence *
The final occurrence of rakbu in first millennium 
texts Is from the inscriptions of Nabonidus :
39* Not9, however, in Sennacherib’s annals the delivery of trioute 
by Hezekiah of Judah’s rakbu; D.D* Luckeablll, OIP.II> i|-9ff.;
J4O. See above p. 117 ;
^  “ 6 ; soe aow Oogan and H. Tadmor, Or. ns
l\.6 (TJ775 69 - 89;
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LU.RA.GAi/T3 J  ultu Hatta /”..0_7 uannri^ eme uraaa
"A frider1 from the west ^came a ndj7 repea ted the intelligence 
thus .
The context ts too fragmentary to establish whether another 
king 3ont this man or whether it refers to a Babylonian scout or 
spy. Nevertheless the similarity of terminology, and perhaps 
function, with the riaktm cf neo-Assyria is indicative of the 
continuity of diplomatic conduct and of the official reports of 
that conduct.
c ) Conclusions
Foreign envoys to Assyria during the late eighth and seventh 
centuries B.C. undertook the diplomatic duties of communication 
between rulers. The manner in which they conducted these duties 
Is not referred to in the texts and it is therefore unknown to 
what extent they undertook negotiations or whether they merely 
repeated messages given them by their masters. The detention of 
Teumrnaa’s envoys by Ashurbanipal^ show3 that they were not 
inviolate but it is possible that this incident was an exception 
to customary diplomatic behaviour because Ashurbanipal iad been 
severely provoked by the missions of Teumman0 The fact that 
Ashurbanipal recorded in a relief the humiliating exhibition of 
these envoys to visiting Urartians suggests that the whole 
incident was unusual-
It is ii Ashurbanipal*s inscriptions that a large 
proportion of the references to seranl, rakbu and mar siprl 
of foreign lands occur and it may be suggested that he was aore 
concerned to record his diplomatic encounters with foreign rulers 
than hT3 predecessors. This is probably due in large measure to 
Assyria’s continuing dominance of most of the civiLlsed ancient 
near east and the pressures resulting from this domination of 
subjects, vassals and allies, not to mention independent lands. 
Whether thi3 greater awareness of the significance of diplomacy 
bespeaks a greater sensitivity on matters of diplomacy and 
International law is a moot point,.
0 9 0 0 9 0 0 ) 9  ) 9
1+2. W.'i. CAPibo.'t. AfO 22 (1968/63) 5 50f.;
:+3. ASjj, ?2ff. 57 - 65;
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Part II
Diplomatic contacts of Persia with Greece, 
6th - 4th centuries B.C.
ID iplomatic 'Contacts before c 51 0
The rulers of Assyria and Babylonia, Persia1s imperial - 
predecessors, are not known to have engaged In formal diplomatic 
contacts with either the Greeks of Asia Minor or of the mainland 
though It'is possible that the Cypriot Greek cities had a 
formalised relationship with Sargon II of Assyria^. This Is not 
to deny the presence of individual Greeks In the ancient near
east, evidence of which Is found In both classical and near
. 2 eastern sources •
The Greeks of Asia Minor, however, were in close proximity 
to the kingdoms of Phrygia and Lydia which successively controlled 
western and central Asia Minor from the late eighth to the middle 
sixth centuries* It Is not surprising, therefore, that the first 
known formal contacts between oriental monarchs and Greeks were 
In this area. Midas of Phrygia married the daughter or Agamemnon 
king of Cyme, Inthe late eighth or early seventh century, thereby 
establishing a diplomatic relationship between the two lands^.
If Midas is to be Identified with MIta of Muski who was in close 
diplomatic contact with Assyria at this time, the proximity of 
Greeks to traditional oriental patterns of diplomacy Is 
significant. It can only be a matter for speculation whether 
Agamemnon1 s daughter was Midas* sole wife or merely one. of a 
harem, as would be consistent with Oriental practice^.
1 . Wlnckler, 126 11*5 - 9;
2.'Alcaeus Z 27, on his brother fighting for the Babylonians;
E .F/WeIdner, Melanges ... Dussaud vol. II (1939) ?. 932f. for 
Ionlans in Babylon. *1!ii0'*mos*t *use?ul general studies of early 
Greece and the Near East are T.J. Dunbabin, The Greeks and their 
eastern neighbours (1957); A*R. Burn, The LyrTcT A~ge ~qf "Greece 
( T 9 W ;  HuxXey, The^Early IoniansTf972T 'arid for "archaeological 
evidence, J. Bo a r dma n7~Yfie ~Gre  oks Oversea s (1930) ch. 3.;
3. Pollux, Onomastlcon IX 83; cf. Aristotle Fragmenta (ed. V. Rose, 
1883) Frag, fell, 3 7/ “see also Huxley, The Early Ionians» 52;
1*. e.g. Ashurbanipal* s diplomatic marriages: so© above pp. 8 3f.;
The Cimmerian invasions of the seventh century severely 
disrupted the political geography of Asia Minor, destroying the 
power of Phrygia and allowing the Merronad dynasty of Lydia to 
become the dominant political force in the west. The first king 
of this dynasty, Gyges was active politically and diplomatically, 
repelling the Cimmerians, attacking the Greek cities of Asia 
Minor and cultivating good relations with Assyria . Gyges' 
attempts to control the Greek cities on the Aegean coast were 
both military and diplomatic^ and though his immediate successes 
were few his policy was continued by his successors. His impact 
on mainland Greece was through his gifts to the oracle at Delphi 
which had confirmed his usurpation of the throne of LydiaT.
After Gyges* death in another Cimmerian invasion detailed 
records of Lydia1 si contacts with both the monarchies of Assyria, 
Babylonia and Media to the east and the Greeks of Asia Minor to 
the west are lapking. Alyattes, Gyges* great grandson,
Q
continued the war against Miletus which his father, Sadyattes,
had begun but eventually concluded an agreement ( 6taXXay^ ) with
the city by which they became friends and allies* ( ZeCvovS’ .. .xat 
# 1 0. cuinidxouS' ). It Is uncertain to what extent these terms Imply 
parity between Miletus and Lydia though they certainly embody 
concessions from the position Alyattes would have taken If he 
had captured Miletus.
Alyattes was more successful against Smyrna and Colophon, 
both of Wiich he captured11. Colophon fell after Alyattes had
5. Gyges, the Cimmerian and Assyria; see above pp. 39 - I|-6 ;
C. Talamo, La Lidia arcalca (Bologna 1979);
6 . Pausanlas, 9 29 iv; Mlmnermus (ed. Diehl) F13 Xenophanes 
(edT^iahir F3; Hdt.--T TZ£74; 2 152.5; Strabo,“T J  Tr?2'C590); 1k
1.28 (6k3); Diodorus. 1 66.12 FGrH 90 Frag7“627f;
7. Hdt, 1 13; Hie Dam. (FGrH 90) Frag. k7;
8 . Callisthenes (FGrH 12k) 29;
9. Hdt.,1 16 - 22;
10. ibid.1 22.k; Bengtson k r 5;
11 • IjlQr Dam » (FGrH 90) F 6k i - II; Hdt. 1 16*2; Polyaenus,
7 27?; also Strabo. 1k 1.28 (6k3);
made an alliance (cuppaxCa‘; I ) with it and had lured Its cavalry
away to Sardis, presumably In accordance with the alliance, where
12-he massacred them . If this tale Is correct it might Imply-that
cu^ jpaxia gave, one or both parties the right to call on the
other*s forces, a situation not necessarily of advantage to the
weaker partner. It should not be assumed that cuppaxia implied
parity of status in treaties.
Alyattes maintained his dynasty*s good relations with Delphi
by consulting it and dedicating a large bronze bowl to the god
In recognition of the good advice he received. His attitude
toward his eastern neighbours was, however, hostile. After the
fall of Assyria in 612 the Medes led by Cyaxares had-extended
their territory to include eastern Anatolia while Alyattes
consolidated his hold on western Asia Minor and attempted to
expand east of the Halys. The inevitable conflict was resolved
through the mediation of Syennesls of Cilicia and Labynetus of
1IiBabylon, according to Herodotus , and sealed by a marriage 
between the daughter of Alyattes and the son of Cyaxares. This 
treaty should be seen in the context of the ancient near east, 
not the Hellenic world, and It shows the continuing influence 
of near eastern diplomatic tradition on the kingdom of Lydia.
Alyattes* successor, Croesus, Is the best known of the 
Mermnad kings. Herodotus devotes considerable space to his 
relations with the Greeks of both Asia Minor and the mainland 
and his ambitions to expand the Lydian kingdom eastwards1^.
12. Polyaenus, 7 2.2;
>13* Hdt. 1 19#2, 25; Pausamas. 10 16.1 - 2 ;
1k* 1 73f; the treatment of this treaty by J.D. Bing, A History 
of Cilicia in the Assyrian Period (Ann Arbor, 1969; Dl3s7T~f£fr. 
shoulcf ^ be "v e je c te d ;
15. Hdt., 1 26 - 58, 69 - 92;
Croesus maintained his family*s connection with Delphi and
received the advice that he should make the most powerful Greeks
his friends ( cpCXot ), if he Intended to attack Persia, by this
16time the successor to the Median Empire . Croesus, therefore, 
offered cptXia and cuppaxia to the Spartans :
• •• ertoiTicavTo ( Aaxefccupovtoi ) opxia geiviTjS' rcepi xai
• 17cuppaxfnS' .
’...they took oaths of friendship and alliance.*
The details of this treaty are not stated but from Croesus*
18subsequent appeal to the Spartans It seems that he called on 
them only when he was attacked, Implying a defensive alliance. 
Xenophon doe3 not mention Spartan contingents In the army which 
Croesus led against Cyrus, a possible corroboration of the 
alliance as purely defensive. Xenophon’s silence on this point 
cannot however be conclusive since with his partiality toward 
the Spartans he might have omitted references to them on Croe3us* 
side as out of keeping with the story of his hero Cyru31^. It 
is also possible that Croesus did not choose to call on Sparta 
foi* support before his campaign against Cyrus.'
Croesus* pact with Sparta was one element in a complex 
network of alliances between Lydia, Babylon and Egypt , 2 0 all of 
whom had reason to fear the burgeoning power of Persia. There 
were Egyptian and Babylonian contingents in Croesus* army which
 ^6 • Hdt. 1 53.2, also 1 6.2, 56. 1 - 2, 69. 1 - 3* Xenophon,
Cyrop, 6 2.10; Pausanias. k 5.3; the historicity of this treaty
has been questionedf^Fr^Jacoby, R.E. Sup]Dl_II (1913) 3 8 3 ,
L. Moretti, Riv. Fil. NS 2k (l9k<n~2T5£f.; contra E. Meyer, GdA III2 , 
(1937) I8 3 and .G7L. Hammond, A History of Greece. (1959) 168;
17. Hdt. 1 6 9 .3 ;
18. Hdt. 1 77.k;
19. Xen. Cyrop 2 1.5; 6 2.10;
20. Hdt. 1 77.1 - 2;
21fought Cyrus, but the Egyptians may have been mercenaries •
The Egyptian king, Amasis is said by Herodotus to have sent a
gift to Sparta, which indicates his friendly attitude if not a '
22formal relationship . Similarly, the Arabians were allied
2 ^with, or at least friendly toward, Croesus J > a connection ihich 
might be explained by the alliance between Nabonidus of Babylon, 
Croesus* ally, and the Arabs2 -^. Thus Croesus had allied himself 
with all the major powers of his day against Cyrus.
In western Asia Minor Croesus had gained control of almost 
all the Greek cities, either by outright assaults or negotiated 
settlements y • Ephesus was alleged by later writers to have 
secured concessions so that its freedom ( eXeuQepia ) ^ 3
26protected although it probably still paid tribute to Croesus .
The implication of eXsuGepia in this case must be of local 
independence and autonomy while still acknowledging the 
sovereignty of Lydia. All'the cities of the Ionians, Aeolians 
and Dorians were subject to tribute ( <popou •), with the
possible exception of Miletus and, less likely, Ephesus2^.
Croesus* relations with Miletus are not explicitly mentioned in 
the sources but it is possible that the settlement, made by 
Alyattes with the Milesians whereby they became geivoi and
pQ
cuppaxoi was still in force . After Cyrus* conquest of Lydia
Miletus was the only city with which he made a treaty (opxiov )
PQ
on the same terms as had the king of Lydia“%  but the reasons 
for this favoured treatment are not stated. Herodotus may imply 
that Miletus had offered its allegiance to Cyrus before his 
conquest of Lydia but this seems unlikely. Alternatively, it
.s'
7 1 Croesus' mercenaries, Hdt. 1 77.1).; Xen.Cjrog.
7 1 .14.1 if. j
22. Hdt. 3 47.1;
2 3 . Xen .Cyrop .6 2.10; 7 4.16; 5.14;
2 4 . C.J. Gadd, An.St. 8 (1958) 58 43 - 45;
2 5 . Hdt. 1 26.3ff.; 6 , 2 - 3 ;
'1
26. Bengtson. 7; Poljaenus, 6 50; Aelian, Var. Hist. 3 26;
may be suggested that Miletus had not agreed to a renewal of
its treaty with Alyattes when Croesus came to the throne of
L y d i a a n d ,  therefore, being independent of Lydia it was not
in the same position as all the other Greek cities. If this -is-
accepted it seems unusual that Cyrus should make a treaty fon
the same terms as the Lydian* ( ex' otci rcsp o Au6o5’ ) -when this
would be a renewal of a treaty at least forty years old and with
12
Alyattes , not with Croesus^ •
It seems more probably that MiletusT status vis-a-vis Lydia 
was somewhat different from that of the other Asiatic Greeks in 
view of its treaty with Alyattes by which it was not only a 
91X0? but also a ciSppaxoS' , unlike the other cities which were 
said to be yxoxefpioi If cuppiaxoS' here implies a defensive
alliance Miletus1 failure to answer Croesus* appeal to his 
duppaxcH , notably Sparta, Egypt and Babylonia^, would be a 
favourable act in Persian eyes. Thus Cyrus* attitude toward 
Miletus would be understandable and he might be prepared to renew 
Its special status.
This explanation demands that Cyrus* attempt to induce the 
Ionians to revolt from Croesu3 ( Kpoicou &tu cravat ) before 
the battle of Pteria did not include Miletus^, and he therefore 
had no quarrel with the city after his victory. Whereas the other 
Ionian cities, as subjects of the Lydian king, chose not to 
desei’t him, Miletus was an ally and therefore of a completely 
different status. Thus Cyru3 was by right of conquest lord of
30. Diog. Laert. 1 25; P. Hiller von Gaertringen, RE XV (1932)i
15951
31. so, implicitly, Ed. Meyer, GdA. Ill (1937) 712; also H. Berve, 
Die Tyrannis bel den Griechen (i 967) II, 597;
32. Neither would It explain why Croesus subdued the other Greeks 
of Asia but left Miletus completely independent;
33. Aelian, Var. Hiat. 3 26;
all the Ionian cities - hence his unfavourable reply to their
request for the same terms as they had enjoyed from Croesus^®-...
but not of Miletus which had not been a subject of Lydia.
Acceptance of this view requires the supposition that Cyrus
was not only aware of the different statuses of the Ionian cities,
but also, as overlord, was prepared to make agreement with than
on the same terms as his predecessor. It Is not, however, clear
what privileges Miletus had enjoyed as a cupt^X0®’ of Lydia.
If the other Asiatic Greeks all paid tribute then one of Miletus*
privileges may have been exemption from tribute and, In addition,
since Ephesus seems to hav9 gained concessions on freedom
(eXeuOepCa ) it is likely that Miletus al30 enjoyed this freedom,
though whether this implies total political Independence from
Lydia Is unknown. \
It should be noted that In Diodorus* account of the abortive
negotiations between Cyrus* representative Harpagus and the
17Ionians after Croesus* d e f e a t t h e  Ionians sought to achieve 
<piXta with Cyrus as cuppaxoi but were rebuffed and told that 
they could only gain <piXia. by offering themselves as fcovXoi . 
Herodotus* narrative of the same Incident, where he says that the 
Ionians knew that they would be xa/rfaooi (subject) to Cyrus but 
were hoping to gain some concessions*^®, show3 that Diodorus * use 
of cuppaxia cannot imply independence but merely privileged 
status within Persian sovereignty. It Is possible therefore that 
Miletus* special status, if it was cuppaxia , did not embody 
outright independence from Cyru3 but merely certain privileges 
within the framework of Persian sovereignty*^.
If Cyrus renewed without amendment the treaty between 
Miletus $tnd Lydia .he will have granted an uniquely privileged 
position to a small state on the western boundary of his kingdom 
but this seems unlikely unless Miletus* privileges were restricted.
3 6 . Hdt., 1 1Ij.1 1 - 3 ; a similar story In Diodei rus 9 35* 1 - 3;
37. Diod., 9 35;
3 8 . 1 llil.lj
39. This might also be true of Miletus* relationship with Alyattes 
and, possibly, Croesus;
- ' 1 3 2  -
l ‘
* •#
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Although the history of Miletus In the later sixth century is 
only recorded fragraentorily and its1 relationship with Persia is 
hard to define it seems to have been treated as any other Ionian 
city and, like the others, had a Persian-sponsored tyrant after 
c $20**^. The conduct of Aristagoras during the expedition 
against Naxos in 2*99 and his dealings with Megabates, the Persian 
commander, suggest , that as tyrant of Miletus he had a different 
status from the tyrants of the other Ionian cities**"* • This may 
be a reflection of continued privileges as a cu^axoc which 
Miletus in contrast to the rest of the Ionians, enjoyed through 
its treaty with Cyrus**2 . This is, however, the only evidence 
that Miletus did gain concessions from Cyrus and that these 
concessions were honoured by his successors**^.
Miletus wa3 honoured by Cyru3 with an acknowledgement of 
Its good sense in coming to terms with him but the other Ionians 
were forced to accept unconditional servitude ( 6ouXeTa ) as a 
result of their failure to respond to his overtures before the 
battle of Pterla***^. The King of Persia had no reason to negotiate 
with cities which were his by right of conquest and which had 
done nothing to merit special treatment. They were already 
his 6ou\oi and their refusal to accept this status was a rebellious 
act destined to end In all Ionia being subjected ( *t»viTj 
e&e6ouXw<co )**^ .
1967)
2*1 . Hdt. 5 31 - 3k; ..
!*2. H. Serve, op.clt. II $79;
2*3. cf. Hdt. 2 1.2; where Carabyses is said to have regarded the 
Ionians and Aeollans as fcouXovST xa/rpuiCouS’
k k o Hdt. 1 12*1.2; Diod. 9 35.3;“ ““  ■“— * »
2*5. Hdt. 1 169.2; the extent of Ionian 6ouX£Ta in practical terras 
Is nob clear; Xenophon, Cyrop.; 2**9 seems to be anachronistic In 
talking of the cities gaining concession from Cyru3 but there Is 
no firm evidence that Persia Interfered directly in the cities1 
internal government and some evidence that they still fought 
amongst each other (Hdt. 3 39.2+). La Bua (MGR 2* (1975) 70 - 80) 
has argued that the policy of imposing tyrants In Ionia can only 
be traced back to Darius,, not Cyrus; for contrary views 3ee 
ibid., 72 nn. 2*,5 ;
2*0. Hdt. 2* 137 ii; RE 15 (1932) 159i*ff.; Huxley, The Earl£ 
Ionians, 79f.; H. Berve, Die Tyrannl3 bei den Grieoften ftfunich, 
TT, 5?9; also V. la Bua, tfCrR 1* ’f19 T7 77 - “ftff
After the Persian conquest of Ionia the dealings of Greeks 
and Persians are scantily recorded. Polycrates of Samos appears 
to have held unrivalled naval power in the Aegean around 530 B.C. 
and was also an ally of Amasis of Egypt 3y 525 he was, 
however, an ally of Cambyses of Persia in his invasion of Egypt 
but his career was cut short In 522 when he was murdered by the 
Persian satraps of Sardis Oroetes^. The chaos surrounding the 
death of Cambyses and the struggle for the Persian throne was 
eventually resolved In favour of Darius but he was not recognised 
by Qroetes who had not only removed Polycrates but also the 
satrap of Dascylium and his son*®. In order to nullify this threat
ho
in the west Darius had Oroetes murdered^ and to ensure that the
Samian navy, now no longer allied to Persia, did not fall Into
the wrong hands Darius supported the attempt of Syloson, Polycrates
50brother, to gain control of Samos-' . There can be no doubt thab
Syloson was a vassal of Persia.
• Within a few years most Ionian cities had Persian- 
51sponsored tyrants^ and it Is possible that Darius had 
instituted this policy in order to attach the troublesome Greek 
cities to him directly and thereby Increase his control over 
them, a policy in accordance with his known administrative reforms.
In the Ionian cities where there was no current tradition of 
a ruling family It was in Darius* Interests to promote a man who 
owed allegiance to him alone and who depended on him for support
1*6. On Polycrates and particularly Herodotus* account of him:
V. la 3ua, loc. cit., 1-2*0 and 1*1 - 102; Id, MGR 6 (1978)
1 - 38; alsTTS.HTHitchell, -JHS 95 (1975) 75“ - ^Tf Hdt., 2 182.2;
3 39.2; ---
2*7. Hdt. 3 1 2 0 ^  125.1*-; La Bua, MGR 2* (1975) 83 n.1j
2+8. Hdt., 3 126;
l*-9. Hdt., 3 123;
50. Hdt., 3 139 - 11*7;
51. Hdt., 1* 133; date of the Scythian expedition is disputed;
see 77M. Balcer, HSCP 76 (1972) 97 - 132 and esp. 103 for previous 
studies;
52. V. la Bua, MGR 1* (1975) 79 and n e 2; M.A. Dandamayev, Hist or la 
Eln2el3chrift 18- (1972) 19 and R.N. Frye, ibid., 85;
against revolt from within the city. Where the established 
rulers of a country were willing to acknowledge Persian sovereignty, 
as in Macedon, the Persians did not hesitate to retain them as 
Persian vassals-^. By c51 0 B.C. the Persians were on the borders 
of Greece and yet had had no formal diplomatic contact with any 
mainland Greek state except for Sparta In c 52*5 when Cyrus had 
been warned not to harm the Greeks of Asia M i n o r E v e n  If 
Cyrus1 jibe about Greek faithlessness was misdirected In the 
case of the Spartans the lack of any action to reinforce the 
warning will not have increased the Persians* appreciation of Greek 
diplomacy.
' ;r - • • r\
Persia* s Diplomatic contacts with Athens 
_____________C$10 - i;79 B.C.______________
Of all the Greek states Athens* relationship with the 
Achaemenid kings is the best documented and most complex. Prior 
to 510 B.C. only Sparta had established formal diplomatic contact-
with Persia but thereafter Athens became the focus of Persian
1 ■ -interest in Greece and remained as such for nearly a century .
Within this time there are two distinct phases whose boundary 
is the Athenian victory of Eurymedon and the immediately subsequent
p
campaigns of aggression in Cyprus and Egypt i-n lj.66-lj.61j. . The 
character of the diplomatic contacts in the first phase is 
determined by Persia* s military superiority which, however, 
received such a blow in the failure of the invasion of Greece 
in lj.79 that diplomacy was discontinued. Between c510 and lj.79 
it is possible therefore to observe Persian diplomacy in its 
normal context of a stronger, imperialist state attempting to 
overcome a smaller and, seemingly, less powerful political unit.
Pour episodes are of especial interest in establishing the 
Persian diplomatic approach to Athens and other Greek states 
In this period.
i) A recent study has drawn attention to the diplomacy of Athens 
and Persia in the last decade of the sixth century B.C., stressing 
the Persian,viewpoint on these contacts^. It was argued there 
that the cosmic element in ancient near-eastern treaties and the 
sanctity of the contract in Zoroa3trian belief were the 
background to the relationship between Persia and Athens at this 
time and that the Persians accordingly believed that they had
1 • This may be the result of the sources. Herodotus* view of 
the Persian Wars puts Athens at the centre and Thucydides? references 
to Greek contacts with Persia prior to Ij.15 are mainly of Athenian 
dealings. Sparta’s relationship with Persia is fully discussed 
in Lewis, Sparta and Persia;
2. See below pp. I58f*;
3. L.L. Orlin : Michigan Oriental Studies in honor of 
G.G. ^ Cameron. (edT^/C. ' O r l i n T 976T” '2$$ *- ' 2 6 6 ;
gained in Athens a permanent vassal^** The importance of the 
traditions of ancient near eastern diplomacy as a powerful 
influence on Persian diplomacy can be observed in these 
diplomatic contacts.
Herodotus is the only source for the first incident in the 
diplomatic relationship and his account is, perhaps intentionally, 
silent about some aspects^. The political disorder after the 
expulsion of the Peisistfatid tyrant Hippias from Athens in c$10 
led to an intervention by Cleomenes of Sparta on behalf of the 
party led by Isagoras. When Cleomenes too was forced to leave 
Athens by a popular demonstration the Athenians realised that he 
was likely to retaliate by interfering forcibly in their affairs 
and that they needed the support of strong allies. No Greek 
state was willing or able to assist them to resist Sparta and the 
only other possible ally was the king of Persia^. An embassy 
was therefore despatched to the Persian satrap at Sardis,
Artaphrenes* in the hope of gaining an alliance with'Persia.
7
The sAtrap asked the identity of the envoys' and agreed to the 
alliance on the condition that they submit to Darius; if ihey 
refused then they should leave forthwith. The envoys agreed to 
his demand but were severely censured on their return to Athens.
Artaphrenes* high-handed response to the request for alliance 
is characteristic of traditional near-eastern diplomatic 
behaviour toward inferior powers. His answer was in effect an 
ultimatum since to fail to submit to Persia was to forfeit 
Persian good-will. Moreoever, it made an important assumption:
» 5 739 96; no opinion is here expressed on the Zoroastrian 
element in Persian diplomacy but Orlin1 s exposition of it is 
supported by the arguments presented below; on the immutability of 
Persian laws, 0. Bucci, RIDA 25 (I978)e.sp. 17ff.;
5. Hdt. 5 73; W.W. How and J. Wells: Commentary on_Herodotjiis, II 
(19I2 j J4.O; previous discussion of this epfsocfeYTeTc[7"Meyer, (TdA. 
IIl2 (1 9 3 7) 71^.1 - 7(4.3 ; Beloch, Q.G. I (1912) E.M. Walker,
CAH IV (1926) 157 - 9j
6 . The knowledge that Sparta and Persia had been hostile since the 
conquest of Lydia may have Influenced the Athenians: Hdt« 1 12|.1*
152f; W . G. For re st: A History of J5part»a 95,0 19^8) 3 Of.
7. It seems unlikely that Artaphrenes was ignorant of Athens, cf. 
Hdt. 1 153.1 and 5 105 for similar Persian 1 ignorance1;
that the envoys were competent to answer such a proposal 
Immediately and with full authority, an assumption counter to
O  .  — • •
normal Greek diplomatic practice • Artaphrenes* insistence that 
the envoys should not depart before either accepting or tacitly 
rejecting Persian good-will forced them to reply without 
consulting their sovereign body, the Athenian assembly,
Artaphrenes was perhaps aware that he was pressurising the 
envoys to make a decision beyond their competence as diplomats 
but, without discounting this as one element in his attitude, 
there is a more compelling factor. Prom Artaphrenes* point of 
view, the Athenians were a minor power from beyond the borders of 
the Persian Empire who were appealing through him for an alliance 
with the King, If he was informed of the circumstances 
surrounding this embassy he would have realised that its prime 
motive was an urgent need for allies against a local threat.
Even if he were unaware of this, the nature of the envoys1’ mission 
would encourage him to assume a superior role in negotiations and 
dictate as far as possible the type of relationship resulting 
therefrom.* , *.
The manner in \ l iich appeals from inferior powers to their 
superiors were made in the ancient near east, best demonstrated 
from the late neo-Assyrian documents, throws a great deal of 
light on Artaphrenes* behaviour toward the Athenian envoys. 
Neo-Assyrian treaties were based on the 3 \jpposition that Assyria 
was the superior partner in the relationship, dictating the 
terms of the agreement in accordance with its own interests and, 
seemingly, giving little thought to the welfare of the vassal^. 
Assyrian political ideology demanded the total submission of Its 
inferiors and, In thbory at least, did not countenance an 
Inferior power gaining concessions by a negotiated settlement10.
8 . D.J. Mo3ley, Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (1973)
68 - 72; *
9. e.g. E.F. Weidner, AfO 8 (1932/33) 17 - 27; R. Borger, Ash 
107 - 109; D.J. WisemanTlfoE 1 -100;
10. P.O. Fensham, VT 13 (1963) 133 - Uj-3* osp. 1 lj.1; see also 
above p. 8 ;
This authoritarian attitude tox^ard subordinate rulers was
one of the fundamental concepts of Assyrian diplomacy. In
practice a ruler who appealed for help to Assyria was obliged
to subordinate himself and accept the consequences of vassaldom.
Thus when three chieftains from the Zagros mountains requested
Assyrian aid, they were obliged to submit and accept the imposition
of tribute in ordei** that the Assyrians would supply the required
11military support •
This incident may be compared with Athens* appeal to Persia
in that a minor power appealed to a political superior and was
granted a formal link but only on condition of accepting vassaldom.
Artaphrenes* - reply to the envoys should be seen in the near
eastern context in which as representative of the superior power
he was expected to dictate terms and enforce them as best he
could. In this case It would have been inno7ative for him to
have bargained with the envoys or to have allowed them to remit
his proposals to their sovereign body.
It Is In this second aspect that the more serious
discontinuity between Greek and Persian diplomacy occurs. The
Athenians may have known that the King demanded vassaldom of
those states sppealing to him but they may not have realised how
unilateral an ultimatum it was. It seems unlikely that they would
have thought it necessary to permit the envoys complete freedom
of action in negotiating with Persia and they may have expected
more extended negotiation than occurred. Artaphrenes* ultimatum
conflicted with the Greek concept of limited competence of
diplomatic envoys whereby envoys who felt a proposal wa^ beyond
their competence referred It to their sovereign body. Eren whan
proposals were agreed completely it was necessary to return in
1 0
order to ratify the agreement . In this case, therefore, the 
envoys should have wished to return to Athens and to put the 
proposals before the assembly. •
1 1 . Borger: Ash 5 k  -  5 5 >
1 2 . p. 137 n.8 ;
It can be argued that the envoys, aware of the implications
of offering submission to Persia but desirous of the alliance,
took it upon themselves to submit even though they knew that the
Athenians might not recognise their action. Herodotus could have
condemned the envoys outright but by portraying them as on the
horns of a dilemma caused by Artaphrenes* ultimatum he attempts
at least a veiled exoneration. The envoys could have claimed and
*
perhaps did claim that by refusing to accept Artaphrenes* terms
they were prejudicing Athens* prospect of gaining Persian support
and were unable to seek guidance from the assembly because of the 
1 \ultimatum . ^
Artaphrenes* treatment of the envoys in a manner which 
conflicted with the tenets of Greek diplomacy caused friction 
between Athens and Persia in subsequent years. Immediately on 
their return to Athens the envoys were attacked for their act of 
submission, were accused of acting on their own responsibility 
( exi ctpetov a&Tffiv paXopevot, )^  , and, implicitly, of not consulting 
with the only body competent to deal with such severe proposals, 
the Athenian assembly. It is not however explicitly stated that 
the relationship brought back by the envoys was itself disowned 
or rejected. The effects of submission to Persia may not have 
been immediately apparent: no tribute was sent or periodic * 
compulsory attendance on the Persian court stipulated. This 
should not detract from the possible future implications of the 
envoys act since, as Orlin has argued, both the tradition of 
near eastern treaties and Zoroastrian belief confirmed the
13. D.J. Mosley: op.clt. ^ ls right to emphasise that the envoys 
had no explicit instruction for their action but their failure to 
consult the Athenians was due not to pressures of distance from 
Athens, as he opines, but rather necessity in the face of the 
ult imatum.
12|. The force of this idiom is to delimit a decision or those 
responsible for a decision or action; Histiaios disclaimed • 
Aristagoras* revolt (Hdt. 5 106. iv;) Zopyrus justified his 
decision to keep secret his plan to capture Babylon (id: 3 .
155, iv) other refs: Hdt. 3 71.5; 4 106.1; 3 109.1;
1  5solemnity and perpetuity of an international agreement .
Neither is it convincing to argue that the relationship between
Persia and Athens was informal, implying impermanence and lack' of 
1 6definition . The international agreement, particularly in the
neo-Assyrian period, corresponded largely with a commitment by
17one side to be loyal and obedient to the other *. In course of
campaigning it might be necessary to accept submission merely by
oath without a formal setting or accompanying written commen
commemoration but the agreements thus effected were no less
1 ft
binding for being peremptory ceremonies • Similarly the Athenian 
envoys in Sardis made an act of submission valid in the eyes of 
the Per sians.
ii) There is other evidence that the relationship between Persia
and Athens was of a formal nature. It has been argued^ that
Athens and Persia were on good terms during the last decade of
the sixth century 3.C. and that the Athenians were eager to
maintain this situation. The basis for this argument is another
Athenian mission to Artaphrenes at a later date than that of the 
20submission . This mission’s aim was to counter the ii^fluence 
of HIppias, who had arrived In Sardis and was pressing Artaphrenes 
•to support him as the legitimate ruler of Athens, and Its main 
argument was that, the Persians should not be swayed by Athenian 
exiles. If Athens had openly repudiated the first mission and 
the relationship with Persia It Is unlikely that Artaphrenes would
15. Orlin: loo, clt.: 258, 263f; the failure of the Persians to 
exploit the submission of the envoys, i.e. by demanding a more 
formal ceremony of giving earth and water on Athenian soil, may 
have affected their view .of the envoys* submission, see below 
p p .  1i+7f.;
16. so V. Shrenberg: From Solon to Socrates (1968) 102 & n.5^;
17. M Weinfeld: UF 8 (1976) 379 -
18. ABL 280, 19 - rev. 3 .;
19. B.D. Merritt, Hesperia 8 (1939) i|.8 - 82, esp. 63f; a different
approach in A.E. Raubitschek GRBjS 5 (1961±) 151 - 159, esp. I52ff.; 
also E. Schachermeyr, GB 1 (1973)' 211 - 220; R. Sealey, CJ 72 (1976) 
1 3 - 2 0  esp. 17; R.B. Croraey, Historia 28 (1979) I32f.;
have received the Athenian envoys and even more improbable that
• 21 he should have been convinced by such an argument . Only if
Athens and Persia regarded themselves as having some form of - •
defined relationship can the mission and Its argument be explained.
Finally it must be noted that it was only after the failure of
the mission that the Athenians concluded that they should be on
terms of clear hostility x^ithPersia, suggesting that prior to
it they were at least neutral but certainly not hostile (...JoSx
IvSexopevotci 6 e  ccpt e6e6oxTO ex Totf <pavepoff t o l c l  Ilepc'fld xoXepiouc
e t vac • Hdt. 5 96;)
This later incident elicited another ultimatum from 
Artaphrenes: that the Athenians should tak9 back Hippias if they 
wished to be safe ( •••»££ pouXotaTo coot etvat ,xaTa6exec0ac oxtcu>
‘It o u t j v . Hdt. 5  96). It is instructive to compare the two 
ultimatums and their settings. In both, Athenian envoys went to 
Sardis on the Instructions of their state and not In answer to 
a Persian summons; In both they presented a request - in the first 
for alliance with Persia and In the second for an undertaking 
by the Persians not to heed disaffected Athenian exiles. The 
ultimatums which were given in reply to those requests also form 
part of a consistent pattern: In the first Persian enmity was 
threatened, though not explicitly, while in the second 
Artaphrenes1 sanction was actual violence. At this point the 
similarities between the two Incidents seem to end because the 
second mission was allowed to return to Athens without responding 
to the Persian demand. The circumstances of the two missions 
account for the change In Persian attitude. Whereas in the first 
Athens was an Independent power still possessing autonomy and the 
right to reject Persian demands, in the second she was a Persian 
vassal - or so the Persians believed - and, though allowed to 
make requests to her overlord, was expected to obey orders from 
the Great King or his ministers. From the Persian point of view, 
therefore, this was not a question of putting proposals - even
21. E.M. Walker, CAH IV (1926) 168 realised this problem but did 
not conclude that-the earlier mission had not been repudiated.
In such a loaded manner as in the first mission - it was one of
command and obedience, characteristic of near eastern diplomacy.
Artaphrenes1 willingness to entertain and pay attention to
Hippias - a known exile from Athens - shows how the sovereign
power1s obligations toward its vassal were limited, even to the
extent of a complete reverse in sympathies. Relations between
Artaphrenes and Hippias prior to this mission are very obscure
and the assumption commonly held by scholars that relations between
Persia and Hippias were favourable during the whole of the last
22decade of the sixth century is untenable . In Its favour there 
can be called only Hippias1 refuge at Sigeum and his exile there
and at Lampsacus, where the Persians were probably aware cf him
23but not necessarily supporting him . Apart from this, prior 
to 5^0 Hippias had no known connection with the Persian 
authorities and if he were relying on Persian support at that 
time the Persian acceptance of Athens* submission independent 
of him would be unusual. Furthermore if Hippias were known to 
be in league with Persia or to be receiving Persian support It 
is unlikely that the Athenians would have approached Artaphrenes 
for help and if such a connection did exist why did not 
Artaphrenes demand Hippias1 restitution during the first Athenian 
mission^. Even were Hippias1 attachment to Persia proved,
It cannot have been so close or rewarding as to prevent him from
22. e.g. E.M. Walker, CAH IV (1926) 167 - 172 and C.J. Robinson Jnr 
AJF 66 (19ij-f>) 2U3 - 25i^ ; more recently F.J. Frost, CSCA 1 (19 6 8 )
1 05 - 12lj. and E.S. Green, CSCA 3 (1970) 91 - 98 have noted the 
intractability of Athenian politics at this period; see also 
P. Leveque and P. VIdal-Naquet, Cllsthene l*Athenien (196I4.) 113 n.2
2 3 . Hdt. 5 65, 91, 9l|ifJ Thuc: 6 59; M.F. McGregor: HSCP Suppl. 1 .
(19^6) 73 n.16; Hippias* preparation of a place of exile and the 
marriage of his daughter which brought him influence with the king 
are not sufficient Indication that he and the Persians were in 
alliance or even working together. Thucydides’ compressed 
narrative of events should not be preferred to Herodotus* clearer 
synopsis.
2Ij.. Macan (Herodotus, ij-th, 5th, and 6th Books, vol. 1 (1895) 218) 
noted that Artaphrenes* * ignorance* of Athens (Hdt. 5 73), if 
genuine, would indicate that Hippias had not already fled to Sardis
accepting aid from Sparta when the latter offered to restore 
Hippias as ruler of Athens (c506/6)2^. Hippias1 acceptance of 
Spartan aid suggests that any connection he may have had with 
Persia in 507/6 was not offering material help in his campaign 
to return to Athens.
Persian may have had no official policy in Hippias1 favour 
but equally she found no difficulty in allowing him to take 
refuge in cities under her control. This might suggest that 
she had no formal relationship with Athens since to harbour an 
ally’s enemies was to contravene concepts of alliance. This 
argument, however, supposes that the two parties in this 
relationship had mutual obligations of repatriation of exiles to 
each other and that Persia’s responsibilities under their 
formalised relationship were undefined is confirmed by the 
Athenian actions after the second embassy. They did not claim 
that Artaphrenes had broken the agreement by demanding the
restitution of Hippias but rather that their refusal to comply
26with this demand brought about hostile relations . Persia’s 
insistence on dictating the terms by which her relationship with 
Athens should function is another reflection of the traditional 
near-eastern view of diplomatic relations between suzerain and 
vassal. *
It seems, therefore, that Herodotus was correct in stating 
that Hippias did not attempt to gain Persian support before the 
failure of Cleomenes’ scheme. When he did resort to Persian aid 
he promised to be a loyal vassal doing everything in his power 
to subject Athens to him and to Darius2^. Athens was already 
a Persian vassal, in name- at least - as a result of the first 
mission - and Persia’s support for Hippias probably derived 
from three causes : i) Hippias* influence through his daughter’s
marriage may have gained powerful support with Darius for him ,
ii) it is likely that the Persians knew that Athens was divided
over the desirability of alliance with Persia at the cost of - 
29independence since Athenian failure to keep in contact after 
the first mission will have been suspicious, iii) at this time 
Persia was only comfortable with tyrants in Greek states.
Persian support for Hippias was a threat to Athens and the 
mission to Artaphrenes was an attempt to counteract Hippias* 
influence. Artaphrenes* ultimatum aimed to force Athens to 
comply with Persia or face hostility but its effect in Athens 
was to overturn the policy of maintaining good relations with 
Persia. A reaction from this pro-Persian line can be seen in the 
Athenian awareness that in future they should be on terms of 
hostility with their former ally^ .
For internal Athenian politics in the decade after the 
expulsion of Hippias the relationship with Persia was of crucial 
importance. Those who favoured the return of Hippias and those 
who looked to Sparta for support will have been discredited by the 
flight of the Peisistratids and Cleomenes* abortive coup in 
Athens. Those who promoted alliance with Persia as an alternative 
to the policies of other groups gained their objective perforce, 
despite the act of submission and the criticism it aroused, becaus 
in the face of Spartan enmity there was no alternative. Hippias* 
compact with Sparta called into question the motives of both and 
did nothing to increase the popularity of either in Athens, thus
28. p. 1^2 n. 23 ; •
29. Hdt. 5  73;1 1
30. The use here of .. .ccpi e6e6oxTo ... (Hdt. 5 96.2) may not 
imply a resolution of the assembly since it would then be a 
declaration of war. Rather it embodies the sentiments of the 
Athenians in general that their rejection of the Persian demand 
led inevitably to open hostility.% Several passages in Thucyjdidps 
throw light on Hdt. * 3 use of tpavepoS* in conjunction with
but none are conclusive on this particular passage* s meaning:
Thuc. 1 k 2.2, 125.2, 2 2.3, k 71J..2, 79.2;
enhancing the policy of friendship with Persia. However the 
news of Hippias* understanding with Artaphrenes would have 
dismayed the supporters of Persia especially if the Alcmaeonidae 
were among them since they least of all desired the return of 
Hippias. The failure to maintain good relations with Persia 
without accepting the return of Hippias undermined the independent 
pro-Persian line to such an extent that the only alternative 
was to oppose Persia.
In Persian eyes, however, the relationship with Athens was . 
still in force. One of the most striking features of near eastern 
diplomacy was the emphasis laid on the permanence of the bonds 
between treaty-signatories. This was expressed either by the 
use of words to denote permanence or eternal validity or by 
stipulating that the,bond extended to the descendants of the 
signatories, the latter particularly in the first millennium^. 
Clauses guaranteeing a limited period of peace or good-relatL ons 
were seemingly unknown. It seems likely that Persian views on 
the solemnity of the contract combined with the traditions of 
diplomacy .inherited from the near-eastern states to produce a 
concept of the international agreement as a permanent bond^.
Thus Athenian submission will have involved her in a relationship, 
the consequences of which she may have chosen to ignore or did not 
understand, and her decision to sever the bond with Persia was 
regarded by the Persians as a breach not only of contract but 
also of a religious oath.
The Athenians may have understood that by refusing to accept 
the return of Hippias they were disobeying an ordei* from Sardis 
and therefore realised ^he imminence cf Persian hostility but even
31. Pitzmyer, Seflre (19&7) 12 1 .- 6; 16 1 - 6; Wiseman, VTE,
30 1 - 12; also G. Kestemont, Diplomatique et Droit International.. 
(197^) 21lj.; expressions of everlasting friends ip Between rulers 
E.P. Weidner, PDK II (1923) no. 8, 8f.; G. Dossin, ARM k, no. 20, 
26; J. Nougayroi1,' PRU 3, Lj.3 RS. 16. 270, 32;
32. Orlin, lpc.cit.: 263;
had Artaphrenes maintained good relations with Athens the revolt 
of Ionia and Athens* support of the revels would have condemned 
her^. The Persians saw Athens* hostility as that of a 
recalcitrant vassal aiding other rebel vassals and Darius* anger 
at such conduct is therefore understandable^.
33. Hdt.: 5 97;
3k • jLd: 5 105; it is reminiscent of Assyrian reactions to the 
faithlessness of their vassals and allies: VAB 7. 20ff. - 12B-
6 k 82 - 106; 78 68 - 7k; AS-S. 56ff. 18 - 25, 1^ 6;
i H i  7  • t:" . •. ••• •
~  ' H - l  “
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iii) In preparation for the' campaign of lj.90 B.C. Darius despatched 
heralds to the Greek mainland and island states to ask for earth 
and water^. From its frequent occurrences in Herodotus’ work 
it is clear that earth and water was the sign of unconditional 
submission to Persia but its origins and symbolic significance 
cannot be elucidated from near-eastern or Greek texts. There Is 
no parallel in either Assyrian or Babylonian diplomacy nor does 
it seem to be a Greek or Lydian mechanism. It Is likely, therefore, 
that it Is a traditional Persian symbol whose meaning was 
sufficiently clear for it to need no explanation by Greek authors. 
Earth and water were usually requested but could be given
unsolicited by a ruler who wished to make certain of Persian
06
friendship^ . Darius demanded earth and water while on campaign 
against the Scythians^' but both he and Xerxes made the same 
request of the Greeks before their invasions of Greece-^®.
Megabyzos’ Thracian campaign concluded with the Macedonians
giving earth and water^^and.Artaphernes granted Athens alliance 
with Darius only if this gesture were made^. It never appears 
in conjunction with a negotiated settlement and appears to be a 
unilateral demand by the Persians. In this sense it must function 
as a symbol of complete submission.
The giving of earth and water seems to have been a binding, 
permanent, once for all act which was not repeated even when 
a city regained Its Independence and subsequently returned or 
was forced to return to Persian allegiance. Thus In the Ionian 
Revolt no demand for earth and water was made on the defeated 
rebels. Where earth and water were not given and the Persians
35. Hdt. 6 lj.8; Ed. Meyer, Gdflj IV 1 (1939), 299f.+ n.1 is followed 
by H. Berve, Miltlades ... (Hermes Elnzelschrlft 2, 1937) 69 n.1, 
in believing that the heralds were sent before Mardonios’ expedition 
of lj.92; for other modern discussions see below p. 1lj.9 n. lj.7;
36. Gelon of Syracuse in lj.80, Hdt. 7 163.2;
emerged victorious the vanquished were presumably adjudged to have 
forfeited their claim to their land and therefore no ceremony of 
earth and water was necessary^ .
Darius1 demand for earth and water from Athens in Jj.91 is an 
exception to the rule of earth and water being sought only once 
since in cf>07 Athenians envoys had made submission to Persia by 
this gesture^*2 .
Persia had not, however, been able to confirm this submission 
either by occupation of the territory or by a repetition of the 
ceremony on the vassal’s soil, the more customary location for 
such gestures. The Persians may not, therefore, have regarded 
the Athenian, commitment, binding though it was, as fully ratified. 
In 1^.91 they were taking the opportunity to confirm A then* s 
vassal-status^.
A similar exception is Xerxes’ repetition in lj.81^ of Darius* 
request for earth and water from the Greek states, many of whom 
had complied with the earlier request^. As in the case of Athens, 
the Persians may have felt that their failure to confirm the 
submission by occupation of the territory required a repetition 
of the demand. An additional cause is Xerxes’ accession between 
the date of Darius’ request and his own invasion. The emphasis 
on each king performing important diplomatic functions^ may 
have necessitated a repeated demand.
Prom the standpoint of Persian diplomacy, therefore, both
lj.1 . Cyrus and the Ionians in c£lj.6, Hdt. 6 U8.1; 
lj.2. Hdt. 5 73; above pp 136 - 11+0;
1+3. It might also be an'expression of Persian magnanimity, Hdt.
7 136.2; 6 9.3f*; 8 11+0 and ff.; an Assyrian parallel, Borger,
Ash. 103f. 29 — 31;
lji+. Hdt. 7 32, 131 - 133; Athens and Sparta were excluded;
1+5. H d U  6 l+8f.;
1+6. Just as loyalty was demanded of each vassal on a king’s 
accession, see below pp. 1 5l+f*;
Darius* and Xerxes* missions of lj.9V and I4.8 I, respectively, are 
intelligible. The historicity of Darius* request for earth and 
water has, however, been doubted by some scholars who believe 
that it is a doublet of Xerxes* embassy in lj.81^. In particular 
the maltreatment of the Persian envoys to Athens and Sparta, 
which Herodotus unequivocally ascribes to Darius* reign**"®, is 
said to fit the context of lj.81 better than that of lj.91 • Herodotus* 
clear statement that Xerxes did not send envoys to Athens and 
Sparta in I4.8 I because the heralds sent by Darius in 1^ 91 had been 
maltreated is difficult to refute despite the. clearly later 
traditions confusing several incidents of this nature^. Even 
if one believes that heralds were sent to Athens and Sparta in 
ij.81 there is no justification for a denial of a similar mission 
in ij.91 . Moreover, Xerxes* mission of lj.81 is more easily 
understandable in the context of a diplomacy which usually 
despatched such missions before a campaign, the best other example 
of which is Darius* mission of 1±91 • If the latter Is doubted 
the former becomes less Intelligible. The objections to the 
mission of the envoys In lj.91 are not convincing,
iv) Prior to lj.79 diplomatic agreements between Persia and Greek
states had been dictated by Persia alone. In that year, however, 
Mardonios, the Persian general In Greece, attempted to gain* 
Athenian loyalty to Persia by offering terms: Athens was forgiven 
her crimes against the King, she was allowed to retain her
territory and to appropriate any other Greek land she wished, her
1^ 7. notably K.J.Beloch, G.G.II2 (191*0 I, 1^0+ n.6 ; G. de Sanctis, 
Rlv. Fll. NS 8 (1930), 292'"-“2995 H. Bengtson, G.G.5 (1977), 163;
(5. HLgnett, XIG, 8 7 J R.'Sealey, CJ 72 (1976) 13 - 20, argues that 
the mission of Zj.91.. should be accepted.
U8. Hdt. 7 133-1;
*J-9. Plod., 11 2f.; Aelius, Aristides, Panath., 9 7 - 9 9 , 125; 
Pausanlas 12.7; P lut. Them., 6.3f. discussed by R.J. Lenardon, 
fllstorla 5 (1956) 2j.10f.; see also Busolt, G.G.II2 (1395) 571f-n.5;
autonomy was guaranteed and her temples would be ^ rebuilt with 
Persian aid-^ • The Athenians were urged to come to terms 
( opoXoyeeiv xaxaXucacOcu )^1 in order to become * friends* (<pft°t )
of Xerxes but Herodotus does not make explicit what the Persian 
were to gain in return for these concessions. When the Athenians 
were subsequently using the spectre of an agreement with Persia 
to threaten the Spartans they claimed that once they had become 
allies ( cuppaxoi ) Qf the king they would attack any state against 
which they were led^ . This suggests that Athens was to become 
a vassal of Persia, since participation in royal campaigns was 
a customary requirement of vassals^, but that she should also 
enjoy the privilege of autonomy, as some of the Ionian cities 
had in the sixth century^*.
During the same speech the Athenians had claimed before the 
Spartans that. Xerxes had offered to make an alliance with them 
on fair and equal terms ( • • .cuppdxooS' eOeXei ex'tc^xe xat op°Mn 
xoCqcacOat... )-* , sentiments which are not explicitly expressed
in the Persian offer. It is, therefore, possible that the 
Athenians exaggerated both the extent to which Xerxes was willing 
to make concessions on status and also, in contrast, his ability 
to call upon their obedience-^. It is unlikely in the light of 
the outcome of an alliance between Persia and Athens - the- 
probable collapse of Greek resistance to the Persian invasion - 
that Athens would have been granted full independent status
50. Hdt. 8 1 3 6 , 1lj.0ff.; Plut. Arlst., 10.2; discussion in Ed.
Meyer, Gdfl.3 (1939) IV 1, 3 8 0 , 352f7; J.A.R. Munro, CAH IV (1930)
3 1 7 - 3 2 2 7 Hignett, X1£, 271 - 273; ------
51 . Hdt., 8 2.- 4;
52. Hdt., 8 140' 4;
53. Hdt., 9 11.2;
54* 3Cen. Cyrop. 7 4*2, 4-9, 8 6.8; Isocrate3 4 123;
55 • See above p p 129 - 132;
56. Hdt., 9 7.1;
57. The account of the Athenian embassy to Sparta Is discussed 
by Munro, CAH IV (1930) 321 and Hignett, XI9, 231 - 285; .
whereas all other Persian ’friends1 in Greece were vassals.
Moreover the terms offered by Mardonios to the Athenians are 
similar to those enjoyed by some Ionian cities in the sixth 
century and, more noticeably, to those proposed in the late 
fifth and early fourth centruy for the Greeks of Asia Minor^®, 
none of whom were independent.
Mardonios* embassy to Athens in 79 marks a change in 
Persia’s relations not only with Athens but also with the rest of 
the mainland Greeks. By offering terms the Persians acknowledged 
that they could more easily gain their own ends through 
concessions to Greek independence, a conclusion they had already 
reached with the Greeks of Asia Minor. However these concessions 
were not submitted for negotiation or discussion; they remained 
a unilaterally-proposed settlement^ which implied submission 
to Persia. In this respect - the presentation of an international 
agreement - Persian diplomacy is consistent from the sixth 
century into the fifth and, as will be seen, from the later fifth 
century into the fourth. Between clj.65 and clj.13, however, the 
political balance in Greece and the Aegean was markedly different 
from that obtaining in previous or later periods. The relationship 
of Athens with Persia in particular was conducted on an entirely 
different ‘footing*
58. See below, chs.lf,5; the settlement after the Ionian Revolt 
also has similarities, namely internal autonomy but external 
submission to Persia, Hdt. 6 1^ 3• 3;
59. So also the ’reforms’ after the Ionian Revolt: Hdt. 6 h.2 and 
k3i ---
Persia* s Diplomatic contacts with Greece 
____________ clj-65 - clj.20 B.C._____________
Ancient sources record several embassies from Persia to
various Greek states, and vice versa, in the period between the
death of Xerxes and the Persian intervention in the Peloponnesian
war^ . Two are of particular significance for a study of.
diplomacy: first the simultaneous Argive and Athenian embassies 
2
to Susa , and second the mission on which Epilykos, the uncle of
3
Andocides, served . There are two noteworthy similarities
between the incidents: they occurred toward the start of the
reign of Artaxerxes I and Darius II respectively and they both
involved a formal statement of the relationship between Persia
and a Greek state. It will be argued that these are not coincidences
and that they demonstrate the influence of near-eastern
diplomatic tradition on the relations between Persia and the
Greeks. The date of each incident is crucial to the argument
and will be discussed first in both sections.
i) Herodptus provides no secure chronological setting for the 
simultaneous Argive and Athenian embassies to Susa except that 
they occurred many years after ( x o W o T c i  execi ucxepov )
I4.8 I B.C.^. Greater certainty about their date can be achieved 
by studying the possible contexts for the two embassies separately.
The purpose of Herodotus* narrative at this point is to 
corroborate rumottrs of Argive pro-Persian sympathies manifested 
by her neutrality during the Persian wars, when Xerxes had 
promised Persian good-will if she stood aside from the conflict.
1. R. Meiggs, AE 508 - £12; Thuc. 1 109, 2ff.; Strabo, 1 3.i.U7: 
Plato, Charm, T>8a; Aristophanes, A ch. 61 - 1227 6ij.£> - 65Jf may 
reflect contemporary diplomatic activity;
2. Hdt. 7 151; the latter led by Kallias son of HIpponikos;
3. Andocides, 3 2 9 ;
If. Hdt. 7 1£0ff.; R.W. Macan, Herodotus Books VII, VIII, IX, 
vol. 1 part I (1908) 206f. argues that this expression suits a 
date in the I4J4.O* s better than the lf60*s. The expression is, 
however, vague, cf. Hdt. 6 1If0.1; 7 16 .2; 7 137.3;
The Argive mission to Susa was intended to ascertain whether 
Artaxerxes still considered them as friends or as enemies and the 
incident was, therefore, cited by Herodotus as possibly 
corroborative evidence of Argos* medism. Artaxerxes* favourable 
response to the mission must have confirmed Greek suspicions of 
Argos* sympathies.
The importance of this incident is two-fold: why did Argos 
consider it necessary to ascertain Artaxerxes* attitude toward 
her and what does this imply for relations between Persia and a 
Greek state? The Argive enquiry implies a breach or hiatus in 
the relationship with Persia caused by either Argive or Persian 
action and calling for a restatement of Persian policy. The only 
known Argive action which might have been construed as hostile 
to Persia during the period from cl*80 to cl*30 was the alliance 
with Athens (cl*62 - cl*51 )^ * Athens was at war with the king for 
at least part of this time and if their hostilities had already 
begun prior to the alliance with Argos it seems unlikely that the 
king would have given the Argives a favourable reply. Moreover 
if Argos was at the time of the embassy in alliance with Athens 
and therefore indirectly anti-Persian the force of Herodotus* 
story, whose implication is that Argos was still friendly toward 
Persia some twenty years after the failure of Xerxes* invasion, 
would be nullified. Alternatively the Argives might have sent 
an embassy to' the king after the lapse of the alliance with 
Athens, i.e. after 1*51, in order to re-establish their former 
good relations^.
A close inspection of Herodotus* text of the Argive question 
shows, however, that the breach of the relationship was not as a 
result of Argive action but can be definitely ascribed to the
5* Thuc. 1 102.1*; 5 28.2; the chronology of the Pentekontaetea 
is notoriously difficult to establish; see Gomme, HCT 1 (1959), 
1*08-1*13; * ~
6. As suggested by How & Wells, II 1915
7
death in lj.65 of Xerxes and the accession of his son Artaxerxes I* .
... etpojrdv *ApTogepgT|v 'tov Sepgeoo et ccpi e t t e ^ e v e t  e Oe X o u c i  
ttjv xpoS' S e p ^ v  ©CXiT)v cuvexepacavTo, vo{jii£6iai;o ^poS" afcxou etvai
N * 8xoXejitof •
*... to ask Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, if the friendship
which they had formed with Xerxes still held good (as they
desired) -, or whether he would consider them to be enemies* •
As noticed by Stein this enquiry has no sense unless it
9follows closely the death of Xerxes • The emphasis of the
question is on the continuation of the previous friendship and
10. only in the second place on possible hostility . If this question 
were asked clj.f>0 not only would fifteen years have elapsed since 
his accession so that Artaxerxes might find it somewhat belated 
but also the intervening Argive alliance with Athens would make 
the question insolent especially as the Argives indicated their 
own desire to reaffirm the friendship (eQsXouct ).
It can berseen that Herodotus* text favours an historical 
setting for the Argive mission to Susa soon after the death of 
Xerxes, The near-eastern background confirms this since the 
death of a monarch and the accession of his successor was a period • 
of uncertainty when all royal relationships were in flux. This 
was a direct consequence of the personalisation of both 
international relations and internal administration. The loyalty 
of subjects and vassals was to their lord and, If discontented, 
they might revolt against a new master before he could impose 
his authority. Similarly foreign states might seek to alter 
their relationship, relying on the uncertainty surrounding a change
7. R.A. Parker and W.H. Dubber.stein, Babylonian Chronology,
626 B.C. - A.D. 75, (Providence, R.I.7 19;>6) 17:’BM 32235;
8. Hdt. 7 151;
9- H. Stein, Herodotus, IV^ (1881) 11+3; Walker, CAH V (1927) 1^ 70 
also came to ^hfs conclusion.
10. This may be reflected in Herodotus* choice of the indicative 
for the first clause and the optative for the second, see Hdt.,
5 97 but cf. Macan, ad. loc.
/ ' ' ■ 
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in ruler. Thus, for example, the deaths of Sargon II,
Sennacherib and Esarhaddon all gave rise to revolt by vassals^ .
11and/or internal strife within Assyria . . It was to inhibit
disputes over the succession such as had occurred on his own
accession that Esarhaddon bound his subjects to protect his
legitimate successor, Ashurbanipal, and to expedite his accession
on Esarhaddon1 s death. The care taken in formulating these oaths
demonstrates the concern of the neo-Assyrian monarchs to effect
a smooth transmission of power which would render the dislocation
12of government as innocuous as possible • r
The accession was also the time when the ruler was best
able to change his status vis-a-vis other rulers and institute
new policies or relationships. A good example of a major change
in diplomacy is the belligerent attitude of Samsi-Adad V of
Assyria toward Marduk-Balatsu-Iqbi of Babylon although the
former’s immediate predecessor had been a nominal vassal of 
1 ^Babylon . Similarly Ashurbanipal*s annals record a foreign 
king voluntarily accepting the protection of Assyria, and thereby 
acknowledging his own inferior status, soon after his accession^.
It became customary for rulers who wished to maintain good 
relations to acknowledge a new king soon after his accession and * 
to delay doing so might indicate hostility. Vassals were 
expected to declare their allegiance as soon as possible and were 
regarded as rebels if they refused to make this gesture. In 
this way the accession became a test of other nations* recognition 
of the new king, those failing to acknowledge him becoming
potential enemies. Equally, the new ruler, if a vassal, might
^'
11. Luckenbill, OIP 2, 2l+ff. 1+8 - 62; Borger, Ash. *1+0 - 1+5;
VAB 7s 6 - 111.;
12. Wiseman, VTE, 3f.;
13. Earlier relations, E.F. Weidner, Af0 8 (1932/33) 27ff.; also 
Brinkman, PKB, 207 - 210;
11+. VAB 7» 81+ 1+0 - 50; see above pp. 1+9 - £6;
receive good treatment from his lord if he confirmed his loyalty 
even when previous relations between the two countries had been 
strained^.
The Achaemenid rulers probably experienced similar pressures
to their predecessors and they no doubt recognised the need to
impose their authority on vassals and to obtain the recognition
16of friendly independent states without delay after accession
Artaxerxes may, therefore, have expected to receive recognition
from states such as Argos who had previously been on good terms
with Persia though what status the Argives enjoyed in Persian
eyes is obscure. They were <pCXot (’friends1) but this need not
imply that the Persians did not consider them vassals. Athens
in I4.79 was o f f e r e d  <ptXia on very favourable terms but would
1 7nevertheless have been a vassal . If the Argives wished to 
maintain friendship with Artaxerxes it was clearly in their 
interest to recognise his assumption of power as soon as possible 
since long delay might have jeopardised their mission’s reception 
in Susa•
The final factors which may help to determine the date of 
the Argive embassy are the alliance with Athens and the Athenian 
hostilities against Persia. If Athens and Persia were not, at 
the time of the Athenian alliance with Argos, engaged in active 
warfare it is possible that the embassy falls after the alliance 
or during the negotiations leading up to it. If, on the other 
hand* Athens were continuously at war with Persia in the late 
lj.60’s the embassy Is more likely to have occurred before the 
alliance, since artaxerxes is unlikely to have given a 
favourable reply to the^Argives if they were already allied 
to his enemies.
15* AS 5 * 50 - 5k esp.. $k 86ff.; see above pp. k&» 8 3 ;
16. The confusion on Cambyses’ death demonstrated these problems: 
Hdt., 3 61 - 88, 126ff.; Artaxerxes’ own accession: Ctesias 6lff. 
5iod. 11 69, 7 1;
17* Hdt. 8 Hj.0; see above pp.15>0f;
The coincidence of the Athenian and Argive embassies in Susa
suggests a common stimulus for their presence - the accession of
1ft * — ___
the new king . It may be inferred that both states realised
that
i) the new king might introduce new policies
ii) this was a time when diplomatic relationships might be 
redefined.
The Argives, as Persia’s major (if covert) sympathisers in
mainland Greece, were anxious to preserve their privileged status
while Athens, as active leader of the struggle against Persia,
was bound to discover any change in Persian attitudes. An added
incentive to the Athenian presence in Susa was their recent
success against the Persian forces at the Eurymedon and on Cyprus
They might have believed that these victories and Artaxerxes1
' 1 9accession would make the Persians more amenable to negotiation .
There is no reason to suppose that Artaxerxes was committed to an
anti-Athenian policy and, even if he were not concerned about
recent Persian defeats, the revolt of Bactria (and possibly the
revolt of Egypt) will have distracted him from an enforcement of
20his own will over the Greeks • In view of these distractions 
within the Empire the timing of the Athenians mission was 
fortunate.
18. S.K. Eddy, CP 65 (1970) 11 also reached this conclusion, 
Herodotus* statement that the Athenians were there ’on other 
business’ ( ETepou xpTTffpaxoS* etvexa ) may be an admission of
Ignorance but is more likely intended to conceal his knowledge of 
the purpose of Kallias’ mission - a purpose at variance with his 
own work; so Macan, ad Hdt. 7 15^ 5
19. Date of Eurymedon, R. Meiggs, AE pp. 81 f.; subsequent 
.activities, M. Sordi, RSA 1 (1971) 33 - W #  J.D. Barns, Historia
2 (1953 - k ) 163 - 1767
20. Diodorus, 12 states that the Persian initiative over the
Peace of Kailias (sic) was motivated by the defeats in Cyprus.
I would date this, with Sordi RSA 1 (1971) 31* - 1*8; to cl*65 not 
clj.50. The tradition is not confirmed by other sources. The 
revolts in Bactria and Egypt Ctesias, 61ff.; Diod. 11 6 9 , 71;
It has been established that the Athenians sent an embassy
led by Kailias to Artaxerxes I soon after his accession. Could
this be the occasion of the treaty later known as the ‘Peace of
Kailias1? Its dating was disputed even by ancient authors;
Diodorus assigns the Peace unequivocally to 449/8, after the
21 •Cyprus expedition of Kimon , but Kallisthenes, quqted by 
22Plutarch , believed that if there were a Peace (which he doubted)
then it was concluded before the death of Ephialtes, i.e.
cJj.62/12^, and Isocrates2^ clearly believed that the Peace dated
from the period before the radical reforms which curtailed the
power of the Areopagus, clj.622 '^ .
Diodorus1 chronology has been criticised by Sordi who argues
convincingly that his source, Ephorus, dated the Peace to the
period immediately after the Eurymedon and the first campaign
in Cyprus but Diodorus confused this first expedition in c464
26and Kimon* s later campaign in Cyprus, c450 • Thus Diodorus*
date for the Peace of Kailias can no longer be asserted with any 
confidence as the most likely one. Kailias* expedition to Susa 
in cl|.6l|-, as mentioned by Herodotus, becomes the probably setting 
for the negotiations leading to the settlement later known as the 
Peace of Kailias2 .^
Evidence of the outcome of Kailias* negotiations in Persia is
21 . Plod., 12 4.4;
22. Plut., Cim. 13.4 (= FGrH 121;, P16);
2 3 . Aristotle, Athp., 25.1;;
21;. Isoc. Are op. 80;
25. Aristotle, Athp., 2 5 .3^** 26;
26. M. Sordi, RSA 1 (1971 ) 33 - 48;
27* The date of the Peace of Kailias does not materially affect 
the conclusions of this section and I have not attempted to give 
a comprehensive review of the case for and against the date of 
449/8. Some of the arguments of the authors of the ATL (vol. Ill 
2 75 - 300, esp. 277ff.) most recently set out by Meiggs, AE 129 - 
151> 4^7 - ^95; are still persuasive but not wholly convincing. 
Bibliography of the subject in Bengtson, 61; - 69 and Meiggs, 
op. cit.; add de Ste Croix, OPW 31 ~ 314 and a very
Idiosyncratic treatment by J.H. Schreiner, SO 52 (1977) 19 - 38;
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contradictory. Demosthenes claimed that Kailias was prosecuted
and found guilty of receiving bribes while concluding the famous
29 - -treaty whereas Plutarch '* transmits the testimony of some
(unidentified) authors that Kailias was highly honoured for his
services to Athens in concluding the treaty named after him.
These conflicting stories might refer to two separate incidents^
and Demosthenes may have confused the two, resulting in the,
seemingly unthinkable, prosecution of Kailias after his most
*5*1
successful mission-' •
The terms of the Peace differ greatly from the treaties
between Persia and a Greek state both before clj.70 and after
clj.20. In outline the terms were :
i) the Greeks of Asia Minor to be autonomous,
ii) Persian forces not to come within three days march of the
west coast of Asia Minor,
iii) no Persian warships to sail westwards of the Chelidonian
Isles on the southern coast of Asia Minor nor the Kyanean rocks
on the northern coast,
iv) the Athenians not to attack the territory of the King.
If these stipulations are not part of an elaborate fourth 
*52
century forgery*' but reflect the terms of a genuine mid-fifth 
century treaty they demonstrate the weakness of the Persian 
bargaining position. No previous formal agreement made by Persia 
had countenanced the partial loss of its subjects in western 
Asia Minor, or elsewhere, nor had its freedom of action within its
28. Dem., 19 273;
29. Plut., Cim. 13.*5; Paus., 1 8.2; C.L. Murison, Phoenix 25 
(1971 ) 27n.TS; '------------------------------- -------
30. S.K. Eddy, CP 65 (1970) 10f.;
31. D.J. Mosley, Mnem., 26 (1973) 57f.;
32. For this opinion see M. Sordi et al., RSA (1971) 205 -211; 
C.L. Murison, Phoenix- 25 (1971 ) 12 - 31; C .TTT^Habicht, Hermes
89 (1961 ) esp. 12ff7, I9,25f.; contra S.K. Eddy, CP 65 TT97JT 9f.;
own territory been curtailed by another state. Such restrictions
are likely to have been distasteful not only in their practical
application but also in the affront which they represented to the
Persian imperial ideology. The only Persian gain was the Athenian
undertaking not to attack the territory of the King, presumably
including Cyprus. On these grounds it is possible to see how
the Persians might have rejected the Athenian proposals but if
this were so it is difficult to understand why rejected proposals
were remembered and how they were transformed into a glittering 
33success^ .
The most important clause for a study of later settlements 
between Persia and the Greeks is that guaranteeing the autonomy 
of the Asiatic Greeks. Early in the fourth century Persia was 
willing to make a similar concession when faced with the invasion
o)
of Agesilaus^, a prospect as menacing as the Athenian naval
supremacy after Eurymedon. The reference to the autonomy clause
in the Peace of Kailias occurs in Diodorus^, presumably drawing
on Ephorus, and also Lycurgus^, who may also have knownEphorus1 
37work but. not in the other fourth century sources for the 
Peace. It is possible therefore to trace the autonomy clause to 
Ephorus whose supposition it could have been, based on his 
knowledge of Persia1s dealings with the Greeks of Asia in the 
late fifth and early fourth centuries and from the boundaries of 
Persian influence which the Peace of Kailias allegedly imposed.
If the clause is not an invention by Ephorus or others then it 
shows that already in the middle fifth century Persia was 
capable of distinguishing between outright independence ( eXeuOepta ) 
and local freedom ( auTovopia ), a distinction she was certainly 
making later in the century.
This point is strengthened if the king did not, in the 
Peace of Kailias, disclaim his right to tribute from the Asiatic 
Greeks but rather acknowledged his intention not to collect it.
33. cf. A.W. Gomme, JHS 50 (1930) 1D5f.; 
3^. see below pp. 1 7&f;
35. Diod. 12 26.2;
36. Lycurg., Leoc. 73;
37* C.L. Murison, Phoenix 25 (1971) 19f.;
The renewal of the Persian claim to this tribute in c lj.15 is 
further corroborative evidence but one must then accept that the 
Peace of Kailias remained valid - at least in theory - from 
the date of its conclusion to clj.1 5^ .
If the autonomy-clause of the Peace of Kailias is genuine, 
and if it was acceptance of this principle which prevented the 
King from claiming the tribute of the Greeks of Asia Minor after 
the Peace of Kailias then the Persian attitude to autonomy had 
changed by the last decade of the fifth century, since there 
seems to have been no conflict for the Persians between autonomy 
and their right to tribute at this later date. It can be 
suggested that the different historical settings altered their 
perception of autonomy: in the later fifth and early fourth 
century Persia was able to enforce her claim to tribute whereas 
she had no such will or capability after her defeats some fifty 
years earlier.
If the autonomy— clause is rejected as a later interpolated
invention then it is possible that the Persians recognised no
limit on their right to tribute from the Asiatic Greek? but
merely neglected to enforce this right because of their military
weakness. The Persian renewal of claims on their tribute in
clj.15 might, therefore, be of no relevance to the Peace of Kailias
particularly as it seems likely that Athens had entered into a
less well-defined relationship with Darius II, Artaxerxes’
39successor*' .
The Argive mission to Susa in clj.65 has been shown to 
conform to a traditional pattern of near eastern diplomacy, the 
early acknowledgement of .a new king and a redefinition of the 
relationship with him. Athens too attempted, perhaps successfully, 
to obtain a formal relationship with Artaxerxes at this time. 
Whether or not either or both states were aware of the near 
eastern tradition they both realised the political advantages 
of opening relations with the new king as soon as possible.
3 8 . Thuc. 8 0. Murray, Hlstorla (1966) 1lj.2;
39. See below pp I6ijf*f.;
ii) The expedition on which Epilykos served has been dated 
from circumstantial evidence to the year 1+21+/3 and was almo3t- 
certainly the first Athenian contact with Darius IJT^who was 
acknowledged king in some parts of Babylonia at least as early 
as August 1+21+^ . The basic similarity between this embassy 
and that led by Kailias some forty years earlier is their occurrence 
very early in the reigns of Darius II and Artaxerxes I 
respectively. As in the earlier case it can be postulated that 
the Athenians were eager to discover the attitude of the new 
Persian King toward them and were aware of the opportunity for 
diplomatic manoeuvre consequent on his accession. In any case 
Athens was concerned to forestall Spartan attempts to win the 
King over to their side, attempts which had been made since at 
least the beginning of the Peloponnesian War^2 . In this respect 
the Athenians were successful according to Andocides since they 
elicited a favourable response from Darius :
... paciXel peva-Xy ... cxov6aS' xoirjca+ievoi xal cuvOe+ievoi 
cpiXiav els' 'cov arcavTa xpovov,... ^
1+0. Andocides, 3 .2 9 ; and the comments of U. Albini, Andocides, de 
Pace (Firenze 1961+); H.T. Wade - Gery, HSCP Suppl. 1— (f9i+0) 127 - 
T35 (= Essays In Greek History (Oxford T95bF“2§7 - 211); the date 
of the emba ssy is <1 isput ed by A .E . Haubitschek, GHBS 5 (19610 
I56f. who prefers cl+15, W.E. Thompson, Kilo 53 (1971 ) 121+ who 
suggests soon after the Peace of NIcias and A. Blamire Phoenix 
29 (1975) 25 whose proposal of 14-2 2 /1 is founded on a belief tkat 
Wade-Gerv* s chronology is too tight. D. Stockton, Hlstorla 8 
0959) 6of. and 7l+_- 79 attacks Wade-Gery1 s arguments in support 
of the embassy, rejecting It outright; contra Stockton see A.Andrewes, 
Hlstorla 10 (1961) 3ff*; see now M.B. Walbank, Athenian Proxenies 
of the fifth century B.C.^ (Toronto 1978) 258 - 568;
1+1. Lewis, Sparta and Persia 71f. quoting BM 3331+2 for the date.
1+2. Thuc., 1+ 65* 1+; Thuc., I 82.1; Aristophanes, A ch., 61+6 - 
and see Lewis, S&P,~2~- 3 , 6 3. - 65, 69f.;
1+3. Andoc., 3.29;
*... we (the Athenians) made a treaty with the Great King 
establishing friendship for all time,...1
If there were additional terms or stipulations these have 
not been perpetuated in the sources but near-eastern parallels 
assist in interpreting this treaty.
i) the statement of friendship is characteristic of the 
ancient near-eastern treaty even in cases of settlements which 
terminated bitter warfare^**.
 ^ ii) the concept of eternal validity is found explicitly in
some near-eastern treaties and Is assumed in others^- .
On these grounds at least the truth of Andocides1 reference 
to a formal statement of Persia1 s relationship with Athens early 
In Darius1 reign is not unlikely.
The relationship between the settlements of If61f and If2if Is
«
complicated, not the least difficulty being Thucydides* failure
to mention either^. Other ancient authors pass over the * Peace
of Epilykos* in silence, Demosthenes explicitly stating that there
were only two' treaties with the Great King, namely the Peace of
ii7Kailias and the Peace of Antalkidas • Theopompos* derogatory 
reference to an Athenian treaty with the Persians includes the 
name Darius and it Is possible that he was attacking the Peace 
of Epilykos but other ancient sources believed him to be referring 
to the Peace of Kailias^.
Given the absence of ancient confirmation of Andocides 
reference to Epilykos* mission there are two possible lines of 
enquiry :
iflf. see above pp* 87 - 1QQ; M. Weinfeld, TJF 8 (1976), 390f., 383f.,
2j.5» M. Weinfeld, loc .clt.» if02; above n. 8 ; the importance of
the inclusion of ckov&a.Z to indicate a cessation of hostilities 
is argued by M. Amit, RSA if (197^) 55> - 63; Persian views of 
treaty-validity are outlined by L.L. Orlin, Michigan Oriental 
Studies ... G.G. Cameron, (ed.*'Orlin, 1976, Ann Arbor) - 266;
*
lj.6. Gomme, HCT 1, 333 and 3> i-l-99 accepted both but with some 
reservations in the case of the latter;
lf7- Pern., 15 29 though the text at this point is not agreed by 
all editors;
if8. FGrH 115 F 153, l£ij-; W.R. Connor, Theopompos and Fifth Century 
AtherTs"Tl 9 6 8 ) 78 - 86;  — --------------------- *
i) the Peace of Epilykos reaffirmed the Peace of Kailias
in so many details that it was not regarded as a distinct
k9
settlement, hence later silence^ •
ii) The Peace of Epilykos was a simple declaration of 
friendship between Athens and Persia, containing no clauses of a 
geographical or military nature and accordingly having little 
practical effect. In this respect it resembled the assurance of 
Persian friendship given by Artaxerxes I to the Argives^.
Darius may have given the Athenians verbal undertakings but a
mission’s settlement did not invite commemoration by any of the 
later authors whose main concern was to contrast the terms of 
the Peace of Kailias with those of the Peace of Antalkidas and 
who - if they knew of Epilykos1 mission - would have thought it 
superfluous to their argument.
The first hypothesis rests on the belief that the Peace 
of Kailias was a formal and fully ratified treaty of kk9 containing 
explicit reference to certain topics of disagreement between 
Athens and*Persia. It was argued above that the Peace of Kailias 
Is better dated to ck^ Ij. and the subsequent hostilities between 
Athens and Persia in Egypt and elsewhere are surely evidence of 
the breakdown of any relationship the Peace may have 
Instituted^ . It was, therefore, inoperative for over thirty 
years and although - as the most recent settlement between Athens 
and Persia-it could have formed the basis for negotiation, it 
seems unlikely that Persia would have agreed a second time to 
such humiliating terms.
The second hypothesis regards the results of Epilykos* 
mission as completely distinct from the Peace of Kailias and, If 
Andocides* reference to c t c o v S c u  is accurate, perhaps partial
written settlement;
52. Thuc. 1 109f., 112, 1 1 5 .1* - 5, 116.1,3; Plod. 12 2 7 .3  - 5; 
It Is also possible that the Peace may never have come into ef 
despite the agreement of terms;
treaty proper, in the Greek sense, Thus Epilykos*
U. Kohler, Hermes 27 (1b92) 6b - 73;
50. Hdt., 7 1 5 1 ;
51. I do not think that.. .cuv6enevoi (ptXtav has to imply a formalised
proof that the Peace of Kailias was defunct since cxovdcu would
not be necessary between two states already formally at peace^.
Thucydides1 silence on the mission could be explained if Epilykos*
mission did not achieve a formal agreement with Darius but merely
a verbal understanding, a result which Thucydides might not have
considered important when writing of this period. Even so
Epilykos* embassy was the most significant diplomatic contact
between Persia and Greece during the Peloponnesian War prior to
Athens* support of Amorges* revolt. It also seems an unlikely
coincidence that Thucydides* revision of the earlier books of
his worlc^ should have broken off at the point where the Athenian
embassy to Artaxerxes I turned back hearing of his death^, an
event which must have antedated the sending of Epilykos* mission
*?6 *by at most a few months^ . If one Is prepared to reject Andocides* 
reference to Epilykos* mission as unhistorical^ it Is possible 
to preserve Thucydides* narrative as it stands but this solution 
is not accepted here.
The settlement brought back by Epilykos was not as explicit 
as the Peace of Kailias in Its definition of the relationship 
between Persia and Athens. This may be due to the different 
political backgrounds - in the earlier case Athens had been at 
the pinnacle of success and Persia at the nadir while In the' 
later agreement Athens was engaged in a taxing war while Persia 
had no immediate distraction - or to a reluctance by both parties 
to commit themselves to anything more than a statement of friendship. 
If Andocides is to be believed, the Persians were still willing 
in c.lj.214. to remain on friendly terms with Athens despite the 
Athenian Involvement in-the Peloponnesian War which might have 
been the occasion for renewed Persian aggression.
53. M. Amit, RgA k (197W 55 - 6 3 ;
5k • A. Andrewes, Historia 10 (1961) 1 - 18, esp. 5ff., 15;
55* Thuc ., k 50;
56. Andrewes, loc. clt.» 15 seems to imply a connection between 
Thucydides* silence over both the Peace of Kailias and that of 
Epilykos;
57. C.L. Murison, Phoenix, 25 (1971) 2k - 26, esp. n .5 k ;
The King may also have been wary of detailed commitments 
to a Greek state in view of the failure of the Peace of Kailias 
and of the negotiations with Athens in the late sixth century. 
Greater acquaintance with Greek diplomacy and politics had 
convinced the Persians that unless they were In a position to 
dictate a settlement and see It fulfilled they were at the mercy 
of Greek political life and its effects on diplomacy. They 
achieved this position in the years between cij.15 and c385 B.C.
From a study of these two Incidents it has emerged that 
Persia continued the near-eastern tradition both of confirming 
loyal allies In their former status and of negotiating agreement 
of friendship with previous enemies. Persian attitudes to the 
Greeek notion of autonomy have also appeared and It is the 
history of Persia* s attempts to reconcile autonomy to imperial 
ideology which form the core of the next chapter.
Persia* s Diplomatic contacts with Greece 
________________ cij.1 3 - 3 8 6________________
Between Ij.1 3 and 386 B.C. the Achaemenid rulers of Persia 
and several Greek states, notably Athens and Sparta, were Involved 
in complex diplomatic Intercourse^. During this period ten 
agreements, either full settlements between the supreme political 
authorities of each state or temporary truces to enable further 
negotiations to take place, were negotiated. Each of these will 
be considered for the light it may throw on the Persian approach 
to diplomacy with the Greeks before conclusions on broader issues 
are drawn.
In lj.1 3 the Athenian expedition to Sicily was completely 
defeated by the Syracusans and their allies while in Greece Sparta
took the initiative against Athems by fortifying Decelea in
2
Attica . The other significant event of the year was the 
reappearance of Persia as an enemy of Athens, with the avowed 
intention of - regaining the tribute of the Greek cities of Asia 
Minor which Athens was preventing her from collecting-^. It is 
uncertain why Persia should have chosen this time to interfere 
directly in Greek affairs but the anti-Persian revolt of Amorges - 
who may have received Athenian support - is a possible caused.
If Athens already had an agreement of friendship with the Persian 
king^ then his wrath at Athenian support of a rebel and his 
desire to strike back would correspond with a common near-eastern
........ och, G.G. 2 1 (19114.) 377 - 382, 388 - k02,
h \3  -  k32 ; GG; 3,1 _ (1922) 28 - T K 7 6 1  - 3^2 (1923)§§ 83 - 91;
ch. IX, 54 (1958) Hi. IV; CAH V (1927)
1. Previous studies: Bel  
lj.13 U ; ' 2,1
Ed. Meyer, G3A 1^ 42 (1956 )^ , ____, ,   __ _________ .
chs. XI, XlT; VI (1953) chs. I, II; and most recently D.M. Lewis, 
Sparta and Persia (Leiden 1977) for an analysis of Greek, 
principally Spartan, relations with Persia in this period.
2 * Thuc. 7 8I4. — 87 and 7 19;
3. Thuc. 8 5-5; 8 6.1; see 0. Murray, Hist or la 15 (1966) II4.2 - 1 5 6;
[j.. Andocides, III. 29; -
5 . see above pp 161| - 166;
diplomatic motif .
7
It has, however, been suggested' that Persia took advantage 
of Athens* weakened condition after the Sicilian disaster to try 
to regain the Asiatic Greeks and that Athens* support of Amorges 
was a counter to this policy. Hostilities would, on this 
argument, have been initiated by the Persians. Against this view 
it may be argued that the time-span between the Athenian disaster 
in Sicily (Autumn VI 3) and the Persian embassies to Sparta 
(Spring I4.12) is hardly long enough to accommodate the communication 
of the news of the disaster to Persia, the formulation of the 
new Persian policy toward Ionia, the transmission of this 
directive to- the satraps and their own subsequent embassies to 
Sparta®. It is possible that the King knowing of Athenian 
difficulties in Sicily had begun to demand the tribute of the 
Asiatic Greeks prior to the Sicilian disaster but Thucydides* 
assertions that Tissaphernes had only recently (vewcxt been
approached by the King for his tribute should, it it' has any
10 *force, refer to VI3 and not previous years
• Whatever the Persian King* s reasons for intervening In the 
affairs of the Greeks his satraps in the west, Tissaphernes and 
Pharnabazos, both aimed to overthrow Athens* control of the 
Greeks of Asia. The easiest way to achieve this was to support 
Athens* enemies In campaigns in the eastern Aegean and Hellespont 
areas''1 . Tissaphernes Induced the Spartans to intervene In Chios 
and Ionia without concluding a formal agreement, either an alliance 
or and undertaking to supply money or supplies, though he had 
made promises on these last two points.
Within a few months of the Spartan expedition to Ionia 
Tissaphernes did conclude an agreement with the leader of the
6. see above pp 5 7 - 5 9  ; It can be paralleled In Darius* I 
reaction to Athens* support of the Ionian Revolt.
7. H.D. Westlake, Phoenix 31 (1977) 319 - 329;
8. Lewis S&P 87 n. 25;
9. Thuc.. 8 5-5;
10. Further discussion of Athens and Amorges in Lewis, S&P 85 - 8 7 ; 
11 . Thuc • 8 5*5 and 8 6.1;
I' '
. '12Spartan forces, Chalcideus • According to its heading it was an 
alliance made by the Spartans and their allies with the King and
Tissaphernes ( .. .guppaxiav £7«UT)cavTo xpoS’ pactXea xal Ticcacpepvqv - -
» % t » 13Aaxedaipovtoi xal ol guppaxot* ) J. The provisions of this
alliance fell into three sections :
i) the King’s right to the territory which he and his pre­
decessors had ruled was affirmed and the allies undertook to 
prevent Athenian exactions from the cities therein
ii) the war was to be conducted by the allies in co-operation. 
Hostilities were not to be terminated without the agreement of 
both sides.
ili) Rebels of either side were to be enemies of the other.
The second agreement was sworn at Miletus in Autumn lj.12 by 
the retiring Spartan admiral Therimenes and Tissphernes though
’ 1J i
the latter is not mentioned explicitly ^ . Its heading described 
it as a  compact ( £uv6fjxai ) between the Spartans and their allies 
on the one hand and the King, the King’s sons and Tissaphernes 
on the other. ( "SuvQfjxai AaxeSaipovioov xal xffiv £uppaxcov xpoS’ paciXea 
AapeTov xata'trooS’ xatSaS' xouS’ paciXewS” xal Ticcatplpvrjv *..." )
establishing a truce and friendship on certain c o n d i t i o n s •‘otovSaS* 
etvat xal <piXtav xaxa toSe. )1^. These conditions embody the 
three sections of the first treaty with some clarifications: the 
King’s right to his territory was understood as settled and the 
Spartans and their allies were forbidden to attack it or to exact 
tribute from it. In return the King undertook not to attack nor 
allow any of his subjects to attack the Spartans or their allies. 
The King was also to provide upkeep ( SamvTj ) for any forces in 
his territory which he had sent for. The guarantee clauses 
against aggression by either 3ide are obscure but seem to envisage
12. Thuc. 8 17.1).;
13. Thuc. 8 13.1;
1^. Thuc. 8 36.2;
15* Thuc. 8 37.1; on the possible significance of cxov&u see
M. Amit, RSA (197^) 55 - 63;
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1 6attacks by individual members of either group on the other
The third agreement sworn in ij.11 and again called £uv6^xai 
in its heading, differs markedly from the previous two treaties 
in that a formal introduction giving date, place and a list of 
participants, appears. ( HTpiT<p .xal &exdT<p exei Aapeiou (3aciXeoovToS', 
ecpopeuovToS* 6e *AXe£i7C7u6a AaxsSaijaovi,£vv6fjxai eyevov^o ev Maidv6pou rce&C<|) 
Aaxe6ai(jiovta)v xal tGJv guppaxoov ^poS” TtccacpepvTiv xal 'iepapevrjv xal 'touS'
$apvaxou TcatSaS'... ) ^ .
Terms again included the first two sections of the first 
treaty, somewhat modified, but the non-aggression clauses of the 
second treaty were altered. The King1s territory was defined 
as Asia but his right to do with it as he wished was affirmed.
The King's obligation to supply the Spartan forces was
interpreted more carefully, but again not in cash terms, and the 
limits of his responsibilities once his own fleet arrived were 
stated.
18These three treaties have attracted much critical attention ,
and their form and content have been subjected to rigorous
examination. It is commonly conceded that form, vocabulary and
style reveal no significant Persian influence and it is, therefore,
19content alone which will be studied below .
An important feature which the three agreements have in
16. The peculiarity of this section might imply that in an 
agreement embodying cpiXia , outright war between the two parties 
could not be envisaged formally so a measure of circumlocution 
had to be introduced.
17. Thuc. 8 58.1;
18. Notably from G. de Sanctis, Storia dei Grecl dalle origini 
1^18- I'lp6 clQl secolo V (1939) 8lj. - 9b, C. Meyer, t)le Urkunden lm 
(jeschlchtswerk des Phukydides (1955) -66ff.; A. Kirchhoff,
TEukydfcTes~unc5~sefne"iJrkunclen-material (1895) 128ff.: G. Busolt.
Schwartz, Das Geschichtswerk 
Thukydldes (1919) 72 - 75; see now Gomme HCT;
19. Kirchhoff, op.clt. 1lj.3; Lewis, S&P 1lj. and 95 n. 57. A possible 
near-eastern feature may be seen in Q?huc. 8 37.1 where the phrase 
'couS' %aVba5 touS' (3aciXeu)S' may refer not only to sons but also
descendants (cf. VTE 29 1 - 12) and might be paralleled in 
$apvaxou naC6a9 of Thuc. 8 58.1;
common is the claim of the king to territory which he and his
ancestors held, further defined as Asia in the third treaty.
This claim is foremost in all three documents but whereas the~
first explicitly asserts the king's right to the territory, the
second takes it for granted while the third does not put forward
the grounds for the king's claim (i.e. it was his or his
ancestors), as had the previous two, but merely asserts that it
belongs to him. This Is a progressive toughening of the Persian
attitude on the claim itself, modified though the territorial
extent may be20.
Increasing Persian assurance Is also reflected in their
attitude to the tribute of the Greek cities. As part of the
Persian Empire these cities would be liable to taxation andthe
Persians, once their right to exact these dues was conceded and
political conditions allowed, would havereasserted this right.
In as much as there are specific references in the first two
21treaties to tribute and a clause In the third which might
22reasonably be taken to refer to It , the Persians were concerned 
to define .their right to the Greek cities' tribute even though 
as part of their territory it should have been automatic. This 
bespeaks Persian awareness that the payment of such taxes was 
likely to be a disputed point. Similarly, a clause of the first 
agreement explicitly refers only to preventing Athenian collection 
of the tribute, but it Implies that tribute was now due to Persia, 
by virtue of the reassertion of Persia's claim to the cities.
The first treaty obscures this claim, perhaps purposely since 
it would have been in Persia's interest to ensure Spartan support 
while not relinquishing a formal claim.
In the second agreement where the King's right to his land Is
20. Lewis S&P 90 suggested that the king's broad claim in the 
first two treaties only referred to Asia Minor. This is not 
capable of proof.
21. Thuc. 8 18.1; 8 37.2;
22. Thuc. 8 58.1; M.S. Goldstein, CSCA 7 (1972;) 162ff;
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taken for granted, the Spartans were forbidden to harm It or to
exact tribute from the cities. Again the recipient of the
tribute was left undefined but it should be Persia, merely by - -
right of possession. This is another assumption of rights by
implication which although natural in Persian eyes may not have
been immediately apparent to the Greeks, especially when no
explicit claim was made.
In the third agreement, tribute was not mentioned at all but
in addition to an absolute right to Asia the king secured his
prerogative to do with it as he wished. This clause may refer
to tribute because in both previous agreements care had been taken
to establish .the king's right on this point and the third agreement
2 ^contains no other clause which could refer to tribute . However, 
the king's assertion of his rights is couched in very broad terms 
(xepl •rtjS’ xwpc.S' 'tfjS' eau'toB pouXeue'ta) paciXeuS' oxcuS' pouXexat. ) ^
and it may have been drafted purposely as a catch-all whereby 
he could justify any action he pleased, Including the exaction of 
tribute^-3.
It is.apparent that none of the three treaties explicitly 
asserted Persia's right to collect tribute from the Asiatic 
Greeks nor her intention to do so, though the third treaty gave 
her considerable scope for action. However, in conceding the 
king's absolute right to Asia the Spartans were - in theory at 
least - allowing him to make the tribute of the Greek cities of 
Asia a legitimate demand.
The next diplomatic contact of a significant nature between 
Spartans and Persians,, in Spring 2j.07, is recorded somewhat 
obscurely by Kenophon :
23. M.S. Goldstein, loc. cit.;
2Ij.. Thuc. 8 58*2;
25. Whether the background to this clause is a previous Athenian 
treaty with Persia or the immediately preceding Athenian 
negotiations with Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8 58;) is not of importance 
here. See Lewis S3cP 105f + n.91 , and Goldstein, loc. cit.;
...ot Te Aaxe6ai(iovto)v xpECpeiS" Boiwrtofi' [ovopa] xal ot pET’auTotf xai oPctoXoi
a*YYeXoi,xai sXEyov oti AaxEdaipovioi a>v Seovtcu rnvTcov xe^ pa.Y'OTeS' eiev xapa -
paciXewS”, ’(they met) the Lacedaimonian ambassadors - Boiotlos and
tho other) 27those with him - and algo ) messengers; they announced -that
the Spartans had obtained from the king all that they asked 
for ...»
Nothing is known of the antecedents of this embassy nor are 
the contents of the Spartan demands ever made clear. However, 
the embassy* s return in company with Cyrus, the king* s son, who 
was to assume overall command of Persian forces in western Asia 
Minor, shows that conduct of the war is likely to be closely 
connected with the Persian concessions to Spartan demands. This 
conclusion is borne out by the subsequent collaboration between 
Cyrus and Lysander which was instrumental in the final defeat of 
Athens.
Lewis has recently argued that Boitios* mission succeeded 
in establishing a treaty with the king, the major components of
which were assurances on Persian subventions for the Spartan
29fleet ' and commitments by the king that he would respect the
autonomy of the Greek cities of Asia on condition that they paid
10him the ancient tribute • His most cogent argument in favour 
of this second point is the continued enthusiasm of the Asiatic 
Greeks for a war after which, on conventional readings of their 
position, they would be handed over to the Persians as subjects-^. 
He also stresses that in later negotiations with the Spartans the 
Persians did not exclude the granting of autonomy to the Asiatic 
Greeks and argues that if the Spartans had previously abandoned 
claims for the autonomy^,of the Greeks of Asia, the Persians 
could have regarded it as a prlma facie unreasonable claim^. In
26. Xen. Hell. 1 2j..2;
27. cf. Xen. Hell. 1 1 .6; 2 2.10; 2 I4..9 ;
28. S&P 12i;ff;
29. Xen. Hell. 1 5-5;
30. Lewis, S&P 123, *... the cities were, after a fashion, 
autonomous, though they were going to have financial obligations 
on the Persian side*
31. Lewis, S&P 112j. - 117;
support of this contention he adduces much evidence, particularly 
on the status of the cities as part of the administrative districts 
of the Empire and on their relationships to Cyrus and 
Tissaphernes as imperial officials and private individuals. His 
conclusion, as he admits,
’... cannot be more than tentative. It is that, from ij.07, 
the cities of Ionia were not part of the Persian empire in the 
sense that "they were part of administrative satraps and that 
their relationship, first to Cyrus and then to Tissaphernes, was 
to them as persons and not as satraps. They could therefore be 
described as autonomous in relation to the king.*^
Although Lewis’ arguments are important for an understanding 
of Persian theories of administration they do not seem necessary 
to explain Persian concession of autonomy to the Greeks of Asia. 
They postulate a judicial fiction whereby the Persians could 
maintain final rights over the Asiatic Greeks while conceding 
their autonomy on paper. This theory is consistent with much 
of what is being argued here but it seems an unnecessary 
complication of the issue.
Lewis* ’Treaty of Boiotios* depends upon two arguments 
1a) the Greeks of Asia Minor fought valiantly for a cause 
which did not guarantee their autonomy unless it were laid down 
in the Treaty of Boiotios,
1b) Persia would have rejected out of hand Spartan attempts 
in the 390*s to ensure the autonomy of the Asiatic Greeks if 
autonomy had previously been a dead letter,
2 ) there is evidence of a clause governing the finance of 
the Spartan fleet which ..cannot come from any of the known 
settlements between Sparta and Persia and is likely.therefore 
to come from the* Treaty of Boiotios^.
This last point is not immediately relevant to the argument
33. ibid. 1 2 2 ;
3^. Xen. Hell. 1 5.5;
of this chapter but it must be admitted that there does seem to 
be a new financial clause. Previous agreements had not been so 
generous or explicit in dealing with the financing of the fleet. 
Nevertheless this clause alone does not necessitate acceptance 
of Lewis1 1 Treaty of Boiotios1 .
On point 1a) Lewis emphasises the belief that the Asiatic 
Greeks strove for autonomy and were resolutely opposed to Persian 
sovereignty during this period. He does concede that there is 
very little evidence that the Greeks of Asia Minor were opposed 
on principle to Persian sovereignty^ , and he also notes that 
some groups within the cities might have preferred the Persians 
to either the Athenians or Spartans. The complex changes of 
allegiance of several cities during this period indicate that 
loyalties were not governed solely by a quest for autonomy and 
independence, desirable as these may have been. In practical 
terms the Greeks of Asia were very likely to become the clients 
or adherents of Athens, Sparta or Persia and some may have chosen 
the last as being the most likely victor in Asia Minor itself^.
Lewis1 remaining argument is also open to objection. Later
negotiations between Persian and Spartan leaders took place on 
three separate occasions in 3 9 7 * *396 and 3 9 5^  and all three 
resulted in truces which, in two cases, the Persians exploited 
to reinforce their troops. In the first Dercyllidas, the Spartan 
general in Asia, made the autonomy of the Asiatic Greeks a pre­
condition for negotiations about a peace while the Persian satraps 
demanded the withdrawal of the Spartan army and garrisons from 
Asia Minor. The Persians were in addition probably motivated 
to make a truce by the knowledge that reinforcements for the 
fleet were being prepared in Phoenicia-5 .
In the following year Agesilaus made a truce with Tissapherne
to enable the Spartan demands for the autonomy of the Asiatic
35. S&P 115 - 117;
36. H.D. Westlake, CQ ns 29 (1979) 9 - 1+4; D. Heygi in Hellenische 
Polels (ed. E.C. WeTskopf, Berlin, 197k) 1015 - 102j.0;
37. Xen. Hell. 3 2.20; 3 k«5; 3 k*25; Xen. Ages. 1.10; Plut. Ages 
9*1; Polyaenus, 2 1.8 on the second meeting;
38. Xen. Hell. 3 -^*1* Plod. I4 39; Xen. Ages. 1.6; Plut. Ages. 6.1
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Greeks to be put to the king but Xenophon shows that Tissaphernes 
had no intention of* respecting the terms of the truce because he 
proceeded to request the king for reinforcements without pressing 
the Spartan demand as he had promised to do. Lewis does not 
believe that this duplicity affects his argument because, he 
argues^, the king was aware of the Spartan demands and would 
have refused them outright if they had been excessive or 
unreasonable. This is to view Persian diplomacy as hide-bound 
and legalistic, a system unresponsive to the vagaries of military 
or political change. The king was enough of a diplomat to be 
able to conceal long-term objectives if an advantage could thus 
be gained in-the immediate future. The same may be. said for the 
conduct of Persian diplomacy by the satraps whose immediate 
concern was to protect their territory from Spartan attack, not 
to precipitate hostilities unnecessarily. Hence the truces of 
397 and 396 should not be taken as an index of Persia*s willingness 
to compromise^. These may have been genuine Persian attempts 
to reach a settlement but it is equally possible that they were 
tactical delays^1. It was not in Persia*s diplomatic interest to 
reject out of hand Spartan demands that the autonomy of the 
Asiatic Greeks should be respected.
The third set of negotiations which included a similar- 
Spartan demand was the meeting in 395 between Agesilaus, who had 
recently defeated Tissaphernes and thereby caused his disgrace • 
and execution by the Persians, and Tithraustes, Tissaphernes* 
successor^2 . Persia’s fortunes in Asia Minor were at this time 
at their lowest ebb and Tithraustes did not offer a truce but
, 39. S&P 117 n. 65;
k 0. For discussion of the authority and latitude given to satraps
to negotiate settlements, see next chapter;
k1. Ed. Meyer GdA V 188;
k2. Xen. Hell. 3 k*25; on the magnitutde of the Persian defeat
see Pausanias III, 9*6;
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substantive terms which guaranteed autonomy for the Greek cities 
of Asia as long as thqy paid the ancient tribute and Agesilaos 
and his forces returned home. The manner in which these terms 
are presented (•••> paciXeuS* 6e 4gtor ce pev ixoxXefv oixa6e,TaS' 6’ev Tfl-j 
*Ac 19. xoXeiS' ataovopouS* oucaS1 tov ipxafov 6acpov aux<p ixocpepet v.
) shox*s that the king w® directly involved and proves 
that the Persians were willing to concede autonomy at least in 
this case. Even so there are several reasons why Lewis’ 
interpretation of this concession should not be accepted without 
question. As he concedes^, the Persians still maintained their 
claim to tribute which indicates that they considered the cities 
as remaining a part of their domain^. Moreover, the victory of 
Agesilaos had severely jeopardised not only their claim to the 
Greeks of Asia but also their hold on the whole of Asia Minor 
and they may have feared another anabasis by a Spartan force^p .
It could also be argued that Tithraustes was buying valuable 
time in which to divert Agesilaos by fomenting civil war in 
Greece. This would then be another example of a Persian satrap 
exploiting a truce for his own ends^.
Lewis’ argument on the Persian attitude toward Spartan 
demands for the autonomy of the Asiatic Greeks can be seen to 
depend upon the belief that the king would have rejected sucrh 
claims on purely theoretical and legalistic grounds. It has been 
shown, however, that Persian concessions could be dictated by 
considerations of military or diplomatic expediency and that 
such considerations were present on each of the occasions xiien 
autonomy was discussed. Even under the most compelling 
circumstances the king relinquished neither final claims to the
ij-3. S&P, 117;
2j4. The use of -auxovopia may also suggest a limited self- 
determination as opposed to outright Independence ( eXeuOepia )• 
E.J. Bickermann, RIDA 5 (1958) 313 - 3i|4, esp. 328ff. and see
below pp. I88f;
1^ 5. Xen. Ages. 1.33ff.; Plut. Ages. 12]. - 15.1; Xen. Hell. 3 5.1; 
k 1 • k i also G.L. Cawkwell, CQ ns 26 (1976) 6 6f.; Hell. ~Oxy. 22.
i].6 . Timocrates’ mission connected with Tithraustes Xen. Hell.
3 5*1; but cf. Hell. Oxy. 6 - 8  and I.A.P. Bruce, An Historical 
Commentary on the ’HeTTenlca Oxyrhynchla’ (1 9 6 7) 5 8ff . J
Greeks of Asia nor their tribute. Thus Lewis1 argument 1b) 
cannot be thought convincing.
Three known sets of negotiations between Persians and 
Greeks remain to be considered. In lj.09 B.C. the Athenian forces 
in the Hellespont attacked Chalcedon and succeeded in defeating 
the garrison, led by a Spartan, and driving off a relief-force 
under the satraps Pharnabazos^. While Alcibiades went to 
campaign against Selymbria the other Athenian generals at 
Chalcedon came to terms with Pharnabazos about the city and 
succeeded in persuading him to aid them in an embassy to the 
King about a treaty between Athens and Persia^. The commonly- 
held view that Chalcedon now reverted to her alliance with 
Athens and ceased to form part of Pharnabazos* satrap has been 
challenged convincingly by AmitT . He argues that Pharnabazos 
had no authority to concede absolute rights over territory in a 
formal settlement, that Chalcedon therefore remained Persian 
territory in theory (and in practice since the Athenians did not 
capture it) and that Pharnabazos merely granted to the Athenians 
the revenues, from the city, hence giving the impression that it 
was once more an Athenian tributary.
These arguments are plausible and attractive; Pharnabazos 
could not sign away royal territory de Jure (though of course it 
might be lost de facto) but he could assign the revenues of a 
city to Athens^ • In addition, these concessions were only a 
temporary measure while the Athenian embassy to the king was in 
progress and, since it Is not impossible that Pharnabazos knew 
of the Spartan embassy led by Boiotios, he may have been using
yt ••••••••••
lf7. Xen. Hell. 1 3.1- 7; cf. Plut. Ale. 29.6 - 30,2; DIod. 13 
6 6 . 1 f •;
lj.8. Xen. Hell. 1 3.8 - 12; Plut. Ale. 31.1 - 2; Plod. 13 66.3; 
l±9. AC i|2 (1973) 14-36 - 14.57;
50. Discussed further below pp. 206 - 212;
51. Presumably his satrap*s tribute would have remained constant 
in exchequer terms and he must therefore have made up the loss 
himself.
I
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the truce as a tactical device to protect himself from further
Athenian attacks. Amit’s supposition that only the king could
withdraw royal claim to territory coincides with the evidence,
considered above, from the other settlements since in them no
satraps had abrogated Persian claims to territory, instead referring
^2them to the king for judgement^ •
The last two sets of negotiations between Greeks and Persians,
the conference at Sardis in 392 and the King’s Peace of 3 87/6 ,
differ markedly from those discussed above. They did not aim to
create a bi-lateral agreement between Sparta and Persia^ but
rather a settlement involving all participants in the
Corinthian War and, in the case of the King1s Peace, any others
who cared to participate. The negotiations at Sardis^- were
followed within a few months by a conference at Sparta^ but the
role which Persia played in the negotiations there, if she was
represented at all, is obscure and discussion seems to have been
focused on resolving the differences of the various Greek states
*^6without reference to Persia^ . It is assumed here that Sparta’s 
concessions to Persia made in Sardis would have been the basis 
for Persian involvement in an agreement arising from the Sparta 
conference. These Spartan concessions show how Sparta had 
abandoned the Greeks of Asia Minor In the face of military reverses.
52. The three treaties of lj.12 - Jj.11 do not deny Persian claims 
to territory whil9 the negotiations conducted by Boiotios, which 
may have conceded certain rights,'were with the king. The peace- 
terms of 397 - 395 all depended upon the king’s agreement or had 
already received it;
53* In 392 Sparta clearly intended to negotiate a bi-lateral 
treaty with Persia but was forestalled by the arrival of her 
opponents’ envoys In Sardis; Ken. Hell, ij. 8.12;
54. Ken. Hell. 4 8.13 - 15;
55 • Andocldes 3 and Philochoro3 (FCfrH 3 2 8 ) Frag. 1 !j.9;
56. Discussion of the Sparta conference in Ryder, Koine Eirene
2 5 - 33; 165 - 169; also Lewis S8cP 1 i+6 and G.L. CawEwSll <3Q 'nT*
26 (1976) 2 7 1f • n.13, 276f. n. 257 -----
. ...nrffiv *te y^P ^  *Acig. *EXAt)vi6u)v xoXeoov Aaxe6aipoviou5' (3aciXer oux
ivTiTtotetcOat,TaS' Te vt c^ouS' axacaS” xal TaS* aXXaS* xoXetS' Apxetv c<ptctv _ .
auTovoLLOuST el vat.
57 •
’The Spartans are putting forward no claim against the king 
for the Greek cities in Asia; all the islands and the otha? cities 
should be governed according to their own laws*•
The king was being offered the undisputed title to the 
Greeks of Asia in return for a commitment to the principle of 
^rtonomy amongst the other Greeks, a principle which, the Spartans 
urged, would benefit Persian security by ensuring that no Greek 
state gained too much power through interference in other states^ 
It is doubtful that the king’s rejection of these terms, when 
they were announced to him by Tiribazus, was on the grounds that 
they were inadequate - the King’s Peace differs from them only 
on minor details and Tiribazus might be expected to have known 
whether the Spartan concessions were sufficient^. The king’s 
response should be traced to his perception of the state of the
war and the possibility of making greater gains, not quibbles
An
over diplomatic niceties . The fact that Sparta was willing to 
come to terms may have convinced the king that continuing support 
for Sparta’s enemies could only be beneficial to Persia’s interest 
in the Aegean area.
The king’s calculation of the political and military 
situation was shown to be incorrect over the next five years when 
Sparta was not defeated and Athens* sea-power again became a 
menace to Persia. Therefore the king and Sparta were reconciled 
and terms were agreed whereby the king would support Sparta if 
the latter’s opponents did not accept the settlement proposed by 
the king :
57. Xen. Hell, k 8.11*;
58. ibid.
59. Tiribazus* competence to accept the terms and support Sparta 
is discussed pp. 206 - 212;
60. Perhaps also his hatred of the Spartans, Lewis, S&P 1I|.6;
-  1 8 1  -
lAp'uagepgrjS' pa-ciXeuS' vopi£ei 6txaiov T a ^  pev ev T^ j *Ac ig. TtoXetS” 
eauTotf eivat xal tOv vt)CO>v KXa^opevaS" xal Ku7Cpov,'caS” 6e aXXaS" *EXXrjvC6aS' 
xoXetS* xai pixpaS' xal peyuXaS' auTovopouS' icpeTvai xXtjv Arjpvou xal IpPpou 
xal Cxupou* TauTaS' be wcxep to apxatov etvai *A0T)vaCcov. oxoTepoi 6s 
TauTT|V tt)v elpTjvTjv pfj 6exovTat jTOUtoiS* lyw xoXepfjcu) pexa tGSv TafHa pouX- 
•opevwv xal xal xaxa GaXaTxav xal vaocl xal x p V ^ M *  ^
*King Artaxerxe3 considers it just that the cities in Asia 
should be his and also, among the islands, Klazonenai and Cyprus; 
that the other Greek cities both great and small should be free 
to govern themselves except for Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros which as 
of old should belong to Athens. I shall make war, together with 
those who want the same objectives by land and by sea, with ships 
and with money against whichever of the two parties rejects this 
peace* .
These terms differ from those of 392 only in the specification
of Klazomenai and Cyprus as the kingfs and the inclusion of the
three Aegean islands in Athens1 sphere of influence. These
changes resulted either from disputes in the intervening years -
62
Athens1 support of Evagoras of Salamis and her interference in 
Klazomenai^ - or were modifications of the autonomy principle 
which were conceded by Sparta as early as the conference at 
Sparta in 391^.
The enforcement clause has, however, no parallel in the 
earlier terms and is particularly interesting because it seems 
to imply that the king was settling a bi-lateral war ( oxoxepoi )^. 
In theory therefore the king was standing outside the settlement 
as its guarantor* offering Persian friendship to those who accepted 
it and threatening enmity to those who did not.
61. Xen. Hell. 5 1*31; other texts in Bengtson, no. 21^ .2;
62. Diod. H 4. 9 8 ; Xen. Hell, k 8.21^ ; 5 1.1 Off;
6 3 . Tod II 11JU-51 " ' 1 1 " 4
61^ . Andoc. 3 12, I4 ;
65* So Lewis, S&P 1Ij.7 + n. 79;
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It can be suggested that If autonomy meant to the Persians 
a restricted freedom within the context of an external authority 
(as the Greeks of Asia Minor), then the king may have considered 
that the signatories of the King1s Peace were tacitly 
acknowledging his claim to theoretical sovereignty over them.
He would then - as their suzerain - have had every right to 
settle disputes between them.
This reassertion, however, remained theoretical since, as 
far as is known, Persia did not attempt to impose tribute on or 
Interfere directly In any Greek mainland state. There•is no 
reference In any source to a realisation by the Greeks that the 
king regarded them as his subjects after the King1 s Peace^.
The major Persian gain in this treaty was the explicit 
recognition not only by Sparta (who had conceded it in 392) but 
also by all Greek signatories that the Greeks of Asia were the 
King*s. Sparta*s gain was the autonomy clause which allowed 
her to interpret the terms to her advantage, forcing Thebes to 
renounce her hegemony of Boeotia and splitting the recent 
synoecism of Corinth and Argo3.
autonomy
Having considered the negotiations between Persia and the 
Greeks from 1^ .12 to 386 it is necessary to isolate those features 
most significant for Persian diplomacy. A theme which appears In 
all these settlements is the king*s claim to the Greeks of Asia 
and as a corollary their quest for autonomy. Those two inter- 
linked claims seem to have been the most disputed points in every 
negotiation between Persians and Greeks. It is therefore
66. cf. Isoc. Paneg. esp. 121, 137;
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pertinent, to ask whether Greek definitions of autonomy were 
compatible with Persian ideology and whether the two sides always 
understood each other’s views on autonomy. What did the king’s 
claim entail?
Thucydides states that the objective of Tissaphernes and
Pharnabazos was to regain the tribute of the Greek cities in their
territory which the Athenians were preventing them from collecting^.
The first formal indications of the tribute obligations of the
Greeks of Asia, the three treaties of lj.12 - lj.11, are not explicit
but it has been argued that recognition of Persian sovereignty
automatically subsumed rights to tribute, at least in Persian
eyes, and there was therefore no necessity to legislate about
it formally^®. Thus the tribute-clause of the first treaty
merely strove to prevent the Athenians depriving Persia of her
rightful tribute while in the second the Persians sought to
safeguard themselves from possible Spartan interference in the
tribute. In the third treaty such safeguards were no longer
necessary and Persia 'could assert her right to the Greeks of
Asia tout court, knowing that her right to tribute was..
69acknowledged •
In I4.O8 Pharnabazos conceded to the Athenians for a limited
time the tribute from Chalcedon but only as a gift not a right,
70thus maintaining Persian claims to it. . If Sparta did make a
formal treaty with Persia in lj.07 (the Treaty of Boiotios) it is
extremely likely that it embodied Persian rights to the tribute
71of the Greek cities' • In the agreements of 397 and 396 tribute 
is not mentioned specifically, though the Spartans demanded the 
autonomy of the Greeks of Asia and in 396 this autonomy was to
6 7 . Thuc. 8 5.5; 8 6.1;
68. Lichas and his delegation seem to have realised this; Thuc.
8 8^.5;
69. In the abortive negotiations between Tissaphernes and the 
Athenian envoys before the third treaty with Sparta, the first 
two Persian demands had been the right to the whole of Ionia and 
in addition the adjacent Islands, Thuc. 8 5 6 . ]±;
70. Xen. Hell. 1 3-1 - 7; M. Amit , AC lj.2 (1973) 1^ 36 - 1^ 57;
71. Xen. Hell. 1 ij.,2; Lewis 3&P 123;
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be coc7tep xal mS' ev 7cap'T)(irv ‘EMafci ^  ( • as it is in the cities of
mainland Greece » ) which may deny the Persian right to tribute.
In 395 Tithraustes offered autonomy to the Greeks of Asia provided
that they pay the ancient tribute^. In 392/1, however, as in
3 8 7 / 6  the Greeks of Asia were once again conceded to the king
uncondit ionally^.
On the question of tribute, therefore, the Persian attitude
was unchanging. Even after the victory of Agesilaos and its
possible effect on Persia1s control of Asia Minor the right to
tribute was not relinquished. This policy is in accordance with
the Persian objectives in lj.12- but Persia aimed not only at
tribute. Underlying the payment of tribute lay the recognition
of Persian sovereignty which was an important feature of Persian
7 q
and near eastern political and diplomatic idealogy . A state 
which paid tribute acknowledged Persia as its master. Hence 
tribute-payment was not merely an economic process but also a 
matter of diplomatic prestige. Thus Pharnabazos in I4.O9 could not 
and did not concede the Athenian right to tribute from Chalcedon 
but merely'the privilege of collecting it for a limited period.
Persian rights to Chalcedon were not being infringed^.
Though tribute-payment was the sine qua non of Persian 
participation in agreements with the Greeks her claims over the 
Greeks of Asia were not limited to it, as the third treaty of 
Lj.11 , the proposals of 392 and the King’s Peace indicate. By 
maintaining claims to ultimate sovereignty over the Greeks of 
Asia the king could demand, If he wished, the imposition of
72. Xen. Hell. 3 i]..5f.;-'
73. Xen. Hell. 3
7h. Xen. Hell, h 8 .1 Z^ f.; 5 1.31;
75. E.g above p , 3l| ; the Persian reliefs of tribute-bearers fron 
the palace at Persepolis and the lists of the peoples under Persian 
control attest the continuing importance of such beliefs.
✓
7 6 . The status of the Ionian cities as a personal fief of 
Tissaphernes and later Cyrus, as suggested by Lewis, may be 
similar but in as much as their ruler and recipient of tribute 
was a Persian their privileged status was a sham in real terms. 
Lewis, S&P 122f.;
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Persian garrisons in their cities and the supply of troops for
7 8
the royal armies' . The question of garrisons arose soon after
the conclusion of the treaties of lj.12 - lj.11 and was, without
doubt, a contentious issue between on the one hand Persia and
on the other Sparta, her allies and the Ionian cities. The
Milesians expelled a garrison from the fort which Tissaphernes
had built in their city and received moral support from the
79Greeks who were there, particularly the Syracusans' . Soon
afterwards the Antandrians expelled the garrison of Arsaces, a
Persian commander, with the help of Peloponnesians from Abydos 
and at about the same time Knidos expelled its garrison*
Tissaphernes believed that the Spartans were accomplices in all 
these risings®^.
The Spartan attitude toward the garrisons was not unanimous 
for at Miletus Lichas - who had led the delegation which
negotiated the third treaty®1 - advised the Milesians and the
other Greeks in the king’s territoy to submit to Tissaphernes and
O p
to pay court to him until the war should be concluded successfully 
The Milesians were outraged at this response and sent 9. 
delegation to Sparta to inveigh against Tissaphernes but they may 
also have been motivated by the knowledge that Tissaphernes was 
himself sending an envoy to accuse them about the expulsion.of his
garrison and to explain his own actions®-*. These counter-claims 
strongly suggest a difference of opinion about the legality 
of the garrisons, a dispute which both sides believed was worth
77. Thuc. 8 ® 108.Ij. - 109; Plod. 13 ^2.^; Xen. Hell.
I4. 8.T - ,2; Isoc. Paneg.. 123;
after the King1s P
79. Thuc. 8 81)..1).;
•000 Thuc. 8 1 0 9 .1 ;
81. ibid. 8 5?f •;
00 ro . ibid. 8 81)..5;
•co ibid. 8 85.2;
- 186
pursuing in Sparta.
Tissaphernes believed that he had grounds for bringing not 
merely a complaint but also a charge ( xaTayopeuoo ) against the 
Milesians and his legal foundation for this must have been the 
third agreement of a few months earlier. This contains no 
reference to garrisons and Tissaphernes may have been relying on 
the general right of the king to do as he wished ( pouXeuexu) 
paciXeo>5* otooS* pouXeTai )®^. Lichas was aware of Tissaphernes1 
justifiable claim to judge from his advice to the Milesians but 
they were unwilling to concede the right of the king to such 
unrestricted freedom of action. The third agreement can here be 
seen to be capable of wide interpretation, a fact perhaps 
purposely obscured by both sides when it was made®-*.
After this dispute, the outcome of which is unknown there are
very few references to garrisons for the period between lj/10 and
3 8 6. Cyrus had garrisons in the Ionian cities after the end of
86the Peloponnesian War but since these citie3 technically 
belonged to Tissaphernes who was hostile to Cyrus the garrisons 
might have-been protection against Tissaphernes. They are not, 
therefore, good evidence of the Persian or Ionian attitude to 
garrisons as part of Persian imperial administration®*^. In 
Pharnabazos* satrapy some Aeolian cities were occupied by one 
of his dependent rulers, Mania who imposed garrisons of Greeks, 
not of Persians®®. Lewis treats the ethnic composition of 
garrisons as a significant issue but his most persuasive evidence 
is a passage from the Cyropaideia in which the Greeks of the
8I4.. Thuc. 8 58.2;
8 5 . It is possible that 'the Milesians were not appealing against 
the third agreement but were relying on undertakings Tissaphernes 
may have made to them and other Greek cities about their status 
within the Persian Empire. See Lewis, S&P 9l|_ + this 
argument cannot be pursued until it is more fully set out.
8 6 . Xen. Anab. 1 1.6;
8 7 . Cyrus still paid the tribute of these cities to the king,
Xen. Anab. 1 1.8 ; on the status of the Ionian cities, see Lewis,
s&p 1T9IT.;
8 8 . Xen. Hell. 3 1.16;
Hellespont secure concessions from a general of Cyrus the 
GreatI ^
pev tcl TeCxn Pa.ppa-pouS' |jltj 6exec6ai, 6acpov 6e ckotpepew 
xal c'tpaxeuetv ottoi Repos' 67caYYeXXoi. ^
*...they should not receive barbaroi within their walls 
but should pay the tribute and serve in the army wherever Cyrus 
might command.1
91This has been taken7 to reflect the situation of the 
fourth century Greek cities in the empire but no support for this 
suggestion has been adduced. It might be argued from the 
evidence on garrisons in the late fifth and early fourth centuries 
that Persian administrators were aware of Greek resentment of 
garrisons and therefore made them as palatable as possible by 
using Greek soldiers but there is no reason to think that there 
was ever a formal Persian ruling on the composition of garrisons.
The significance of garrisons lies not in their composition 
but rather the fact of their imposition. To the Greeks garrisons 
were the most hated symbol of foreign domination, whether by 
other Greeks or barbaroi. After the battle of Cnidus Pharnabazos 
adopted, on Conon*s advice, a policy of proclaiming to the 
islanders that Persia would not fortify their acropolises (i.e 
impose a garrison) and would grant them autonomy^. At the -same 
time the islanders themselves expelled the garrisons imposed on •
go
them by Sparta7-*. Similarly in 399 when Meidias, the ruler of 
Scepsis, asked Dercyclidas, the Spartan commander, on what terms 
he could be an ally of Sparta, the latter stipulated that the
89. S&P 123 nn. 101, 102^
90. Xen. Cyrop. 7 .9J
91. Ed. Meyer, GdA IV1, .53 - Sk n.1, followed by Lewie, Ibid.;
92. Xen. Hell. 4 8.1 - 2;
93. Plod. 11). 81^ 1*5
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citizens be free and independent ( IXeuOepouS" xe xal auxovopouS' )
and proceeded, once he had e n t e r e d  the city, to expel its garrison,
9k . - •
for which the citizens honoured hiirr^. It seems from these
examples that the absence of garrisons and, if once imposed,
their removal were regarded as benevolent and friendly gestures
toward the principle of autonomy with which garrisons were at
this time incompatible.
Persia* s minimum demands during this period consisted of
sovereignty over the Greeks of Asia Minor as represented by
payment of tribute to the king. This implied the king*s ultimate
rights over the city, allowing him to impose garrisons, requisition
troops or interfere directly in local politics.
In opposition to these Persian objectives were the Greeks
claims for autonomy*^, both theoretical and practical. In purely
theoretical terms the Greek concept of autonomy was of a limited
freedom as opposed to unfettered independence ( IXeuOepia ) ^ #
*AuTovo|ita meant a city*s right to determine its internal affairs
without interference from third parties although it was still
possible that the city might have obligations to another power^.
For the Greeks the major controversy over the application
of autonomy in practical terms lay in its relationship with
tribute. Thucydides, speaking of the Delian League, seems to
use autonomous to describe those allies who did not make cash-
98payments to Athens but the Peace of Nicias recognised some
states which were guaranteed autonomy but nevertheless paid 
99tribute • In the same Peace It was thought necessary to define 
more closely the guaranteed autonomy of the Delphians
• • • • • • • • • •
94. Xen. Hell. 3 1.20f.;
95. On autonomy In general, V. Ehrenberg, The Greek State (1974)
88 - 102 and Ryder, KB, 1 -24;
96. E.J. Blckermann, RIDA 5 (1958) 313 - 344, esp. 327f., 335f.;
97. Thuc. 5 13.5;
98. Thuc. 2 9.4; 3 10.5;
99. Thuc. 5 13.5;
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who were to be self-taxing and self-judging ( o.utoteXeiS' xal 
auToStxouS* )100, a clarification unnecessary if autonomy 
automatically implied freedom from tribute-imposition by a third 
party.
The Persian response to the Greek desire for autonomy is
101attested early in the fifth century when Artaphrenes1 reforms
after the Ionian Revolt and the albeit, enforced * democratisation*
1 02of the Ionians in 1+92 indicate that Persia had begun to
appreciate the desirability of allowing the Greeks some internal 
1 01freedom . This policy, if such it was, seems to have continued
throughout the fifth century with only minor modifications
dependent on contemporary military and political circumstances^^.
After Persia* s re-emergence in lf.13 as a significant force in
Greek history her attitude to autonomy became crucial in the role
she played in Greek affairs. There is, significantly, no
reference to autonomy in any of the three agreements between the
105Persians and Spartans of 1+12 - 1+11 Tissaphernes* subsequent
abortive installation of garrisons at Miletus, Antandrus and
Cnidus were, it could be argued, necessary defences against Athens
and do not provide good evidence of the satraps* attitude toward
106the autonomy of Ionia
The first evidence of Persian offical recognition of
autonomy is contained in Tithraustes* terms to Agesilaos in 
1 07395 , (though Lewis would argue that the negotiations of
100. Thuc. 5 18.2;
101. And possibly before, see above pp. 129 ff.;
102. Hdt. 6 l+2f.; I Calabi, Ricerche sui Rapporti tra le Poleis 
(1953733 - 36; : ~  ----- --------------
103. Herodotus clearly believed that democracies were imposed
( 6 1+3 *3 ) and if this were, true it would throw interesting light on 
Persian political thought; see A.T.E. Olmstead, Hist, of the 
Persian Empire (1914-8 ) 158;
10lj.. See above pp 11+9 - 151, 160; lack of evidence prevents a more 
detailed analysis of Persia*s attitude to autonomy during this 
period.
1°5. Thuc. 8 18, 37, 58;
106. Thuc. 8 81+.1+, 109.1;
107. Xen. Hell. 3 1+.25;
108Boiotios saw a formal concession of autonomy by the Persians)
In 395 the king evidently saw no conflict between Persian
tribute and autonomy and, given the Greek ambiguity over this 
1 09subject , it is unlikely that the Greeks found his attitude
difficult to understand or to accept. It can be suggested that
by 395 the Persians realised that the Asiatic Greeks might be
reconciled to their rule by concessions of autonomy which
consisted in not interfering directly in their internal politics
110especially through garrisons • These concessions did not,
however, exclude payment of tribute since had they done so the
king could not have claimed the continuing presentation of
formal gestures of loyalty and servitude. Thus whereas in the
case of garrisons the Persians were willing to make concessions
to local feelings and political pressure tribute-payment was
not a negotiable Issue. Even the concessions on garrisons were
de facto not de jure settlements and could have been withdrawn 
111at any time • *
I Under severe military pressure the Persians were willing
to make de-facto concessions on the application of autonomy, as
they had done earlier in the fifth century. Their attitude to
autonomy as a political principle was, however,different. Near
eastern theories of political sovereignty were rigid in their
insistence o n a  dichotomy between the overlord and his subject.
The normal Akkadian word for subject (ardu) also and more
commonly meant slave (a concept, so the Greeks believed, still
current In the Persian empire and stigmatised by them as 
• 1126ouXeia and its frequent use in neo-Assyrian royal
•••••••••
108. Lewis, S&P, 122;
109- See above pp. 177 n v I88f.;
110. It is not clear whether they would also have been exempt 
from military service.
111. And were, see Isoc. Paneg. 123;
112. e.g. Euripides, Helen 2 7 6 ; Isoc. Paneg. 1f>0f.;
inscriptions and letters to indicate the inferior status of vassal
11^or subject accurately reflects the oriental idea of sovereignty 
In theory there was no greater gulf than that between the king 
and his subjects* and his theoretical rights over them were 
unlimited.
Persian reluctance to concede the principle of autonomy is
a natural result of similar Persian theories of sovereignty. To
the king autonomy was a concept which limited his theoretical
jurisdiction, and indirectly his sovereignty, and as such was
not only a major affront to his own dignity and position but also
was potentially dangerous because such a limitation could be
11kregarded as a sign of weakness « Hence the Persian insistence
on retaining ultimate rights on what they regarded as their 
11?territory • Pharnabazos* promise to allow the autonomy of the
%
Aegean islanders (specifically referring to garrisons) was made
on the advice of ConSn that such a promise would be beneficial
116to the Persian cause . Immediate political considerations 
were here allowed to modify a diplomatic dogma, but only In de 
facto term-s.
In practigal terms the Persians were willing to concede de 
facto autonomy and to allow cities to govern themselves provided 
they continued to-be loyal to the king and to pay tribute. In 
the later 390* s - after the Greeks of Asia had been abandoned 
by the Spartans - the Persians sponsored the settlement of
113. See also pp. lj.7 - 56;
111+. The status of the Cilician dynasts and the Arabians was of 
long standing and consequent on friendliness toward Persia: Hdt.
3 80 - 91, 97; 5 1+9;.Xen. Cyrop. 7 I*.2 , 1+.9; 8 6 .8 ; ---
115» The treaties of 1+12 - 1+11 and the King* s Peace defined the 
rights of the king over Asia Minor either Implicitly or explicitly 
The principle of autonomy was conceded only under severe duress: 
Xen. Hell. 3 1+.25;
116. Xen. Hell. 1+ 8.1 - 2;
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Ionian inter-city disputes by arbitration, the satrap merely
117authorising the settlement '. At this time their effective
control of Asia Minor was uncontested and, had they so wished,
they could have dominated the Greek cities without making this
118
gesture toward the principle of autonomy
These measures were, however, motivated by a willingness to
adapt to political pressures and were never de jure curtailments
of royal authority. The three agreements of ij.12 - 2j.11 should be
seen in this light since the first two could have been into?preted
to allow the king to reassert his claims to all of Xerxes1
conquests-as far as the Isthmus of Corinth and the third did not
deny such a claim, merely affirming his uncontested right to
Asia. In practical terms the king was seeking to gain as much as
possible without endangering his dominance over the Greeks.
Theoretically none of the settlements which he or his satraps
concluded with the Greeks abjured any of his rights, save that
of 395 when though the king seems to have been prepared to
concede autonomy while still insisting on tribute, the agreement
119was never ratified
117. Tod II, 113; this is highly reminiscent of the reforms of 
lj.92, Hdt. fe \ 2 ;
118. cf. Isocrates1 characteristically black portrayal of the 
Ionians plight, Paneg. 123 and passim;
119. Xen. Hell. 3 2j..25ff.;
Persia’s Diplomatic contacts with Greece'
_____________c392 - c362 B.C.____________
After the King’s Peace of 386 B.C. Persia seems to have 
played a less prominent role in Greek affairs than she had in 
the period after lj.13 B.C. This relative withdrawal may be an 
illusion created by the lacunae in the two major historial 
sources for this period: Xenophon, whose treatment of Persia's
relations with Greece after 386 is far less comprehensive than 
in previous years, and Diodorus, whose account of the contacts 
between Greece and Persia becomes spasmodic, focusing in most 
cases on the common Peaces of the period. Prom 386 to at least 
371 Sparta was acting as Persia* s agent in Greece, a relationship 
abhorrent to Xenophon, which may account for his silence on these 
matters1 .
Isocrates and later fourth-century orators provide
supplementary information on Persia’s relations with Greece but
they do not contradict the impression that Persia’s active
participation in the affairs of the mainland Greeks had
diminished*. Isocrates, in the Panegyricus, stressed Persia’s
interference in and influence on Greek affairs but it was in his
2interest to do so . More substantial evidence that the Greeks 
believed the Persian king was still involved in their affairs 
Is the care taken In decrees of the period to ensure that the 
King’s Peace of 386 was not broken by new alliances within 
Greece . Such precautions would have been unnecessary if the 
Greeks were aware that the king had disengaged himself completely 
from Greek affairs.
1. G.L. Cawkwell, intro to Xenophon A History of My Times (Penguin 
1978) 3 9 f -------- ----- --------
2. Isoc. Paneg. 117, 120f.; 127, 13^, I3&f.;
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The Effect of the Common Peaces on Persia
Persia1s withdrawal from direct participation in Greek 
affairs between 3 8 6 and c368^ does not extend to diplomacy. On 
several occasions between 392 and 362 Persia took part in 
negotiations which would have involved or did involve her 
directly in Greek affairs as the guarantor of or partner in 
Greek internal peace'*. In these settlements there were two 
cardinal issues:
I) recognition by the Greek states of the kingTs rigit 
to the Greeks of Asia Minor
ii) the principle of autonomy within mainland Greece and 
those areas not awarded to the king.
Persia*s insistence on the first clause is consistent with 
her policy from If 1 3 onwards of recovering control of the whole 
of Asia Minor and its revenues from the Athenians and late? from 
the Spartans, without prejudicing possible future gains 
elsewhere^. With the achievement of this objective in the King*s 
Peace of 3 8 6 It might be thought that Persia could retire from 
Greece. It is however likely that the experience of Sparta* s 
support of Cyrus* revolt in If01 and the Spartan Incursions Into 
Asia Minor In the 390* s had made the king wary of leaving a 
potentially powerful enemy in Greece^. When in 392 Sparta 
negotiated with the satrap Tiribazus, Antalcidas pointed out 
that the autonomy clause he was proposing would prevent any city, 
explicitly Athens and Sparta, from becoming too powerful and 
therefore a danger to Persia. Tiribazus seems to have been
o
particularly Impressed by this suggestion . The other Greek
i0
if. Funds made available to Sparta by Philiscus, Ariobarzanes* 
envoy: Xen. Hell. 7 1.27; Plod. 15 70.2;
5. T.T.B. Ryder, Koine Eirene (1965) passim;
6 . See previous chapter;
7. Xen. Hell. 3 T.1f; and passim in books 3 and if;
8 . Xen. Hell. If 8.1iff.; the king rejected the proposals;
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cities involved in these negotiations objected to the clause
because they saw that it would harm them far more than Sparta. .
By 386 9 however, when a similar settlement was introduced they
9
were forced to agree to the principle of autonomy .
.Persia was loath to concede autonomy to the Greek cities
of Asia Minor because such a concession infringed on the
1 0sovereignty of the Persian king . However, the proposed
settlement of 392 and the King1s Peace of 386 explicitly excluded
these cities from their autonomy-olauses and the king*s rights
11were not therefore being undermined . Any deleterious effects 
which the autonomy-clause might have could only be indirect.
It seems unlikely therefore that the king would have objected 
on principle to the autonomy-clause of the Common Peaces from 
386 to 3 8 6 .
Even so, Persia*s acceptance of Antalcidas* assurance that 
the autonomy-clause would prevent any Greek state from becoming 
too powerful seems naive, particularly in the light of Sparta* s 
exploitation of autonomy to her own advantage after 386 . The
problem can be tackled in two ways:
i) The Persians realised the effect of the autonomy-clause
namely that Sparta would be able to increase her power in Greece 
at the expense of the other Greek states - and calculated that 
even so their policy of preventing any Greek state from becoming 
pre-eminent would not be seriously threatened,
ii) Persia did not understand the implications of the 
autonomy-clause and believed that it would prevent the domination 
of any Greek state, as the Spartans had indicated.
Persia*s attitude toward the autonomy-clause - which was 
Sparta*s price for participation in the proposed settlement -
9. Xen. Hell. 5 1.25ff.; Plod. 12j. 110.2 - Ij.;
10. See previous chapter p. 191;
11. Xen. Hell, k 8 .11+5 5 1.31; Diod. 12j. 110.2 - ^5
12. e.g. Xen. Hell. 5 2 - 3 ;
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was affected by her military commitments outside the Aegean,
Both Evagoras of Salamis and Achoris of Egypt were in revolt
and a settlement of the war in the Aegean would release Persian
1 3forces for campaigning elsewhere . Diodorus explicitly connects 
the King*s Peace with the king*s wish to concentrate on Evagoras^. 
It is likely therefore that the king took this into consideration 
when considering the settlement with Sparta and concluded that 
a resolution of the war in the Aegean was worth the risk of 
Sparta exploiting the autonomy-clause.
The king1s desire to settle his war in Greece affects both 
options outlined above but since even before 387 the other Greek 
states had foreseen the Spartan dominance consequent upon the
1 *3enforcement of autonomy , they would have informed the king if 
he himself had not realised the dangers. The second option, 
therefore, seems less plausible than the first.
The king calculated that the Spartans would increase their 
power within Greece but that were they to become aggressive 
toward him he could repeat his strategy of the 3 9 0*s and support 
the other Greek states against them. The king believed that his 
support was the key to the balance of power in Greece and that 
the Spartans would therefore be deterred from attacking him.
After 386 Sparta*s growing domination of Greece would have 
alerted Persia to the indirect dangers of autonomy but no action 
was taken to curb Sparta. The king did not,>however, interfere 
when the Second Athenian Confederacy, an explicitly anti-Spartan 
organisation^, was founded. This acceptance may be a passive
\ 1 *7
move against Sparta to counter her gains of the previous years '. 
The Confederacy had the advantage of not involving Persia at all
1 Q
while 3till keeping to the terms of the King's Peace i. It could
13. Plod. 1!). 98, 15 9.2; Xen. Hell. I4. 8 Isoc. Evag. 6Jl;
Beloch, GG III.2. 226 - 230; ---
11).. Diod. 11). 110.$; the principal reason for the Peace of 375/1). 
was the king's desire for Greek mercenaries to- fight against 
Egypt. Plod. 15 38.1 - 2;
15. Xen. Hell. 1). 8.15;
16. Tod. II. 123 9 - 11;.
1?. Perhaps also motivated by the alliance offered by Glos, the 
rebel Persian admiral, to Sparta, Diod. 15 38.1 - 2; T.T.B. Ryder. 
CQ ns 13 (1963) 10 5 - 1 0 9 ;
18. Tod. II. 123 12 - 15;
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also b© argued that before 379 Persia was still involved in the
protracted struggle against Evagoras and that she therefore felt
unable to intervene in Greece herself. When in 378 a counter
to Sparta appeared in the shape of the Confederacy the king was
able to use it for his own ends.
A further twist in Persian diplomatic strategy might be
inferred if one postulates that the king knew that the autonoray-
clause, though in the short-term advantage to Sparta, was a
potential source of contention between the various Greek states.
He was probably aware of the Theban and Argive resistance to it 
19in 392 7 and from his own experience in the 3 9 0*s realised that
20the interpretation of autonomy gave much scope for disagreement
Thus the enforcer of autonomy was likely to encounter as many
problems as successes in the long run. Isocrates saw that
autonomy could split the Greeks into warring factions and that
21the king would use it for this purpose” .
If these arguments make it more likely that Persia supported 
autonomy in Greece from a calculation of its direct effects on 
the Greek balance of power, there is still some truth in the Spartan 
assertion that the autonomy-clause would by its implications 
prevent any Greek state from attacking Persia, as can be seen from 
the docility of the Greek states toward Persia for twenty years 
after 3 8 6. Moreoever the principle of autonomy itself, once
conceded by the major Greek powers, was likely to weaken in the
pp
long run the domination of Greek affairs by one or two states .
The Persians may have realised this also. ,
In 386 the king correctly calculated the effect of his 
support of Sparta: the other Greek states at war were forced to
19. Xen. Hell, k 8.15;
20. See previous chapter;
21. Pane£. 1 7 , 120f., 13^;
22. Ryder, KE, 120f.;
agree to the terms arranged by him and Antalcidas. Furthermore
the King1s Peace threatened a continuation or Sparta-Persian
collaboration against any state not abiding by the terms.
From the king’s point of view, however, continuing involvement
in Greece was undesirable and enforcement of the settlement
*23
would devolve on his partner . Even so the king did not 
specify Sparta as the enforcer of the terms, allowing himself the 
possibility of abandoning Sparta should the need arise. When 
in 367 it became apparent that to continue to, support Sparta 
would involve him in Greek affairs more than to support Thebes 
the king switched his allegiance2 "^. In this volte-face may be 
seen the clearest evidence of Persia* s attitude toward the 
King’s Peaces: they were no more than a device by which the king 
could secure his own objectives while playing as little part as 
possible. Hence the almost unanimous rejection of the terms of 
the Peace announced at Thebes in 367 when the Greeks 'were made 
aware of the king’s cynicism .
Persis.’s_role in the Common Peaces 386 - 382
If It is conceded that after 388 Persia played a less 
frequent role in Greek affairs, those occasions on which she did 
Intervene or become involved may be significant. The first clear 
Persian action toward Greece after 386 was the Instigation of a 
Common Peace In 375/^ but the sources supply meagre information 
on the reasons for this intervention and on the form it took2^. 
Diodorus is more convincing on the reason for the king’s 
Initiative - namely that he needed mercenaries for his campaign 
against Egypt 2® - than’on the details of the terms.
2 3 . Antalcidas may also have realised-this when negotiating 
the settlement;
21;. Xen. Hell. 7 1.27, 33*^.;
25. Xen. Hell. 7 1.39f.;
26. Plod. 15 38, 1 - 2 ;  FGrH 328 (Philochoros) F 1f>1, and Jacoby* 
commentary; cf. Xen. Hell. 6 2.1; Nepos, Tlmotheus. 2.2;
27. S. Lauffer, Hlstorla 8 (1959) 315 - 348; Ryder, KE 12i;ff.;
28. Diod. 15 3 8 .1;
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The stipulation of the autonomy of the cities was a
restatement of the King1s Peace and the clause on the absence
of.garrisons was merely an extension of the same principle. It
seems unlikely that the king would of his own accord have
initiated this clarification or the alleged splitting of the
hegemony between Sparta and Athens. This division does however
affect Persia because by accepting it she conceded to Athens a
formal position as hegemon by sea in Greece. This was not
necessarily against Persian interests since the Athenian
Confederacy was sworn to abide by the King’s Peace of 3 86^  and
by allowing Athens a measure of power in Greece alongside Sparta
the King would be ensuring Athenian support of the settlements
of 386 and 375* The king therefore had no reason to believe
10that Athens intended to use her sea-power against him^ .
The provisions of this Common Peace can be seen to be 
acceptable to Persia but this does not prove that they were drafted 
by the Persian king. Diodorus’ emphasis in his report of the 
Peace is on the king’s wish that the Greeks should cease fighting 
so that he could recruit mercenaries, not on the king’g 
participation in the negotiation of the provisions^. It 
therefore remains obscure what role Persia played in the formulation 
of the Peace. On the analogy of the King’s Peace of 386 it might 
be argued that the king ’sent down’ a rescript restating the 
earlier Peace or alternatively invited the Greek cities to 
re-affirm their allegiance to the King’s Peace. It seems unlikely 
that this rescript should have contained the clauses about the 
expulsion of garrisons or the division of the hegemony so it 
must be postulated that these were added to the settlement after 
negotiations between the Greek states. Would the king of Persia
29. Tod. XI 123;
30. The king continued to use Athenian admirals after 375:
Ps-Dem XLIX 25ff.;
31 . Plod. 15 38.1 - 2;
have sworn to these clauses? If so, were the additions to his 
proposed settlement forwarded to Susa for approval before he 
assented to them?
There are only two sources which attest to the king swearing 
a treaty: the inscription of the alliance between Athens and 
Chios.in 3 8I4.
... tt)V e[Jp^ vT)V xal ttjv <pi ]Xiav xal towS" opxouS' xal [to.5’ oucaS" 
cuvO'nxajS'SIS'topocev pactXeu[5"] xa[i ’Ae-qvaroi xal] Aaxe6atpoviot 
xai o 1 aXXo [ 1 EXXtjv£ 5”], • • • ^
f... the peace-treaty, the assurances of friendship, the 
oaths and the existing treaties which were sworn to by the king, 
the Athenians, the Lacedaimonians and the other Greeks ...» 
and Dionysius of Halicarnassus* allegation that the king swore 
to the Peace of 371:
... t?)v etpQVTjv *A0Tjvatoi *ce xal Aaxe6aipovtoi xat pactXcuS'
33oopocav , • •.
. f... The Athenians, Spartans and the king swore the Peace ...» 
Whatever the value of the second passage^, the evidence of 
the inscription seems to indicate that the king actually swore 
to the treaty of 3 8 6 . Whether the king swore by proxy through 
envoys or personally in Susa, either before or after the Greeks, 
is unknown .
After 375 the king may have participated in the Peace made
at Sparta in 371^, but Diodorus* narrative is at this point 
37suspect and Xenophon doe3 not mention Persian participation,
32 - Tod II, 118 9 - 12; also Tod II, 123 12 - 15; cf. Xen.Hell.
7 1 / 5 9 7  . -----
33* Dion. Hal., Lysias, 12;
3^ + • Ryder (KE 127 n.2) rejects it out of hand. It is not unlikely 
that Dionysius should either have been in error or to have been 
slipshod in his use of »swearing* to indicate participation.
35* See below pp 206 - 212 for discussion of royal negotiations;
3 6 . Plod. 15 5 0 cf. Xen. Hell. 6 3; Ryder, KE 127f.;
37* S. Lauffer, Hist or la 8 (1959) 315 - 3i+8; Diodorus* reason for 
the king* s interference (15 50.*j.) *he observed that Greece was 
again disturbed* is unhelpful and unconvincing;
(though Xenophon was also silent about the king*s part in the 
Peace of 375/7)* Dionysius of Halicarnassus (in the passage 
quoted above) clearly believed that the king did swear to this 
Peace and If his information derived from Philochoros^ then it 
should confirm Persian participation. However Persia had nothing 
to gain from a Peace in 371 and it would have to be assumed that 
if Persia were involved .it was at the request of a Greek state, 
presumably Sparta. Against this view it may be averred that 
Antalcidas was in Persia at the time of the negotiation of the 
terms of the Peace, which makes Persian involvement In the treaty 
unlikely. Moreover, Callistratus, in arguing Athens* support of 
a Peace, refers to allegations that the Athenians were afraid 
of possible Persian interference which Is Improbable If the king 
were already participating in the negotiations^.
The outcome of this Peace was shortlived since It was 
rullified almost immediately by the battle of Leuctra and It Is 
generally agreed that Persia was not a partner In the Peac.e made 
at Athens after Leuctra^. The restatement of the principles of 
the King*s- Peace in this settlement^ shows that the Greek states 
still found It a useful framework for agreement even when the 
king himself was not a sponsor.
In 368 Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Dascylium, sent Philiscus 
of Abydo3 to try to effect a Common Peace In Greece^-2, the first 
known occasion after the battle of Leuctra on which the king* s 
attitude to Greece was tested. Despite Thebes* recent success
38. so, with confidence, Jacoby, FGrH Illb (supp.) I, 522, 11+ - 17; 
also Cawkwell* s note to Xen. Hell. 6 3*18 In the Penguin translation 
(1978) p. 322; .. -
39. Xen. Hell. 6 3.12; ' .
I4-O. Ryder, KE ?0 - 724-5 131-133;
1+1. Xen. Hell. 6 5*2; probably referring to the Peace of either 
386 or 375777 Ryder, KE, 127;
72. Xen. Hell. 7 1.27; Plod. 15 70.2; Dem. 23.11+1;
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Philicus supported Sparta in her attempts to retain Messene 
which Thebes -wished to make autonomous- Thebes therefore refused 
to co-operate in the Peace and was made to appear the obstacle to 
a settlement, allowing Philiscus to give Sparta military and 
financial aid^.
It has been suggested^* that Philiscus* mission was prompted 
by the Spartans who still relied on their special relationship 
with Persia dating from the King’s Peace of 386- This suggestion 
has the merit of explaining why the king should have intervened 
of his own accord when there was no pressing reason to do so 
unless he was already troubled by the revolt of some of his 
western satraps^. It has also been suggested that It was not 
the king but Arlobarzanes himself who ordered the mission in 
order <to ascertain possible Greek support If he revolted^ •
Against this it can be argued that Diodorus ascribes the mission 
to the king - though this may be merely a less complete version 
than Xenophon* s - and that If Ariobarzanes were responsible for 
the mission It seems unlikely that he would have tried to promote 
a Peace^.-
If Sparta did request the king to interfere in 368 the 
initiative proved to be to her ultimate disadvantage because the 
Thebans sent a mission, led by Pelopidas, to Susa and were able 
to convince the king of the desirability of supporting them and 
abandoning the Spartans^. Pelopidas could point not only to the
I|-3 - Ibid.
See Ryder, 105 135 n.1;
Most recently on the satraps* revolt: M.J. Osborne, Historia 
22 (1973) 515 - 551 and.id. GrB 3 (1975) 291 - 309; --------
lj.6 . Osborne, Historia 22 (1973) 539 n.111;
k 7 • Plod. 15 70-2; Xen- Hell. 7 1-27; or that the Greeks would have 
respected it unless he were making It in the king’s name;
I4-8 . Xen. Hell. 7 1 -33 - 37; Diod. 15 81.3; Plut. Pel. 30f.;
Artax. 2 2 3 - 5 ;  Dam. 19 137;
Thebans1 past pro-Persian sympathies and her opposition to 
Agesilaus* invasion of Asia Minor in 396 but also her present 
pre-eminence in Greece as a result of the victory over Sparta at 
Leuctra^. It is hardly conceivable that the king -was not aware 
before 367 of the Theban victory or of its effect on Greek 
politics and yet Philiscus 3till supported Sparta in 363. This 
suggests that the king saw no reason to commit himself to a new 
Greek hegemon although his partner, Sparta, was now less 
influential. Had the king been concerned solely to support the 
strongest military power in Greece, he would have changed 
allegiance previously. In Itself this shows that Greece was 
per se only of peripheral concern to the king and that It was 
only under the Influence of the SatrapsT Revolt or the obligations 
of the King’s Peace that the king interfered in Greece.
Thus despite the greatly-altered balance of power in Greece 
the king continued to implement the twenty year old King’s Peace. 
Only when deputations from many Greek states had travelled to 
Susa and put their cases to him directly did he choose to take 
account of'Thebe3 * newly-won hegemony. The consequent change in 
royal policy was simply to replace Sparta with Thebes as Persia’s 
agent in Greece. This drastic transfer of allegiance was followed 
by a new Common Peace -whose terms, drawn up by the king on Theban 
advance, included not only the usual autonomy-clause but also an 
explicit recognition of Messene’s Independence. This blow at 
Sparta was matched by the inscription of Amphipolis amongst the 
king’s allies and a command to Athens to beach her navy, thus
effectively denying Athens’ rights to her former colony-*0. These
provisions show that Thebes intended to pursue her local political 
objectives through the Peace she was sponsoring just as Sparta 
had done from 336 to 371
When the terms of the new Common Peace were proclaimed
at Thebes they were rejected by nearly all Greek states-*2 . The
i+9. Xen. Hell. 7 1 .3^ 1*.; Plut. Pel. 30;
50. Xen. Hell. 7 1.36; Dem. 19 137; also Xen. Hell. 7 1 .^11;
£1 . Hence Spartan bitterness, G.L. Cawkwell, CQ ns 26 (1976)
62 - 81j. esp. 7 1 ;
52. Xen. Hell. 7 1.39f.;
-  2 0 1 ;  -
* I 
* ft
Thebans persevered in imposing their will on the other Greeks
and in 3 66 terms were proposed which embodied the principal
features of the previous settlement except that Athens was now
favoured with recognition of her claims to Araphipolis and the
Chersonese-^ . It is not clear whether this Peace of 366 was a
5krevival of the previous year1 s terms'^ or a renegotiation 
involving a new royal letter^ . In any case the Spartans were 
now isolated and the Peace enjoyed a brief period of acceptance 
by most Greek states.
Persian conduct during the period from 371 to 366 shows the 
lack of interest the king felt in Greek affairs. When after 
Leuctra he might have been expected to at least negotiate a new 
Common Peace taking account of recent developments he did nothing 
and even persisted in his now outmoded policy of supporting 
Sparta. Even more reprehensible in the eyes of the other Greeks 
was the change of allegiance to Thebes and the support of her 
policies despite the injustice and hostility this caused. The 
king’s policy was revealed as a cynical protection of his own 
interests with no thought for Peace in Greece^.
The antipathy of most Greek states toward the Persian 
attitude on the Common Peaces - as revealed by the cynical 
transfer of allegiance to Thebes in 367 - persisted even though 
in 366 at least some Greek states were forced by circumstances 
to. acquiesce in a form of Common Peace^. Greek anger was shown 
in 362 when the Greek states made a Common Peace without referring 
to Persia and without Persian participation^ . This purely
53. *©n. Hell. 7 I* . 6 - 10; Plod. 15 76.3;
54. Ryder, KE 137?? .;
55. G.L. Cawkwell, CQ ns 11 (1961) 80 - 8 6 ;
56. Isoc. Archldamus. 26ff.;
57. Xen. Hell. 7 4*6 -10; see Cawkwell, CQ ns 11 (1961 ) 80 - 86 
for the Peace of 366;
58. Plod. 15 89.1; Plut. Ages 35.3f.; Polybius, 4 3 3 .8f.; cf. Plod. 
15 90.2 and Ryder’s comment, KE 144;
- • •V'x • *' •
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internal Common Peace may, however, have alerted not only the king 
but also the rebel satraps to the new feeling in Greece at this 
time. The so-called 1 Satraps’ Decree* records the answer of 
the Greeks to an envoy *from the satraps* and has been dated to 
soon after the Peace of 362^. Whether these are loyal satraps 
working on the king’s behalf or rebels hoping to gain Greek 
support is disputed but the inscription clearly states that the Greeks 
had no wish to be involved either for or against the king and 
would only act in self-defence. If the decree was an answer to 
overtures from the king it is ironic that the Greeks who had 
courted the king’s favour for 25 years should now be spurning 
his attentions while he, who had involved himself In Greek 
affairs as little as possible, should be courting their support.
It has been seen that between 386 and c3&2 the king of
Persia initiated negotiations with the Greek states on only one
occasion - the Peace of 375/b when he needed to recruit
mercenaries from the warring Greeks. On only three other
occasions did he allow himself to be formally involved in Greek
settlements or negotiations toward a settlement: in the Peace at
Sparta in 371 (possibly), in Philiscus* mission (perhaps
promoted by Spartan overtures) and in 3&7 and following year
when he was responding to intense pressure from several Greek
states. The king showed no inclination to interfere in Greece
either after 380 when he might have feared the growth of Spartan
power or after Leuctra when the balance of power was altered.
He had no Interest in securing peace between the Greek states^ 0
61nor in expending funds on supporting one state or another • In 
these respects Persian pdlicy toward Greece over this period 
was highly successful; Persian rights in Asia Minor were not 
challenged, the Greek states paid heed to the King’s Peace and
59. Tod II 11;5; on the satraps’ revolt: M.J. Osborne, Historia 
22 (T9 7 3 ) 515 - 551 and id., Gr.B. 3 (1975) 291 - 309s"Tiyaer7‘KE 
1 l).2f f .; —
60. Isocrates, Panes■ 121, 1314., 175f.; also Xen. Hell. 1 5*9;
61 . Xen. Hell. 6 3.12;
-  2 0 6  -
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62to the king* s wishes , there was debilitating warfare between 
many Greek states for much of the period and all this was 
achieved with the minimum of Persian involvement^.
After the change of Persian allegiance from Sparta to Thebes 
in 367 Persian motives were revealed to be entirely cynical. By 
362 the Greek states had abandoned the king as a useful partner 
in or guarantor of Common Peace and did not therefore protect his 
interests in the Peace of that year^. Even so they did not 
oppose him openly, preferring to remain neutral^. The king, 
however, had forfeited the advantages of the King’s Peace and its 
renewals; no longer had he a commitment that the Greeks regarded 
Asia as his nor did he possess the special status which the 
King* s Peace had conferred on him and which he had utilised to 
such good effect for over twenty years.
Persia’s negotiations with Greece
The conference at Susa in 3&7 saw t*16 important change of
allegiance from Sparta to Thebes^. It highlights an important
feature of Persian diplomacy: the role of the king and ‘his central
authority in negotiations and policy-making.
Walser has argued that the audience was the concrete
expression of the king’s participation in administration and 
67
diplomacy . As such it was an important ceremony demonstrating 
the personal power of the king and emphasising his ultimate control
62. e.g. the recall of Chabrias from Egypt: Plod. 15 29.3; Nepos, 
Chabr. 3*1;
6 3 . Ryder, KE l|/lf.;
6 4 . Ryder, KE 86 and
65. Tod II 1 4 5;
66. Xen. Hell. 7 1 *33 - 37; Diod. 15.8.3; Plut. Pel. 30f., Artax. 
22.3 - 5;~5em. 19.137; --- -----
6 7 . G. Walser, Audlenz beim perslschen Grosskonig, (Zurich, 1965); 
also id., in Festgabe^FTans ~*vonl?reyerz.. I TedTE? Walder, 19 6 7 )
189 - 202 andJT HoFstet'ter T n lTrstofra Einzelschrift 13 (1 9 7 2)
(ed. G. Walser) 94 - 107;
of affairs in contrast to the highly bureaucratic royal admini­
stration. Audience -with the king was a carefully guarded 
privilege for foreign envoys or refuges^ and indicated the
importance of the mission. Envoys who found favour with the king
69were lavishly entertained , a result of not only their personal
impact on the king but also the political importance of their
state, witness Antalc Idas’ disgrace after Leuctra and the
70corresponding success of Pelopidas .
As a corollary of the king1s ultimate authority his
subordinates1 exercise of power was restricted. The king’s
decision was final and could not be opposed without grave
71consequencesj even by satraps' . Accordingly satraps were, on 
occasions, nervous of overstepping their authority and preferred 
to refer decisions to the king even though delay might prejudice 
the achievement of their objectives^2 . Sometimes, however, it 
was to a satrap’s advantage to invoke the necessity of referring
7*3
problems to his master . If a satrap took a decision, acted on 
it and later found that he was out of step with the king he was 
severely disciplined^. -
When on the strength of Antalcidas’ proposals Tiribazus
supported Sparta, with whom Persia was at war, he was relieved of
7^his command. According to Xenophon'*^ Tiribazus could not act 
openly on Sparta1 s behalf without the authority of the King(&veu
68. e.g. Themistokles: Plut. Them. 27; Conon: Nepos, Con. 3 2 - 
Justin 6 2.12ff.; cf. RE sub foonon 1326;
69. Athenaeus 1*8 D - E, 229F, 2J1B; Plut. Pel. 30, Artax 22; 
Dlod.T[r~7$TH - 6; --- -----
^'
7 0 . Plut. Artax 22;.-'
71. Polaenus, Strat. 7 21.5;
72. Plod. 15 1^ 1 .2, 5;
7 3 . Thue. 8 29.1; Xen. Hell. 3 2.20, 3 .
7 k -Xen. Hell. 1; 8.16f.;
75. Ibid.;
paciXea)5’ peTa Aax£6aijio\HU)v Yev®c®al °^x a-ccpaXeS’ auxy ) so he gave
money to Antalcidas in secret and then went to the king to refer
the matter to him. Even so he was not allowed to return to his
satrapy and was replaced. His error cannot have been to give
money to the Spartans for Tithraustes had bribed Agesilaus to
leave Lydia in 395^. It is possible that Xenophon is not being
wholly honest about the extent of Tiribazus* support for Sparta
since Philochoros records a royal rescript which is probably to
be associated with the events of this year and Tiribazus may,
therefore, have issued a rescript in the king* s name without
77consulting him first '. The circumspection which both Tissapherne
and Pharnabazus had shown between lj.10 and 395 about making formal
commitments on behalf of the king suggests that Tiribazus* sending
of the rescript was unusual^.
The freedom with which Tissaphernes negotiated the three
agreements with the Spartans in lj.12 to lj.11 may indicate that
Tiribazus* action was not unparalleled but whereas Tissaphernes
and Sparta were not at war in lj.12, Tiribazus and Sparta were in 
79392 . Ev.en so there is no hint, in Thucydides that any of
Tissaphernes* settlements required ratification by the king 
whereas it is clear that Tiribazus knew he had to obtain the king* 
approval before taking any overt steps to aid Sparta. It has 
been suggested that the king may have been indirectly involved 
in the third treaty between Tissaphernes and the Spartans but
76. Xen. Hell. 3 1+.26;
77. Suggested by G.L. Cawkwell, CQ ns 26 (1976) 2 7 0 - 277, nn. 
13,25 and his discussion„of Philochoro3* evidence therein; also 
Jacoby* s commentary to the Philochoro3 fragment (FQ^FI 328 F1lj.9;) 
Xenophon*s silence about royal rescripts is well Enown, e.g.
Xen. Hell. 6 2.1;
7 6 . See previous chapter 167 - 172, 178 - 182;
79. Thuc. 8 18, 37, Sk;
even this suggestion, requires the dangerous assumption that a
8 0royal envoy could act as proxy for his master in negotiations ,
unless the third treaty was in effect dictated by the king and
was not negotiated, just like the King*s Peace of 3 8 6. If this
last suggestion is correct it would mean that Tissaphernes* two
earlier treaties were merely drafts which were sent to the king
along with recommendations from the satrap and, perhaps,
ft 1
representation from the Spartans • The hypothesis that 
settlements were either dictated by the king and implemented by 
his representative or, when initiated by subordinates, had to be 
referred to him for ratification.fits both the situation in 397 
when Dercyllidas and Tissaphernes referred their proposals for 
a peace to their respective home authorities and also Tithraustes* 
proposals ^ tp Agesilaus in 395 which almost certainly emanate from 
the king.
From these two cases it can be argued that a representative 
of the king might bring down with him an agreement formulated 
and approved by the king which was not capable of revision by 
his subordinates and that proposals made to 3atraps had to be 
passed on for approval by the king. Tissaphernes* first two
* treaties* would then be working drafts for the use of the
8 ft
Spartans and not final settlements . Perhaps In the same way 
Tiribazus accepted Antalcidas* proposals in 392 as the basis of 
an agreement and in order to help Sparta make the other Greeks 
accept them issued a *royal rescript* In which they were embodied®^
80. Lewis, S&P 102jf\; 107;
81. Lewis, S&P 101ff. believes the king was aware of the Spartans
grievances over the first two treaties;
82. Xen. Hell. 3 2.20; 3 ij-.25f, and Lewis, S&P 1^2;
8 3 . G. de Sanctis, Studl dl Storla della Storlografica Greca (1951)
8Ij.. Philochoros* statement about a royal rescript might be
misleading but I prefer to believe, with Cawkwell CQ ns 26 (1976)
276f. n.25, that Philochoros does refer to the negotiations of 
392 which were In effect a King* s Peace manque;
/
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The reason Tor his fall from favour would not then be a breach
of satrapal authority so much as a miscalculation of the king1s
8cj _ ..
desire to defeat the Spartans .
With such uncertainties attending settlements negotiated
through satraps and the possibility that they might also be
playing a double game, it is understandable that Greek envoys
tried to gain audience with the king himself. It is also
significant that important policy decisions were almost always
taken in conf erences with the king. Thus the embassy of Boiotios
o/
which finally determined Persian strategy toward Greece , the
negotiations in 387 leading th .the King’s Peace®^ and the
conference at Susa in 3 6 7^ were all turning points in Persian
strategy and all were with the king himself. Similar direct
interventions by the king were the Peace of 3 7 $ / k ^ > the decision
in 397 to build a fleet with which to challenge the Spartans in
the Aegean and the promotion of Tissaphernes to commander-in-
90chief in the west at the same time .
The intervention of the king in 397 may also help to define
further a .satrap’s freedom of action. In 2+01 on his return to the
west Tissaphernes was hostile toward the Ionian cities - whom he
perhaps regarded as rebels - and in defence they called in the 
91
Spartans7 . Between 2+01 and 398 there is no indication that, the 
king became involved in this provincial dispute, not even when in
8£ • so Lewis, S&P 12j.6;
8 6 . Xen. Hell. 1 l+.1f.;
87. Xen. Hell. 5 1.2Sfif.j
8 8 . Xen. Hell. 7 1.33 - 37;
89. Plod. 15 38.1 - 2;
90. Xen. Hell. 3 2.13; Plod 
6 1.7 - 97~Beloch, GG ITT-?
91. Xen. Hell. 3 1 .3ff.;
1^ 39.1; Plut. Artax. 21; Justin
/
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398 Dercyllidas left Tissaphernes* satrapy and invaded
92Pharnabazus* province . However in 397 following representations 
from Pharnabazu^- perhaps concerned because his satrapy was now 
involved in what had been Tissaphernes* dispute - the king
9kintervened to take in hand the problem on his western borders •
An assertion made by the Ionians at Sparta in c398 - and 
certainly before they knew of the royal intervention - supports 
the hypothesis that the quarrel between Tissaphernes and the 
Ionian cities was not a matter for the central administration: 
Ticcocpepvei, ei pouXoixo, &9ievai auTovopouS” xaS" *EXXt}\h 6clS' 
tcoX e i IT. ^
...*(it was) in Tissaphernes* hands, if he wished, to allow
the Greek cities autonomy...*
Thus Tissaphernes in his role as satrap could have granted
autonomy but, after 3 9 7* presumably, he was not free to do so.
Further support may be found in Tithraustes* condemnation in
395 of Tissaphernes as the cause of the trouble between Persia
and Sparta - an implicit accusation that he had mishandled the
96Ionian cities and thereby involved Sparta7 . Despite the 
understandable inclination of the king to place all the blame 
on Tissaphernes it is unlikely that Tithraustes could have made 
his comment if Tissaphernes had been known to be acting in 
accordance with previously-dictated policy emanating from the king.
92. Xen. Hell. 3 1.95
93• It seems odd that if Pharnabazus instigated the change of
policy in 397 Tissaphernes should have been given the supreme 
command (Xen. Hell. 3 2.13;); perhaps Diodorus (1k 39) has 
confused Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; cf. Polyaenus 1 £4.8 . 3  and 
I.A.F. Bruce, Hist. Comm.en. on Hell. Oxy. GG with Hell. Oxy.
9k* Plod. 1 k • 3 9 .1; and note 90above;
95* Xen. Hell. 3 2.12; it is not clear whether autonomy is here
thought of as de jure or de facto;
96. Xen. Hell. 3 k*25; cf. Lewis, S&P 121f. who believes that these 
remarks concern Tissaphernes* jurisdiction as a private landowner 
not in his office of satrap;
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The dichotomy between satrapal and royal jurisdiction is 
not clear but it seems that purely provincial problems could be 
dealt with by the satrap on his own. When, however,the central 
authority was invoked the satrap1s freedom of action was subject 
to scrutiny and limitation. It is significant that in none of 
the substantive treaties or truces arranged by satraps with the 
Greeks from Jj.12 to 386 did they revoke or limit any claim the 
king had on territory or commit him to any action. Even when 
in l±OQ Pharnabazus was constrained to come to terms with the 
Athenians attacking Chalcedon he avoided prejudicing the king*s 
rights over the city, merely allowing the Athenians to exact
07
tribute on a temporary basis as a personal gift from himself 1.
These examples lead to the conclusion that while satraps
had considerable de facto authority - in their own administration
just as in diplomacy - they were not allowed to make any de jure
commitments on behalf of the king. This dichotomy between the
practical and the theoretical conduct of diplomacy is a constant
theme running through from the Assyrian period. Similarly, as
was seen above, though the king was unwilling to concede autonomy
de jure by a treaty he was not unwilling to give a certain amount
98of self-government to the Asiatic Greeks . In effect the king 
reserved for himself the right to commit his administration to 
any major foreign policy decision and consultation with him was 
far more likely to produce results that negotiations with satraps.
97. See previous chapter and M. Amit, AC (1973) Jj-3& - k5 7 ;
9 8 . S9e previous chapter and Tod. II 113;
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Assyrian Diplomacy
Despite the inconsistency of the two major types of source,
i.e. royal inscriptions and letters, a problem most clearly 
demonstrated in the relations of Mita with Sargon (13 - 38), 
the examination of diplomatic relationships and terminology 
has revealed several significant aspects hitherto not studied 
in detail. Diplomacy has been shown to be essentially communication 
between rulers, effected on most occasions by the transmission 
of letters in the hands of envoys but sometimes, in important 
instances, accomplished personally (80 - 82). The recognition 
of one ruler by another, expressed by the Assyrians in the
y  y
ceremony of sa'al sulme (l;3f., 5 0f.,), was an accepted diplomatic 
protocol and essential -to continuing friendly relations, whether 
between vassal and suzerain or independent rulers (1;7, 53)*
Failure by a vassal to maintain communication with his overlord 
was a breach of their relationship, as the case of Gyges shows 
(39 - 1;6), and similarly the passage of envoys between 
Independent rulers was essential for friendly intercourse 
(Ij.7, 5$). Within the over lord/vassal relationships the loyalty 
of the vassal was rewarded by the overlord with beneficence 
and protection from hostile forces (76 - 80). It seems likely 
that considerations of practical diplomacy and the Assyrian 
concept of t&btu as a reciprocal benefit (101; - 116) obliged 
the Assyrian king to respond In this-way although he neither 
would nor* could have .committed himself in treaty-obligations.
The two studies of foreign diplomats ( 117 - 123 ) 
show that the Assyrians were unfamiliar with the concept of 
a- professional diplomatic corps. Envoys seem to have been 
high administrative officials deputed to fulfill particular 
missions, on completion of which they returned to their home. 
Permanent diplomatic missions were unknown (117 - 123).
The Assyrian concept of 1 friendly relations* with another 
power, usually expressed by a derivative of salamu, embraced 
both associations between independent rulers and the formal 
ties of overlord and vassal (8 7 - 109). Sulummu u tubtu was 
a particularly emphatic expression of such a relationship (97). 
Failure to be on friendly terms (salamu) automatically implied
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hostility (nakaru), but not necessarily a state of war (9 8 - 
103). In legalistic terms there seems to have been no formal 
intermediate status between the two.
Two major themes have been traced throughout the study.
The first, the Assyrian will to establish political supremacy 
wherever possible, led to the second, the problem of 
reconciling this political ideology with the exigencies of 
diplomacy. (The relations of Mita and Sargon 13 - 38) are 
a good example). Independent powers, notably Urartu and Elam, 
were not incorporated into the system of political dependence 
on Assyria and therefore possessed a different diplomatic status. 
(l;7ff., 57ff.*). A measure of parity was grudgingly accorded 
both Elam and Urartu (2;9* 51* 57) but it is significant that 
Assyria developed no formalised vocabulary for parity-status 
until the use of ibru by Ashurbanipal (60 - 63). Even so 
Assyria aimed to reduce these powers to dependent status as 
the ubilation over the submission of Urartu shows (1|9, 51*
5 W f  •) • Prom her relationships with these independent powers 
it is clear that Assyria preferred to dictate the course of 
diplomatic relations and sought to do so whenever possible.
Persian Diplomacy
Several significant features of Persia's formal contacts 
with the Greeks have been established :
1 ) Persian diplomacy was underpinned by the premise that 
in any diplomatic relationship the Persian king was the 
superior party and that he dictated the terms of agreements 
with other nations (e.e. 135 - 12^ -6) 0
2) A corollary of this ideologically-conditioned theory 
was a distinction between on the one had de iure International 
agreements and on the other de facto solutions of international 
problems. The former were in theory dictated by the king 
alone and were not negotiated. In reality diplomatic 
Intercourse often brought about a negotiated agreement but 
even then Persia did not acknowledge the role of the other
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partner (King’s Peace : 180 - 182, 193 - 206).
3) Major changes of policy emanated from the king alone 
and when subordinates undertook the resolution of international 
problems their actions had* to be ratified by him. (2 0 6 - 
212, 178 - 180).
1;) Persian diplomacy was, notwithstanding these oonflicts 
between Ideology and practical diplomacy, flexible and 
responsive to changing circumstances.
It is also important to note the phases of Persian 
diplomacy because they demonstrate not only the evolution 
of Persian policy toward the Greeks but also the underlying 
insistence on Persian supremacy. Down to 1;80 Persia attempted 
to impose unconditional settlements on all Greeks. During 
the campaign of 2;8 0/i;79 concessions to some cities, notably 
Athens, were made In the hope of achieving a swift end to the 
war. However, the king dictated these conditions without 
consulting the Greeks themselves. Prom I4.78 to i;13 Persia 
could not impose her terms on the Greeks and it may be 
significant that only two vague statements of Persian policy 
toward Greek states and a (disputed) treaty are known from 
this period. Persia was loath to enter into agreements 
which she did not dictate and her attitude may have been 
conditioned just as much by ideology as by sound political 
sense. After 1;13 Persia regained the Initiative In 
diplomacy with the Greeks and held it down to the middle 
3 6 0 ’s . It was only once in serious danger and that was in 
the 390’s when Agesilaus was a threat in Asia Minor.
It is more difficult to distinguish the influence of 
Greek on Persian diplomacy or vice versa but it is of interest 
that on no occasion does there seem to* have been a failure to
o
understand, at a simple level, diplomatic messages „ The points 
of similarity between the conduct of diplomacy by both sides
1• The Peace of Kallias
2. Persia’s complaint about Sparta’s diplomatic messages in 
cl(.30 was concerned with their Inconsistency, not their 
incomprehensibility, Thuc. 1; 50;
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make this unsurprising : neither had evolved the institution 
of the professional diplomat and therefore envoys were 
administrators, politicians or impoartant figures in government. 
Similarly there was no concept of permanent representation-^ 
and envoys undertook individual missions as special commissions. 
The authority of envoys and administrators was circumscribed 
by both Persia and Greece. Just as the Athenian assembly did 
not normally allow its envoys to make agreements without 
ratification by the assembly so the satraps of the king had 
to obtain his approval of any terms they negotiated^. Even in 
the case of a se mingly non-Greek symbol, the giving of earth 
and water, the meaning was sufficiently clear for it to have 
been accepted without difficulty.
At the level of diplomatic theory, however, the Persian 
refusal to subscribe to agreements between equals was an 
important source of division between the two parties^.
Moreover the Persians never seem to have taken note of 
contemporary Greek theories of alliance. It has been shown 
that despite the almost wholly Greek drafting and phraseology 
of agreements with Persia the content of the document reveals 
an approach to diplomacy far different from that of the 
Greeks. The King*s Peace and its renewals are, in a modified 
form, just as much expressions of the paramount position of 
the king as Artaphrenes* ultimatum to the Athenians in c$70.
The positive influence of Persia on Greece or vice versa* 
in the field of diplomacy is difficult to isolate. If there 
is influence then it is more likely to be visible in the period 
between i;13 and 386 since Persia1 s involvement with the Greeks 
as more intensive then than at any other time. The necessity
3* Proxenoi in the Greek world are not true diplomats.
Ij.. The Athenian submission at Sardis in c510 can now be seen in 
a different lights Even if Arthaphrenes understood that the 
competence of the envoys was limited he may not have realised 
that the assembly could disown or ignore their actions.
5. The Peace of Kallias would be an important exception if it 
were accepted as a formal treaty.
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of reaching an agreement involving the King on the one hand and 
the Greeks as a group on the other brought to fruition the 
concept of the ’Common Peace’ although the Greeks had been 
approaching the idea before 3 8 6 . The use of to indicate
the formal instrument of bringing into existence the state of 
peace might be connected with Persian influence since it seems 
unlikely that the near eastern tradition of treaties in 
perpetuity^ could have been reconciled with the normal Greek 
method of ending hostilities by means of a truce. Moreover 
it can be added that the prevailing near eastern pattern was 
for an alliance or agreement of friendship to terminate a 
period of hostilities. Thus on two grounds the Persians may 
have found the concept of easier both to understand and
to accept. The Greeks-themselves were attempting to foster 
greater cohesion in the Aegean in this new type of settlement 
and may have been more willing to take note of Persian 
suggestions or demands in this area.
The fundamental difference in attitude to international 
relations between Persia and the Greeks finds its clearest 
expression in the dispute over autonomy. Persia’s attitude 
remained unchanged from the middle of the sixth to the middle 
of the fourth century : formal limits on the king’s authority 
over his subjects were completely denied but a measure of de 
facto local freedom was tolerated and even supported. At 
the very most the Greeks would have gained the semblance of 
autonomy but would still have paid tribute. Persian insistence 
on tribute-payment may have been misunderstood by the Greeks 
but the symbolism of tribute as an acknowledgement of dependence 
on another power can hardly have been alien to the Greeks of 
Thucydides’ day.
It is a measure not only of Persian persistence and 
diplomatic skill but also of Greek weakness and division that 
from ij.13 to 386 the Persians pursued openly the aim of regaining 
Asia Minor and of forcing the Greeks to subscribe to this policy.
6. Persian examples of this : Andoc. 3.29; L.L. Orlin, loc. cit.;
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Even more to Persia’s diplomatic credit is the achievement of 
these objectives and the maintenance of Persian influence over 
Greece for a further twenty years with a minimum of intervention.
Comparison of the conclusions on Assyrian and Persian 
diplomacy reveals important similarities. These are 
particularly significant because they illuminate the theory 
of diplomacy in the near east and the attitude toward foreign 
states of Assyria and Persia.
Whereas certain key features of Assyrian diplomatic 
practice have been established it has proved possible to 
isolate only a bare outline of the practice of Persian 
diplomacy. There are recognizable similarities, e.g. diplomacy 
as a branch of administration, lack of professional diplomats 
or permanent foreign representation, but even with a greater 
understanding of Persian diplomacy and the ability to make 
more comparisons with Assyria the importance of such comparisons 
for a study of diplomacy as a system of ideas would be limited. 
Similarities in the theory of diplomacy, most notably the 
assumption of superiority and therefore sovereignty over all 
other nations, are striking. This vital element in diplomatic 
ideology could have led to severe problems in the conduct of 
diplomacy if enforced rigorously. Both Assyria and Persia 
achieved a resolution of this awkward conflict between theory 
and practice by making a clear distinction between de iure 
and de facto diplomatic acts. Thus it was possible for Assyria 
to accord both Urartu and Elam equality in terms of diplomatic 
protocol but the relationship does not seem to have been 
ratified in a treaty. Similarly the Persian kings may have 
given Athens and Argos an impression of equality but there is 
no evidence that such a status received formal endorsement.. 
Wherever possible the policy of preeminence was introduced
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by the institution of tribute-payment and the ceremonies 
surrounding its delivery. In Assyria these ceremonies were 
symbols of supremacy over the other states and of the 
dependence of the tribute-bringer. Persia’s stress on the 
tribute of the Greeks of Asia Minor is almost certainly a 
reflection of its importance in diplomatic as well as financial 
terms.
It seems more likely that these similarities in ideology 
are the result of Persian borrowings from, or imitation of, 
the tradition of near eastern diplomacy exemplified by 
Assyria than that they are an -uniform response to similar 
circumstances. The perpetuation of traditional diplomatic 
theory and practice from Assyria to Persia,.either directly 
or via Babylonia, suggests that they formed a vital and 
useful way of ordering international relations but whether it 
also implies a common ideology of empire is open to question.
In the past the concept of empire in the ancient near east 
has been taken for granted but recently interest in the 
identification of the characteristics of empire has revived^. 
Significant new evidence has been added in this study to the 
debate on empires and greater insight could be gained by a 
more detailed and systematic analysis based on the conclusion's 
presented above. It can be seen, however, that in so far as 
Assyrian and Persian diplomacy is an ’imperial’ diplomacy it 
represents a tradition different from and at variance with 
the Greek concept of international relations.
A comparative study of the kind undertaken above and 
based on widely differing types of evidence, leads of necessity 
to less than precise conclusions in terms of synthesis. It 
is not at present possible to prove an- indisputable connection 
between Assyrian and Persian diplomacy but valuable insight 
into both have been gained. The substantiation of important
7. Power and Propaganda (Mesopotamia 7, ed. M.T. Larsen,
Copenhagen 1979);
see also Imperialism in the ancient world (edd. P.D.A. Garnsey 
and C.R. Whittaker, Cambridge 1979)
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aspects of Assyrian diplomacy allows a more reliable 
perspective on Assyria1s international relations. Similarly 
in setting Persian diplomacy in the context of the near 
eastern traditions which it inherited most clearly from 
Assyria new and valid evidence has been introduced into the 
consideration of a key issue in the interaction of east and 
west between the sixth and fourth centuries B.C. Further study 
of, for example, Persian treaties in the light of Assyrian 
international agreements and of the connection between 
Assyrian and earlier patterns of diplomacy will make more 
intelligible both the sophisticated inter-relations of near 
eastern states and their contacts with the classical world.
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